Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI511
2009-03-17 13:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: UNOMIG BEGINS EVALUATING RESPECT FOR

Tags:  PREL MOPS KBTS UNOMIG UNSC RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1655
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0511/01 0761356
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171356Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1193
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0186
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4802
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 4010
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000511 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS UNOMIG UNSC RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: UNOMIG BEGINS EVALUATING RESPECT FOR
UNSCR 1866

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS UNOMIG UNSC RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: UNOMIG BEGINS EVALUATING RESPECT FOR
UNSCR 1866

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. UNOMIG personnel have begun
evaluating the degree to which the various sides respect
UNSCR 1866. UNOMIG's position is that 1866 re-imposes on all
sides the conditions of paragraph 2a of the 1994 Moscow
Agreement, which defines a security zone that excludes all
military forces and heavy equipment and a restricted-weapons
zone that excludes all heavy equipment. UNOMIG has observed
what it considers to be examples of non-compliance on both
sides of the boundary, but is hesitant to call them
violations, because 1866 only calls for "respecting" the 2a
conditions, and UNOMIG has no way to enforce compliance.
UNOMIG considers Russian and Abkhaz non-compliance to be more
serious than Georgian non-compliance. Although the EUMM also
uses vehicles similar to the Georgian COBRAs that UNOMIG
consider non-compliant, it is unlikely that UNOMIG will cite
the EUMM. Considering the temporary nature of 1866, it is
unlikely that UNOMIG will put its findings to any specific
use. The Russians and Abkhaz are almost sure to ignore such
findings, and the Georgians are unlikely to take action
absent steps on the north side of the boundary. As we
prepare to negotiate a new UN mandate, it will be important
to ensure that its conditions are not weakened by the
ambiguities of 1866. End summary and comment.

BACKGROUND: 1994 Moscow Agreement, redux


2. (U) UN Security Council Resolution 1866, passed on 13
February 2009, includes the following operative paragraph.

-- 2. (The Security Council) Calls for the provisions that
were set out in paragraph 2(a) of the Agreement on a
Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May
1994 (S/1994/583) to be respected, pending consultations and
agreement on a revised security regime, taking note of the
recommendations on the security regime contained in the
report of the Secretary General of 4 February 2009;


3. (U) The referenced paragraph 2(a) of the so-called Moscow
Agreement reads as follows.

-- 2. The armed forces of the parties shall be separated in

accordance with the following principles:

(a) The area between lines B and D on the attached map . . .
shall constitute a security zone. There shall be no armed
forces or heavy military equipment within this zone. The
territory between lines A and B and lines D and E shall
constitute a restricted-weapons zone. There shall be no
heavy military equipment within this zone. The local civil
authorities shall function in the security zone and the
restricted-weapons zone. The police/militia employed for
this purpose may carry personal arms;

Heavy military equipment includes:

(i) All artillery and mortars of a calibre exceeding 18 mm;
(ii) All tanks;
(iii) All armoured transport vehicles.

THE MEANING AND AUTHORITY OF UNSCR 1866


4. (C) Thereare some ambiguities in 1866. UN Special
Representative Johan Verbeke has noted to various U.S.
officials his understanding that 1866 re-imposes the
conditions of 2(a) on all parties. UNSCR 1866 does not
specify to whom its provisions apply, and Verbeke's reading
is that it therefore applies to all parties. He expects,
however, the Russians will argue that it does not apply to
them, because 2(a) in its original context did not apply to
Qthem, because 2(a) in its original context did not apply to
their peacekeeping forces. Also, the word "respected" is
less absolute than the clear language of 2(a),which declares
simply that "There shall be no armed forces . . ," etc.
Verbeke believes that "respected" means "complied with."
Even so, a UNOMIG staffer explained to PolOff that there is
an ongoing discussion within UNOMIG as to what authority the
word "respected" really gives UNOMIG. Personnel there
already agree that 1866 does not give UNOMIG the authority to
issue "violations," so they are discussing what they can do
with any observed instances of non-compliance. One idea is
to cite instances of "non-respect," which they have done in
some of their reports, although this locution seemed
cumbersome to at least one staffer.


5. (C) Deputy Director of the Georgian MFA's International

TBILISI 00000511 002 OF 003


Organizations Department Shalva Tsiskarashvili told EmbOffs
on March 11 that the Georgian government agrees with
Verbeke's basic reading of 1866 and its reimposition of the
Moscow Agreement limits. He also noted, however, that the
Georgian government does not necessarily agree with some of
UNOMIG's specific findings (see paragraph 7). As far as post
is aware, Russia has not expressed an opinion on Verbeke's
reading. Verbeke himself noted in Geneva, however, that when
he outlined his reading of the resolution to Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Karasin, the latter seemed surprised, as if
he had not considered that possibility before, and did not
offer a formal response.


