GEORGIA: VERBEKE ON WAY FORWARD FOR UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000040

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: VERBEKE ON WAY FORWARD FOR UN

REF: 08 TBILISI 2123

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. UN Special Representative for
Georgia Johan Verbeke offered the Ambassador initial thoughts
on the prospects for renewal of the UN Observer Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG). He believes Russia would prefer to see the
mission closed, but might not want to risk international
condemnation over its closure; the Abkhaz would prefer to see
it stay open, but it is not clear how much they can influence
Russia's decision. The mission could be salvaged in some
form, but it will not be easy; Russia will almost surely
block a technical rollover, and will likely reject a
strengthened mandate as well. In Verbeke's view, the most
feasible approach might be to change the basic structure in a
way that all sides could accept, such as a main office
outside Georgia (such as Vienna) and two satellite offices in
Sukhumi and Tbilisi. If the substantive issues can be
resolved, Verbeke thinks the name will not be a dealbreaker.
Given the serious incidents and humanitarian difficulties
that continue along the Abkhaz administrative boundary --
which UNOMIG has documented as originating almost exclusively
on the Abkhaz side -- an international presence on both sides
remains an important stabilizing factor. Considering the
remarkable restraint Georgian forces have demonstrated in the
face of those attacks, Georgia deserves a forceful,
coordinated effort to find a way to maintain the UN mission.
End summary and comment.


2. (C) In a meeting on January 8, Verbeke gave an overview of
the range of possibilities for a renewal of the UN's mandate
in Georgia. The most basic would be a technical rollover of
the existing mandate, as occurred in October 2008; although
this is currently the most discussed option in New York, he
thought the Russians would almost surely block a second
rollover. Another approach would be to maintain the existing
basic structure, but revise the monitors' authorities either
up or down. He thought the Georgian side would not accept a
weakened mandate, while the Russian side would not accept a
stronger one. A more radical revision would change the
existing structure. Establishing a mission in Abkhazia only,
or two separate missions in Abkhazia and in Georgia, would
please the Russians and the Abkhaz, but be unacceptable to
the Georgians. Another radical reviion would be to take the
approach proposed by Finland to revise the OSCE mission to
Georgia: to establish a base office outside Georgia, most
likely in Geneva, with two satellite offices in Sukhumi and
Tbilisi. Although Russia rejected this approach for the OSCE
mission, Verbeke thought it might ultimately prove
acceptable, if not palatable, to all sides.


3. (C) On tactics, Verbeke warned against pursuing a
technical rollover -- toward which, he thought, many western
friends seem to be drifting -- because Russia would most
likely oppose a rollover and allow the mission to expire. He
explained that Russia went along with the rollover in October
without a substantive discussion of the mission, but would
probably demand such a discussion this time around -- and
would end up rejecting the rationale for the mission in its
current form. He also warned against starting with a
discussion of the mission's name, which could get bogged down
Qdiscussion of the mission's name, which could get bogged down
in politicized exchanges and prevent consideration of the
real issues. He advised tackling those first -- i.e., the
basic parameters and structure of the mission -- in order to
see if there is a deal to be made. If there proved to be
enough political will to find a solution to the substantive
issues, he thought the name issue could ultimately be
finessed. One approach on the name might be to use a
thematic designation, such as "UN Stabilization Mission,"
with no mention of the country.


4. (C) Regarding Russia's attitude to the discussion, Verbeke
expressed more pessimism than optimism. He thought Russia
might end up going along, because it would be awkward for
Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to be
seen as removing a UN mission from Georgia at this sensitive
time. He acknowledged, however, that Russia already showed
itself willing to weather criticism for such a stance at the
OSCE. He even thought Russia might make the calculation that
any damage sustained for obstructionism at the UN might not
compound the damage from the OSCE stance very much; perhaps
the international community would mark down Russia's
decisions as one black mark, not two. Another important
lesson Verbeke drew from the OSCE decision was that Russia
was willing to play harder ball than most observers expected;
it did not want an international presence in the territories,

