GEORGIA: PREVIEW OF FM VASHADZE'S MEETING WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000715

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: PREVIEW OF FM VASHADZE'S MEETING WITH THE
SECRETARY

REF: A. A. TBILISI 0697

B. B. TBILISI 0711

C. C. TBILISI 0681

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).


1. (C) The Secretary's April 14 meeting with Georgian FM
Grigol Vashadze will help reassure Tbilisi that efforts to
improve relations with Russia will not come at the expense of
the U.S.-Georgia relationship. The meeting is an opportunity
to recognize the restraint and flexibility Georgia has shown
in recent weeks and months in regards to the territories and
to urge the Government to maintain a measured path and
commitment to democratic reforms, especially in light of
recent protests. Vashadze is a moderate voice among
President Saakashvili's key advisors. We expect that
Vashadze will raise concerns about recent Russian naval
maneuvers in the Black Sea and its reinforcement of troops in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, seek the Secretary's support at
the UN for the renewal of the UNOMIG mandate in a way that
supports Georgia's territorial integrity, and want to discuss
the structure of a framework to implement the U.S.-Georgia
Charter signed in January. We also expect Vashadze to
express appreciation for the excellent Georgia language in
the NATO Summit communique and the strong statements that the
Secretary and the President have made in support for
Georgia's territorial integrity, long-term development and
security.

Vashadze - Professional Diplomat with a Plan


2. (C) Foreign Minister Vashadze plays an increasingly
important role in Georgia's government. He was appointed
Foreign Minister in December 2008; prior to his appointment
he served briefly as the Minister of Culture and as a Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is a professional diplomat
who began his career in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and
received his undergraduate degree from the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations in 1981. He speaks
English fluently. He has proven extremely capable in
thinking strategically about Georgia's relations with Russia,
and during the August conflict was the Georgian Government's
main conduit with Russia, primarily through direct contact
with Deputy FM Karasin. At 50 years of age, Vashadze is
significantly older and more experienced than his ministerial
colleagues. He is known in Tbilisi as a cultured and
respected figure, a reputation enhanced by his marriage to
Tbilisi's prima ballerina Nino Ananiashvili. Vashadze,
although unquestionably a Georgian patriot, has both Russian
and Georgian citizenship.


3. (C) In a discussion on April 11, Vashadze indicated that
he plans to raise three issues with the Secretary, as time
permits:

-- Russia's increased military activities. As reported
separately (ref A) Post has credible reports of increased
military presence by Russian forces in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. OSCE and EUMM monitors told us that the Russians
have more troops than usual in the Akhalgori Valley during
mid-April. The number could reach as high as one and a half
battalions, or 1,500 troops. In addition, recent reports
from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from UNOMIG
indicate that Russian forces are strengthening their presence
in the Black Sea. Both sources indicate that Russian naval
and aviation forces, to include landing shipments and
military transport, are moving from Sevastopol into the
central part of the Black Sea. Georgia believes Russia's
moves were timed to coincide with opposition-led protests
that began April 9 in Tbilisi calling for Saakashvili's
Qthat began April 9 in Tbilisi calling for Saakashvili's
resignation.

-- Territorial conflicts/Geneva talks/UNOMIG. Vashadze will
seek concrete steps to implement our commitment to Georgia's
territorial integrity. He will urge the United States to
support another round of Geneva talks taking place as soon as
possible. On the UNOMIG mandate extension, he will seek our
support for several key provisions: (1) monitoring of all
military forces within reasonably broad, symmetrical
restricted weapons zones on both sides of the cease-fire
line, and in the Upper Kodori Valley; (2) monitoring of local
law enforcement forces and, over time, co-location of armed
UN police in the restricted weapons zones; (3) facilitation
of voluntary, safe, and dignified return of internally
displaced persons and refugees; (4) monitoring and promotion
of human rights; (5) coordination and facilitation of the
unhindered provision of humanitarian aid; and (6) promotion
of political dialogue between the parties. He will urge the
United States to support a broad mandate that can be extended
to South Ossetia in the future, while avoiding deeply
contentious negotiations over access and security

TBILISI 00000715 002 OF 003


arrangements. Our preliminary thinking as we approach the
June 15 expiration of the UNOMIG mandate is along the same
lines.