6. (SBU) Pursuant to its reading of 1866, UNOMIG has recently
begun compiling observations of what it considers instances
of non-compliance. On March 5, it included in its daily
sitrep, under the heading "Non-Respect for UNSCR 1866," a
compilation of the military forces it observed on either side
of the Abkhaz administrative boundary. On the Russian side
it observed Russian forces in battalion strength; 32 BTR-80
armored personnel carriers; 10 T-72 tanks; 1 multi-purpose
armored vehicle; 6 artillery guns; and 1 MI-8 helicopter. On
the Abkhaz side it observed 7 T-55 tanks; 3 multi-purpose
armored vehicles; 3 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannon; and
approximately 2 platoons of the regular Abkhaz de facto army.
On the Georgian side it observed 22 COBRA joint light
tactical vehicle.

TROOPS, ARTILLERY, TANKS AND BTRS VS. COBRAS


7. (C) Although it accepts UNOMIG's reading of 1866, Georgia
has not accepted UNOMIG's determination that COBRAs are not
compliant. In a March 7 conversation between Verbeke and
Ministry of Internal Affairs officials (reported to post by
an American UNOMIG monitor -- please protect),Head of the
Ministry's Analytical Section Shota Utiashvili noted that
Georgia needs COBRAs to defend itself against the superior
weaponry on the Russian/Abkhaz side of the boundary. He also
said that only two of the 22 COBRAs are armed, and the two
armed ones (which sometimes carry an automatic grenade
launcher, sometimes a machine gun) are not used for
patrolling the boundary, but rather delivering forces to
posts at the boundary. Verbeke insisted that the COBRAs
(whether armed or not) were not in compliance, but also
agreed that such technical findings had to be put in context.
He said that the UNOMIG report to the Secretary General, due
in May, would note the fact of the COBRAs on the Georgian
side, but would also note that the Georgians had lost
policemen along the administrative boundary and that the
armored vehicles were needed for protection. A UNOMIG
monitor acknowledged to EmbOff that there was some room for
interpretation of the applicability of 2(a)(iii) to COBRAs.
He noted that 2(a)(iii) would not apply to every vehicle with
armor on it (such as a civilian armored car),and that COBRAs
were considerably less problematic than BTRs. Ultimately,
UNOMIG had to use some judgment in drawing the line between
armored vehicles that violate 2(a)(iii) and those that do
not, and its official position was that COBRAs do constitute
a violation.

UNOMIG VS. EUMM: NOT ALL VIOLATIONS ARE CREATED EQUAL


8. (C) Verbeke faces a sticky political dilemma. He himself
has admitted that Russian and Abkhaz violations, which cover
Qhas admitted that Russian and Abkhaz violations, which cover
all three subcategories of paragraph 2(a) and the prohibition
on troops, are more serious than Georgian violations, which
cover only the third subcategory. As he admitted to the
Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry, however, he feels he must
be impartial in his evaluation of respect for 1866, so he
will cite all instances of non-compliance. However, not only
the Georgians, but the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) also uses
vehicles similar to the COBRAs in its movements near the
boundary -- and according to Verbeke's own reading, all
parties must respect the conditions of paragraph 2(a). In a
strict sense, then, Verbeke could also cite the EUMM for
non-compliance. (Note: We have detected some impatience and
irritation on Verbeke's part with the EUMM, possibly arising
out of a competitive interest in establishing UNOMIG as the
primary monitoring mission now and into the future.) It
seems highly unlikely, however, that Verbeke, a Belgian
diplomat, will publicly describe the EUMM's use of COBRA-like
vehicles as a violation.

COMMENT: WHAT TO DO WITH THIS INFORMATION?


9. (C) Although UNOMIG has included its observations about

TBILISI 00000511 003 OF 003


non-respect in its sitreps, Verbeke has given no indication
he will raise the concerns in any public forum. He seems to
have adopted the view that, as a four-month "technical
rollover plus," 1866 does not provide UNOMIG the authority to
issue formal violations, much less attempt to enforce the
resolution's provisions. As he told the Internal Affairs
Ministry, however, the observations will inform the Secretary
General's report to the Security Council, which 1866 requires
be submitted by May 15 with recommendations on future
activities. Since the process of negotiating a new mandate
has already started, however, it is important that we take
UNOMIG's findings into account now, without waiting for the
Secretary General's report. In particular, as we consider
specific security regimes, we will need to avoid the
ambiguities of 1866, which UNOMIG has shown itself reluctant
to resolve publicly.
TEFFT