GEORGIA: GOOD AND BAD NEWS FROM EUMM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000674

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: GOOD AND BAD NEWS FROM EUMM

REF: A. MOSCOW 778

B. TBILISI 484

C. GENEVA 183

D. TBILISI 638

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. In a recent trip to Moscow, EU
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) representatives heard that Russia
and South Ossetia have taken steps toward establishing an
Incident Prevention Mechanism (Abkhazia still awaits a new UN
mandate). According to the EUMM, Russia expressed interest
in another Geneva meeting in late May, which is better than
the current plan of June, but still late. The EUMM refuted
further Russian and South Ossetian allegations of a Georgian
military buildup. Although the Russian military finally
provided local contacts to EUMM, it showed little interest in
responding to other EUMM concerns, and in preparation for
Georgian opposition-led protests on April 9 in Tbilisi, it
reported that Russian forces in Akhalgori will be doubled in
strength. EUMM determined that an armored vehicle could have
prevented the fatality that occurred in the March 29 IED
attack, and the Interior Ministry is now using COBRAs more
widely; EUMM monitors themselves were shot at on March 26 in
Ditsi. Although the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs
requested that EUMM staff monitor the April 9 protests,
Brussels decided against it, so only a liaison officer will
observe developments from inside the Ministry; EUMM will send
extra patrols to the boundaries that day. Steps by Russia
and, to a lesser extent, South Ossetia toward cooperation are
welcome, but the real test will be April 9, when many fear
provocations near the boundaries. We will have to pay close
attention to the buildup of Russian forces in the Akhalgori
Valley, which is the portion of South Ossetia nearest
Tbilisi. End summary and comment.

THE (MOSTLY) GOOD NEWS


2. (C) At the weekly EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) briefing
for diplomats on April 2, Deputy Head of Mission Gilles
Janvier and his staff offered an update of the situation on
the ground, and Political Advisor Rosaria Puglisi offered a
readout of the trip she, Head of Mission Hansjoerg Haber, and
EU Special Representative Pierre Morel recently made to
Moscow (ref A). Janvier reported that the EUMM has
established more regular contact with local Russian
commanders, which EUMM has been seeking in vain for several
months. Puglisi reported that the Russians gave positive
signals on the implementation of the Incident Prevention
Mechanism negotiated at the February round of the Geneva
talks (refs B, C). Not only did the Russians name two
liaison officers as Russia's representatives to the Mechanism
(although they did not yet have phone numbers),but the South
Ossetians did so as well. The Russians indicated they hoped
to hold an initial session of the mechanism by April 15.
Puglisi was planning on meeting with Georgian Deputy Foreign
Minister Giga Bokeria in the near future to discuss details;
the Georgians have not yet agreed to some proposed
arrangements, including the South Ossetian de facto
preference to hold the session in so-called "no-man's land"
on the administrative boundary in Ergneti. Two other
unresolved issues are the establishment of an agenda and a
chair for the sessions. (On April 6, Puglisi gave PolOff an
update: Morel tried to organize an initial, "technical"
meeting for April 8, but the South Ossetians refused, saying
they want to monitor the results of the April 9 protests
Qthey want to monitor the results of the April 9 protests
first. She did not expect any further developments until
after the protests.)


3. (C) Puglisi reported that the Russians expressed openness
to another round of Geneva talks, although no earlier than
the second half of May, after the UN Secretary General issues
his report on Georgia on May 15. This would be earlier than
the June timeframe mentioned at the February Geneva talks,
and before the UN and OSCE mandates both expire in mid-June,
but not as early as the co-chairs (and the U.S.) were hoping.
The Russian interlocutors told Haber and Morel that the
Incident Prevention Mechanism should be in place before the
next round is held.


4. (C) In response to a South Ossetian allegation of a
buildup of Georgian special forces in Dirbi (southwest of
Tskhinvali, just outside the administrative boundary),
Janvier reported that the EUMM dispatched a patrol to the
area on March 31 and found no evidence of unusual activity.
It did find two unamed COBRA light armored vehicles in
nearby Gogeti, but these were well within the limits agreed
to in the EUMM's MOU with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
(See additional discussion of COBRAs in paragraph 8.)
Puglisi reported that in Moscow, Haber and Morel both pushed

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back hard on Russian allegations of a Georgian military
buildup along the administrative boundary lines (ABLs) and of
inflammatory statements by Georgian officials. Puglisi
explained that the Russians seem to have a different
understanding of the "adjacent areas" than the EUMM.
According to the EUMM, in the areas closest to the ABL --
i.e., between the first and second rows of Russian
checkpoints established after the August war -- only Georgian
police are present, no military. In the next zone, which
Puglisi described with a new term, the "neighboring area,"
Georgian military forces are present, but in restricted
numbers. Then, in the rest of Georgian-controlled territory,
the Georgian military is unrestricted. Such bases as Senaki
fall into this third category, and Puglisi suggested that
Russian allegations of a "buildup" may count such areas,
which in the EUMM's determination are too far from the ABL to
give Georgia an offensive capability against the territories.
According to Puglisi, the Russians also criticized the
EUMM's MOU with the Georgian MOD, saying it "did not conform
to Russian military requirements" and expressed concern that
"the Georgians could withdraw from the MOU at any time."

