GEORGIA: TIME TO MOBILIZE ON NEW UN MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000625

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS UNSC UNOMIG KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: TIME TO MOBILIZE ON NEW UN MISSION

REF: A. USUN 266

B. TBILISI 484

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. UN Special Representative Johan
Verbeke offered the U.S., French and German ambassadors
additional details on his ideas for a new UN mission in
Georgia, as well as a readout of recent trips to Washington,
London, Moscow and Prague. He urged western countries to
weigh in as soon as possible, because he is preparing his
report now, which will inform the Secretary General's May 15
report to the UNSC (required by UNSCR 1866). He expressed
concern about Russian willingness to accept key elements of
any reasonable plan, and urged western countries to prepare
to apply pressure to Russia directly. The Ambassador noted
that Verbeke's ideas provided a good security regime, but
insufficient human rights protection -- and a human rights
flare-up was just as likely as a security incident to ignite
a broader crisis. We agree, however, that now is the time to
coordinate with our friends and take the initiative to shape
a productive proposal. End summary and comment.

VERBEKE'S THOUGHTS


2. (C) On March 25, Verbeke briefed from a revised non-paper
from the Peacekeeping Office in New York, a copy of which we
received March 27 (see paragraph 4). He expanded on ideas
already summarized in an earlier non-paper distributed in New
York (ref A). Verbeke urged the western countries to offer
feedback as soon as possible, because he is in the process of
preparing a report to the Secretary General (SYG) that will
form the basis of the SYG's own report to the UNSC, due May

15. Verbeke expected to finalize his own report by mid-April.


3. (C) The additional details on his ideas include the
following.

-- Regarding the two zones mentioned in the earlier
non-paper, the first would be between two and a half and six
kilometers wide on either side of the Abkhaz administrative
boundary line (ABL). Although he had first supported the
narrower version, his military experts informed him that a
wider boundary would be required because certain weapons of
concern have considerably more than a five-kilometer range
and could cover the 2.5 kilometers on both sides of the ABL.
Although Verbeke would therefore support a wider zone, he
understands that the width would have to be negotiated -- and
two and a half kilometers would be the minimum to be
effective. (The revised non-paper does not include a range,
but settles on 6 kilometers.) The second zone, a "confidence
zone," would be between six and eight kilometers wide, which
would reach Zugdidi and Gali, but not the military bases in
Senaki or Ochamchire. In addition, there would be a
restricted naval zone extending 12 kilometers into the Black
Sea and 8-12 kilometers on either side of the ABL.

-- The inner zone would limit the sides to no armed forces,
no heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery or anti-aircraft
guns, and only a specified number of armored personnel
carriers (APCs),and the latter would not be allowed to carry
any weapons. The outer zone would also exclude tanks,
artillery and anti-aircraft guns, but allow guns up to 80 mm
in caliber. There would also be restrictions on air
movements over the zones, including for reconnaissance (see
paragraph 6).

-- Rules of notification would have to be established for all
Q-- Rules of notification would have to be established for all
parties. This would presumably also apply to Senaki and
Ochamchire.

-- Some kind of accommodation would have to be reached for
what Verbeke called "border guards" and law enforcement
officials, who would provide security along the ABL and
inside the zones and ensure secure and free movement of
people across the ABL. He proposed that such officials
should not be allowed to carry heavy weapons.

-- UN monitors would continue to monitor the inner zone
actively, as they do now. There would also need to be a
provision for monitoring the Kodori Gorge, although perhaps
not as frequently as along the ABL.

-- One question Verbeke posed is whether the ABL should
extend as far as the Russian border. He was inclined to
oppose such a move, although he was still pondering the
issue. He said doing so might make it easier to link the

TBILISI 00000625 002 OF 003


Kodori Gorge to the rest of the UN mandate's territory, but
it could also solidify a sense of the ABL as an established
border and give Russia the sense that it can completely seal
Georgia off from its Abkhaz territory.

-- Although some have raised the idea, Verbeke did not think
that the EU and UN monitoring missions would merge, but would
retain independent roles.