-- Bilateral framework. He will urge the United States to
support a framework for implementing the U.S.-Georgia Charter
on Strategic Partnership and will likely ask that the
Administration commit to leading such a commission at the
most senior level possible. The agreement was signed in
January 2009 and committed our governments to a broad range
of cooperation. The structure for implementing this
agreement remains under interagency consideration and the
Georgian side hopes that we will head this commission at the
senior level or above.

The Political Backdrop to Your Meeting


4. (C) Your meeting with Vashadze will take place against
the backdrop of ongoing protests in the streets of Tbilisi
(ref B). Members of Georgia's non-parliamentary opposition
have called for President Saakashvili to resign, citing his
failure to prevent conflict with Russia and, in their words,
his failure to produce meaningful democratic reform. The
protest leaders have largely been unsuccessful in building
public momentum for their calls for Saakashvili's resignation
and have failed to coalesce around lesser demands for an
increased role in governance. The numbers of protesters has
been dwindling and the upcoming Orthodox Holy Week will keep
the numbers down. The Ambassador has urged all sides to
engage in a dialogue and has urged restraint on the part of
the protesters and police in order to avoid potential
provocations.


5. (C) Since the August conflict, tensions along the de
facto boundaries with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia have remained high. Eleven Georgian Ministry
of Internal Affairs police officers have been killed and many
others wounded since the conflict by sniper fire, IEDs and
other attacks. For the most part, as advised by the United
States and the Europeans, the Georgians have not used force
to respond to these attacks. International monitors still do
not have access to South Ossetia and the UN's movements
within Abkhazia are limited. The Georgians signed an MOU
with the European Union's Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in which
they voluntarily and unilaterally limited their military
presence near the territories and provided full transparency
on all military movements. To date, the
Russians/Abkhaz/South Ossetians have not responded in-kind.
In an Orwellian attempt at deflection, the Russians have
accused Georgia of increasing tensions by building up forces
near the territories, but all
three international monitoring organizations -- EUMM, OSCE
and UN -- have found that the reverse is true: the Georgians
are keeping forces away from the territories, while the
Russians, Abkhaz and South Ossetians maintain a significant
presence near the administrative boundaries.


6. (C) Hopes for international mediation efforts, as well as
continued monitoring on both sides of the administrative
boundary lines, have not been realized. Although the
February round of Geneva talks produced a modest success, a
proposal for a dispute resolution mechanism, the Abkhaz and
South Ossetians are now backing away from the idea. The
Russians meanwhile suggested a late date -- June -- for the
next round, which would be too late to discuss new OSCE and
UN mandates, both of which expire in June, although in a
recent discussion in Moscow it appears that the Russians may
be willing to meet in May. This would be a welcome
development.
Qdevelopment.


7. (C) As a result of Russia's invasion, President
Saakashvili has re-committed his administration to a new wave
of democratic reform and we are strongly encouraging him in
this effort. The new Prime Minister, Nika Gilauri has
responsibility for the overall direction of the economy as
well as the implementation of the $4.5 billion in pledges
from the international community to support Georgia following
the conflict. These pledges include $1 billion from the
United States. We have informed FM Vashadze and the
Government that the final part of the USG $1 billion pledge
-- about $242.5 million -- was requested from Congress as
part of the Afghanistan/Iraq supplemental request that went
to the Hill on April 10.

Afghanistan


8. (C) FM Vashadze will reiterate Georgia's offer of a
battalion to support coalition efforts in Afghanistan. This
offer of support by President Saakashvili made to Ambassador
Holbrooke follows Georgia's announcement that it plans to
send a company of troops to support a French deployment to

TBILISI 00000715 003 OF 003


Afghanistan. Georgia is waiting for us to provide details.
In addition, Georgia has offered use of its ports, air space
and other facilities to help compensate for the closure of
Manas Air Base.

NATO and Georgia


9. (C) Vashadze will express his appreciation for the NATO
Summit Communique language -- which he and others have told
us was much more supportive than they had imagined was
possible (ref C). Vashadze and President Saakashvili are
grateful for unambiguous statements from you, the President
and the Vice President on Georgia's territorial integrity.
The Georgians are hard at work on a new Annual National Plan
(ANP) for NATO that they see as crucial to Georgia's
membership hopes. Vashadze will urge the United States to
remain actively engaged on NATO membership issues. Recent
rumors in the NATO international staff and among some Allies
have suggested that Georgia's commitment to the NATO
membership process has waned since the August conflict. In
fact, Georgia is working hard to make the reforms and meet
the challenges necessary for membership.
TEFFT