GEORGIA: ALASANIA STILL BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000644

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ALASANIA STILL BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD
PLACE

REF: A. TBILISI 618

B. TBILISI 463

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Head of the opposition Alliance for
Georgia ("Alliance") Irakli Alasania requested a meeting with
the Ambassador on March 30 to discuss plans for the April 9
protest. Alasania has been in discussions with the UNM
ruling party regarding a possible dialogue to overcome the
current standoff and defuse the plans of the more radical
opposition to remain on the streets until Saakashvili
resigns. Specifically, Alasania indicated he has been trying
to convince the non-parliamentary opposition to limit the
April 9 protest to one day. Alasania hoped that a strong
one-day showing would give the non-parliamentary opposition
more leverage in negotiations with the GOG, although he
feared the non-parliamentary opposition had become a hostage
to its own rhetoric and many would not agree to negotiate
anything, but the resignation of the President. End Summary.


2. (C) Comment: Privately, Alasania is engaged in trying
to broker some way out of the impasse, though he seemed less
than optimistic that there was any good way out of the
"mess". He is well aware of the difficult political
situation he faces trying to strike a moderate course while
maintaining credibility among an increasingly radical group.
So far Alasania has managed to remain on the fence without
alienating either GOG officials willing to compromise or the
non-parliamentary opposition, but this window appears to be
closing. In spite of his very moderate, measured, and
thoughtful tone in private, Alasania recently signed on to a
non-parliamentary opposition manifesto calling for President
Saakashvili's resignation and new elections. Various GOG
representatives have pointed out Alasania's tendency to talk
a good game privately but to turn around and publicly support
the most radical demands of the non-parliamentary opposition.
Nevertheless, the GOG remains willing to negotiate, at least
for the time being. It is unclear how long the GOG will
engage on Alasania's private waffling and public ultimatums.
Alasania's plan is to pursue a one-day protest followed by a
call for dialogue. Even Alasania admits he is unsure whether
he can get the non-parliamentary opposition to agree to a
one-day protest much less a unified negotiating agenda.
Alasania appears to understand he has little room to maneuver
and is hardly enthusiastic about any of his options. End
Comment.

These Guys Are Irrational About April 9


3. (C) Alasania told the Ambassador that he had been
attempting to limit the April 9 protests to one day.
Alasania reasoned that showing that the non-parliamentary
opposition could organize 100,000 people and peacefully
disburse them would send a strong message to Saakashvili.
Alasania said that he thought he was making some headway with
the non-parliamentary crowd, but he was unsure if they would
agree to a one-day event. So far, only fellow members of his
Alliance, David Gamkrelidze (New Rights) and David
Usupashvili (Republicans) had signed on to the plan.
Alasania said that he understood Saakashvili would not
resign, and the non-parliamentary opposition needed to have
an alternative plan. Alasania lamented that most in the
non-parliamentary opposition took it on faith that the
protests would bring Saakashvili's government down.


4. (C) According to Alasania, his non-parliamentary allies
were almost "suicidal" and completely unrealistic; none of
them had given any thought to an end game other than
Saakashvili resigning and them being swept into power.
QSaakashvili resigning and them being swept into power.
(Embassy Note: Poloff has heard rumors that a contentious
issue between the non-parliamentary opposition is between Eka
Beselia (United Georgia) and Koba Davitashvili (Party of the
People) as to who will get to be Prosecutor General when
Saakashvili resigns. Alasania ally, David Usupashvili
recently told Polchief that he needed to start focusing on
economic policy issues, apparently convinced that he would be
holding a high ranking office soon. End Note.) Alasania
reiterated that he had explained to his non-parliamentary
allies that Saakashvili was unlikely to resign, and that they
needed an alternate course of action. Alasania said his fear
was that April 9 would fail, in that a small radical rump
group of non-parliamentary opposition would protest
indefinitely, weakening their message, alienating potential
supporters and making a farce of the whole protest. Alasania
told the Ambassador that he saw the wisdom in the GOG
strategy of leaving the non-parliamentary group alone to
discredit themselves. Alasania expressed hope that he would
be able to get at least some of the non-parliamentary crowd
to think about alternatives, but also said many -- he
especially cited Levan Gachechiladze -- were becoming more
radical by the minute.

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One Day of Protests - Then What?


5. (C) Alasania was unsure what he would do if the
non-parliamentary opposition did not agree to his idea of a
one day protest. Alasania sought out the Ambassador's views
on how he could "get out of this mess" and inquired if the
USG would play the role of a guarantor in any
GOG/non-parliamentary dialogue. The Ambassador replied that
he would do all he could to facilitate dialogue but could not
solve Georgia's internal political problems. Alasania said
he understood but asked rhetorically a number of times during
the conversation, "what is the way out of this mess?".
Alasania said that if the protest went as he hoped and was
limited to one day, he would present a demand to President
Saakashvili for dialogue. Alasania said he understood the
futility of presenting another ultimatum to the President.
(Embassy Note: Despite his private misgivings about the
utility of ultimatums, on March 27 Alasania signed on to the
non-parliamentary manifesto calling for Saakashvili's
resignation and new elections. End Note.)


6. (C) When the Ambassador inquired as to whether Alasania
would be in a position to speak on behalf of the
non-parliamentary opposition, Alasania said he did not know.
The Ambassador noted that this dynamic sank GOG discussions
with the non-parliamentary group in the past. Alasania
answered that he understood that he had to be able to deliver
something in order to negotiate with the GOG. Alasania said
he hoped he would be able to convince a sizable group to
follow him but was doubtful some of the more radical members
would agree. (Embassy Note: Alasania, while understanding
that an ultimatum for the President's resignation was a
non-starter, did not appear to have clearly thought out what
his demands would be. End Note.)

GOG Ready to Talk but Is Alasania Ready to Walk the Walk


7. (C) Alasania indicated that he was unsure if President
Saakashvili was serious about a dialogue, but had recently
met with Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze and discussed a
"deal". Baramidze said that the UNM was open to a number of
issues (constitutional reforms - democratic reforms writ
large) and hinted that early parliamentary elections were on
the table, but not for 2009. Baramidze said that Alasania
would have to publicly distance himself from the April 9
protests. Alasania declined as he believes politically he
can not simply walk away from the April 9 demonstrations.
Alasania also said he was not going to accept UNM,s dictated
terms without a more concrete understanding of what UNM was
ready to deliver.


8. (C) Alasania told the Ambassador that he and Baramidze
agreed to speak again soon. Ambassador suggested that
Speaker of the Parliament David Bakradze might also be a
useful interlocutor as soon as Bakradze returns from abroad.
Despite the contact between Alasania and GOG representatives,
Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria expressed a view to EUR
DAS Bryza and the Ambassador that is likely held by many in
the GOG. Bokeria said that Alasania represented himself
privately as a moderate willing to talk but never missed a
chance to call for Saakashvili's resignation in public.
Bokeria previewed the GOG position (which Baramidze
presented) that if Alasania wanted to talk, he needed to
present a moderate public face as well. Bokeria noted that
although Alasania was in contact with the GOG about a
dialogue, his public actions belied his private words.
Nevertheless, Bokeria said the GOG remained open to
discussions.
TEFFT