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and its actions in Vienna may well be the first step in a
long-term plan to remove all international monitors (the
"slice-by-slice" approach described in reftel). Verbeke
noted that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin recently
asked him why monitors were needed on both sides of the
administrative boundary, since the EU Monitoring Mission
(EUMM) covers the south side and Russia provides security on
the north. Verbeke suggested this question indicated that
Russia perceives the EUMM as serving its interest of keeping
the spotlight on the Georgian government and its actions,
instead of Russia and the de facto Abkhaz authorities. In
other words, Russia would be content to have no monitors in
Abkhazia and only the EUMM outside it.


5. (C) Verbeke also pointed out that the EU faced its own
internal difficulties on the EUMM, because there is no
unanimity on the importance, or even the need, for a
continued presence in Georgia. Ironically, both the
"softies" and the "hardies" -- i.e., those who are wary of
supporting Georgia and those who want to do as much as
possible for Georgia -- have reasons to question the EUMM's
continuing presence. The "softies" never understood why the
EU should play a role in Georgia in the first place. The
"hardies" perceive that under its current limitations of not
being able to enter the territories, the EUMM actually hurts
Georgia and helps Russia. He suggested the EU faced some
tough discussions in the near future. (He also noted this
internal dissent within the EU was very sensitive and asked
not to be quoted in this regard.)


6. (C) Unlike the Russians, the Abkhaz want to see a
continued UN presence, according to Verbeke. He said they
see the UN as a counterweight to Russia. Although they would
prefer a mission to Abkhazia alone, Abkhaz "Foreign Minister"
Sergey Shamba told Verbeke in a December 24, 2008 phone call
that he understood the UN's position that any mission would
have to be on both sides of the boundary. (Abkhaz de facto
"President" Bagapsh recently told British Ambassador Denis
Keefe, however, that Abkhazia would never agree to a UN
mission under the current name.) More generally, Verbeke
said his recent conversations with the de facto authorities
indicated that the initial euphoria after Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia had died down, that they were now
experiencing more than a little buyer's remorse. He said
this was also true among representatives of Abkhaz civil
society, who, without spelling it out, have been suggesting
that they will not accept independence at any price. They
have expressed specific concerns about Russia's economic
influence, for example, and the potential environmental
impact of the Russian presence. A week after Verbeke met
with Shamba in mid-December, Karasin called Verbeke for a
readout of the meeting -- suggesting to Verbeke that Russia
is trying to keep close tabs on its client's actions
regarding the UN.

COMMENT: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARY


7. (C) While UNOMIG patrolling efforts have been hampered in
recent months, post continues to consider the UN mission in
Georgia a vital deterrent to increased violence or renewed
hostilities in western Georga. Post likewise sees the UN as
an important source of information about such topics as
living conditions and human rights in Abkhazia, which is now
more isolated than ever. In recent months, UNOMIG has
Qmore isolated than ever. In recent months, UNOMIG has
documented the persistence of the attacks against the
Georgians from the Abkhaz side of the boundary -- and the
Georgians' remarkable restraint in not responding in kind.
We believe it is, therefore, worth making strenuous and
creative efforts to secure a continued UN mandate -- as long
as it does not lend any legitimacy to the separatist Abkhaz
regime. President Saakashvili has consistently insisted that
Georgia will not agree to any long-term arrangement that
could come back to haunt it in future negotiations or lend
any legitimacy to the Abkhaz, and the potential benefits of a
renewed UN mandate are not worth any further weakening of
Georgia's already difficult position. If Abkhaz statements
to Verbeke are sincere, it is possible the Abkhaz themselves
might be the biggest proponent of a continued UN mission, as
long as we can find a formulation they and the Georgians can
deal with. Post believes that Verbeke's formulation -- or
another creative approach -- that would keep UNOMIG in
business is worth the effort. The big question is whether
the Russians are ready to discuss the issue, or are committed
to closing down UNOMIG.
TEFFT