GEORGIA: IEDS KILL ONE, WOUND SEVERAL; TENSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000638

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: IEDS KILL ONE, WOUND SEVERAL; TENSIONS
RISE

REF: A. 09 TBILISI 096

B. 08 TBILISI 2176

C. 09 TBILISI 484

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. On March 29, two roadside IEDs killed one
and wounded six Georgian police officers outside the village
of Dvani, in undisputed Georgian territory just outside the
South Ossetian administrative boundary. This was the first
fatal incident along the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
administrative lines since the January 16 sniper attack in
Knolevi (ref A) and follows several weeks without serious
incidents. Even during this period, however, tension has
remained high along the boundary, with local villagers
subjected to the sound of regular shooting and explosions,
especially at night. Even before March 29, military
movements north of both boundaries were raising concerns.
The planned April 9 protests have also caused worry, as
locals fear police forces will be drawn away from the
boundaries to cover the protests, and malicious forces will
move into the vacuum. The Georgian government is concerned
that this might be the first in a series of new provocations
and has sought the international community's assistance in
pushing for the establishment of the incident response
mechanism agreed to in Geneva. End summary.

IED INCIDENT


2. (SBU) The following account is based primarily on the
OSCE's findings. On March 29 at about 0845 on a secondary
road near Dvani (southwest of Tskhinvali, in undisputed
Georgian territory outside South Ossetia) leading from the
main road to a Georgian checkpoint, a MON-50 (Claymore-type)
anti-personnel mine exploded as a Georgian Internal Affairs
Ministry pickup drove past. Five people were wounded,
including one who later died in the hospital. Several
minutes later, a second vehicle arrived safely to provide
assistance. Fifteen to twenty minutes after the explosion, a
Hyundai SUV carrying the local chief of police arrived, at
which time a second IED detonated, wounding the chief of
police and one other passenger. The Internal Affairs
Ministry determined the first device was triggered by a
tripwire; thus any car going past could have triggered it.
The Internal Affairs Ministry and the OSCE determined the
second device was triggered by remote control; the Internal
Affairs Ministry, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and the
OSCE all determined it was targeted at those who responded to
the initial blast. At a briefing for the diplomatic
community, Shota Utiashvili, Internal Affairs Ministry
spokesman also announced that two other unexploded devices
were found at the site: a booby-trapped grenade and a jumping
mine, which could have served either as the initial attack,
on either a car or a pedestrian, or the secondary attack on
the respondents.


3. (C) Dvani is across the administrative boundary from
Muguti, where South Ossetian de facto authorities alleged
Georgian forces mounted mortar and gun attacks on March 24
and 25-26. Georgian police officers and local villagers in
the Dvani area confirmed to the OSCE that they heard firing
and explosions on the Ossetian side at the times of the
alleged attacks, but could not confirm any attacks being
launched from the Georgian side, and the OSCE could not
access the Ossetian side to assess the situation. On March
27, however, a South Ossetian contact told the OSCE that the
Q27, however, a South Ossetian contact told the OSCE that the
allegations were "propaganda" on the part of the de facto
authorities. One OSCE monitor therefore downplayed the
likelihood that the March 29 incident was a response to the
alleged Georgian attacks, although he could not rule it out.
The March 29 incident occurred very close to the location of
a November 10, 2008 IED incident, which killed two Georgian
police officers and wounded three (ref B).

GENERAL TENSION


4. (SBU) Although this incident marks the first fatality
along the South Ossetian and Abkhaz boundaries since January
16, the situation has remained tense in both areas.
Villagers report hearing firing, especially at night, on a
regular basis, and sometimes explosions as well. In many
cases, the sounds are never fully explained. In other cases
monitors have been able to identify the source of the sound
and determine it did not have an overtly malicious intent --
but the impact on the villagers is the same. On March 26,
for example, OSCE monitors in Dvani received reports from

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local police of "intermittent, intense assault rifle fire and
machine gun fire" from Muguti -- this was the same day the
South Ossetians alleged a Georgian attack. Other police
downplayed the sounds, however, calling them "not more
intense than usual." Also on March 26, OSCE monitors
received reports in Odzisi of "several explosions" from
across the administrative boundary, which Russian and
Ossetian forces subsequently explained as explosive ordnance
disposal operations. On March 28, UNOMIG monitors received
reports near the boundary of "30 shots from an automatic
gun," an "explosion of a grenade," and "four-five signal
rockets," and 20-30 more shots from an automatic gun.


5. (C) One OSCE monitor told EmbOff on March 27 that he and
his colleagues had perceived a general increase in tension
over the past few weeks. In addition to the regular sound of
shooting, he mentioned more frequent military movements on
the South Ossetian side of the boundary as a key factor.
Russian forces have explained many of these to international
monitors, in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as associated
with force rotations, but they nevertheless have apparently
served to reinforce to local villagers the continuing
presence of troops and military hardware. The OSCE monitor
also said the planned April 9 protests were worrying people
outside South Ossetia; they are concerned that Interior
Ministry forces will be drawn away from the area to provide
security during the protests, and malicious forces will then
seek to exploit the relative lack of law enforcement to cross
the boundary and cause trouble.

INCIDENT PREVENTION MECHANISM NEEDED


6. (SBU) In a briefing for the diplomatic corps on March 30,
Deputy Foreign Minister Nalbandov and Internal Affairs
Ministry spokesman Utiashvili provided details on the March
29 incident, placing the blame squarely on Russia as the
occupying power and noted an MFA official statement about the
incident that included language to this effect. They also
expressed the concern that, after several weeks of no serious
incidents, this one may be the first in a series of
deliberate provocations designed to increase tension and
obstruct any diplomatic efforts to improve the security
situation. They expressed their appreciation for public
statements condemning the attack made by the EUMM and the
OSCE. They also emphasized the useful role an incident
prevention mechanism could play in this kind of situation --
indeed in preventing such a situation -- and noted that, of
the participants in the Geneva process, the EU, OSCE, UN,
United States and Georgia have all expressed a commitment to
and taken steps to implement the mechanism, while Russia has
not (ref C).
TEFFT