THE BAD NEWS


5. (C) Janvier also reported that local Russian commanders
had informed him that Russian troops will be doubled in
strength in the Akhalgori Valley in preparation for April 9,
when the Russians apparently perceive an increased risk for
provocation. Replacement troops will be sent into the area,
but the current troops that would normally be rotated out
will remain; the commanders called these "defensive, not
offensive" forces. They did not say what the total numbers
would be. Janvier noted that EUMM monitors had also received
reports from Georgian Interior Ministry forces of large
numbers of military equipment moving from Tskhinvali toward
Akhalgori on March 30: 25 Ural trucks, 1 T-72 tank, and 4
BMP-2 armored personnel carriers. (Note: The OSCE received
similar reports from Georgian police on March 31 and April 1
that may refer to the same movements. On April 1 the OSCE
also received reports of recent movements of large numbers of
vehicles inside South Ossetia to the southwest of Tskhinvali,
in the Dzvileti-Bagiani-Gobozani area (north of Gogeti) End
Note.).


6. (C) During the talks in Moscow, Haber raised some specific
concerns with Major General Proshkin, Chairman of the CIS
Military Department of the Ministry of Defense. He proposed
identifying an EUMM staffer as a liaison officer with the
Russian military, who could visit Russian counterparts on a
regular, perhaps weekly basis; Proshkin did not respond.
Haber asked when Russian forces would be leaving Perevi.
(Note: Haber has discussed this topic on several occasions
with Russian Ambassador to the EU Chizhov, who has
acknowledged that Perevi is outside South Ossetia; Haber has
agreed to refrain from repeating public calls for the
Russians to withdraw, so that the Russians can do so quietly,
hoping to minimize embarrassment. Although the EUMM has
refrained from public comment on Perevi in recent months,
Russia has not withdrawn, and the EUMM seems to be losing its
patience. End Note.). Proshkin answered that Perevi holds
"strategic importance," and furthermore that Russian forces
would have left, if only Georgian forces were not present in
the vicinity in "massive numbers." Haber also asked about
Qthe vicinity in "massive numbers." Haber also asked about
Russian helicopter flights along the ABLs. Without admitting
that the flights crossed into undisputed Georgian airspace
(both the EUMM and OSCE determined they did),Proshkin
acknowledged the flights, explaining them as necessary to
monitor the Georgian "military presence."


7. (C) A member of Janvier's staff reported that on March 26,
an EUMM patrol was sent to investigate reports of shooting in
the area of Ditsi, just outside the administrative boundary
east of Tskhinvali. Upon arrival, the patrol members heard
three bursts of fire pass above their heads. No one else was
in the vicinity, so the patrol determined that the shots were
aimed at them, most likely intended as a warning, and
departed the area.


8. (C) The staff member also provided an update on the
investigation of the March 29 IED attack (ref D). He
described the road where the attack occurred, which leads up
a hill to a Georgian Interior Ministry checkpoint, as not a
public road, so that a civilian vehicle would be unlikely to
use it -- although an EUMM or OSCE monitor vehicle might.
Showing a sketch of the road and the placement of the IEDs,
he showed how they were clearly designed to function
together, first to set off an initial explosion, then to
target responders. EUMM and Norwegian People's Aid (a
demining NGO) both determined that both IEDs that went off
used MON-50 (Claymore-type) anti-personnel mines. Showing a

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photograph of the pickup truck damaged in the first
explosion, he demonstrated how the mine's shrapnel tore holes
in the unarmored vehicle -- including in the spot where one
police officer was fatally wounded. EUMM determined that, if
the vehicle had been armored, no one would have died. In
response to this incident, the Interior Ministry has begun
using COBRA vehicles more widely, including on actual
patrols. Janvier acknowledged that, although the EUMM has
argued in the past that the COBRAs were unnecessary because
none of the previous 11 fatalities could have been prevented
by armored vehicles, it could no longer make such an argument.

PLAN FOR APRIL 9


9. (C) Although the Interior Ministry had asked the EUMM to
help monitor the April 9 protests, and the EUMM was planning
on sending four teams, Janvier announced that Brussels
decided that monitoring internal political developments was
outside the mission's mandate, so the EUMM would not send
monitors to the protests themselves. The EUMM has a regular
liaison officer at the Interior Ministry, and he will be
present in the Ministry on April 9 to observe developments.
(Note: The Ministry has invited other diplomatic
representatives to be present as well; PolChief will
represent Post. End Note.) EUMM does plan to send extra
patrols out to the boundaries on April 9, because many fear
that the Georgian Interior Ministry will draw police away
from the de facto "boundaries" to monitor the protests, and
forces to the north may try to take advantage of the
resulting vacuum.

COMMENT: ALL EYES ON APRIL 9


10. (C) Russia and South Ossetia's moderate steps toward
cooperation are encouraging, but they represent little more
than gestures until the Mechanism is actually up and running.
Furthermore, with South Ossetia indicating it will not
participate until after April 9, and Russia building up its
forces in preparation for April 9, it is clear that we must
get past a major hurdle before we can make any real progress.
The decision in Brussels not to monitor the protests is
disappointing, because the monitors could have provided a
helpful international deterrent to excess by all sides, but
the EUMM's extra efforts along the de facto "boundaries" will
hopefully have some deterrent effect there.
TEFFT