4. (SBU) Th afternoon of March 27, Verbeke provided post
with a copy of the revised non-paper (entitled "NON-PAPER:
elements for a security regime and UN role," provided
electronically to EUR/CARC). It provides additional details
on the above proposals, including concrete limits on troop
levels, but reflects the same basic approach. Verbeke
informed the Ambassador that copies of the revised non-paper
were provided to USUN, and the SYG himself was currently in
Moscow and would provide Russia with a copy.

RUSSIA'S RESPONSE


5. (C) Verbeke said that he had discussed some of these ideas
in Moscow with Andrei Kelin of the MFA and MOD personnel and
received the following responses. In general terms, the
Russians said they accepted the principle of symmetry, but
Verbeke noted their specific positions seemed at odds with
that statement. Verbeke did not raise the issue of
monitoring the human rights situation or of ensuring freedom
of movement across the ABL.

-- Russia accepts the idea of zones on the south side of the
ABL, and in fact proposes extending the outer zone to 24
kilometers, which would include Senaki base, but does not see
the need for any zones at all on the north side of the ABL.

-- Russia does not see the need for monitors on the north
side of the boundary.

AMBASSADOR'S CONCERNS


6. (C) The Ambassador raised a few points and questions in
response. First, he said it is at least as important to
monitor the human rights situation as the security situation;
a new crisis could erupt just as easily as the result of
sudden or increased human rights violations as from a
security incident. The Georgian government has also
expressed the importance of this element of a mission, and UN
executive police could fulfill this function. Verbeke
answered that neither the Russians nor the Abkhaz will accept
the idea; the Abkhaz are willing to accept a continuation of
the civilian UN police mission with 20 staff, but not
executive police. It will therefore be necessary to push the
Russians on this point. German Ambassador Patricia Flor was
not sure whether Berlin would be willing to make this effort.


7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the proposed restrictions
on aircraft would apply to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
He also noted that there had been proposals in the past for
the UN itself to run reconnaissance UAVs in an effort to
improve its monitoring of the situation, and that they could
perhaps extend the UN's insight into areas even beyond the
security zones, such as the Senaki and Ochamchire bases. At
the time of the meeting Verbeke had not considered the issue,
but the revised non-paper includes a prohibition on all
reconnaissance flights, including by UAVs, for both zones,
although it does not address the possibility of UN UAVs.

GENEVA IN APRIL?


8. (C) Regarding the Geneva process, Verbeke said Kelin
suggested Russia might be willing to accept the next round of
meetings toward the end of April. Georgian interlocutors,
Qmeetings toward the end of April. Georgian interlocutors,
however, told Verbeke they did not believe Russia would
cooperate with the incident prevention mechanism agreed to in
February (ref B). In broader terms, Verbeke thought the UN
in Geneva will eventually take over the process itself from
the EU.

COMMENT: CARPE DIEM


9. (C) On the whole we agree with Verbeke's strong proposals
on the security side. We are somewhat concerned that he has
not put sufficient emphasis on the protection of human
rights. Under his "guiding principles," for example, he
includes as a key objective "addressing the needs of the
population," but does not offer much specificity on what
those needs are, nor how substantial and urgent they are.

TBILISI 00000625 003 OF 003


Under the "UN Role," he mentions the continuation of a UN
Human Rights office and the "facilitation of provision of
humanitarian assistance," but these steps strike us as
insufficient. The Georgians, who plan to share their own
thoughts on a mandate within the next few days, have likewise
expressed concern that Verbeke's non-paper does not even
mention IDPs.


10. (C) On the tactical side, however, Verbeke is absolutely
correct that the sooner we (meaning the west) clarify our
position and push Russia on the crucial elements of a new
mandate, the harder it will be for Russia to take the
initiative and get the conversation going down the wrong
path. We also agree with Verbeke that countries will need to
weigh in bilaterally with Russia on those crucial elements --
not least because Verbeke himself may not be our strongest
advocate in Moscow. Finally, providing input to Verbeke in
the next few weeks will go a long way toward ensuring that
the SYG's report to the SYG -- which will presumably play an
important role in the final negotiations in New York -- is as
strong and as specific as possible.
TEFFT