GEORGIA: SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN GALI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000322

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN GALI

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires A.I. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During the first official USG trip to
Abkhazia since the August 2008 war, representatives of civil
society in Gali provided information about several serious
human rights concerns facing ethnic Georgians in Gali. They
face extortion from well-organized criminal gangs; pressure
to accept Abkhaz or Russians passports, or some level of
pressure to renounce Georgian citizenship in order to have
access to basic social benefits and civil rights; and
limitations on both freedom of movement and Georgian language
education. Some expressed great fear at the potential
security and economic impact of a closure of UNOMIG and were
considering leaving if it did close. The IDP issue remains
contentious, with ethnic Abkhaz admitting only grudgingly
that ethnic Georgians should someday be given a chance to
return to Gali, but not the rest of Abkhazia. End summary.

TROUBLES IN GALI


2. (C) EUR/CARC Advisor on the South Caucasus Conflicts
Michael Carpenter and EmbOff traveled to Abkhazia February
12-13 and met de facto officials, UN staff, and
representatives of civil society in both Sukhumi and Gali.
Two representatives of the Human Rights Centre in Gali made
the most serious allegations of human rights concerns,
indicating that the local population faced grave persecution.
Most troubling was the allegation that criminal gangs
control the district, running an almost feudal system of
extorting a certain percentage of villagers' crops. They
said the district is divided into four areas, with each area
divided into small clusters of three or so villages that are
controlled by a particular gang. The gangs are composed of
former militia members who fought in the past and who would
likely be called upon again to fight if necessary in the
future. They are somehow incorporated into official
structures, such as the de facto interior or defense
ministries, but local de facto authorities cannot control
them, and ethnic Abkhaz residents themselves fear them. In
some cases, individual villagers have even been forced to
work for the gangs essentially as slaves, harvesting produce
on abandoned land or working on construction projects in
Sukhumi without pay. One of the gangs is reportedly
affiliated with the Krtadze clan in the area around
Chuburkhinji. According to these human rights workers, this
gang, after seeing the Danish Refugee Council's renovation of
a kindergarten, even tried to force the Council to renovate
one of the gang's buildings. The workers asked that this
example be kept in confidence, lest the Council's staff
suffer retaliation.


3. (C) The Human Rights Center representatives noted other
human rights concerns as well, such as restrictions on
freedom of movement across the administrative boundary line
between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. They confirmed
Kishmaria's statements that the boundary is being
strengthened, and the cost of crossing the boundary is quite
high for the local population, ranging from 300 to 1,000
rubles (approximately $9-$30). They also noted what they
called the growing Russification of the region. The
representatives said that all schools in Gali should
officially conduct classes in Russian; although the schools
in lower Gali conduct classes in Georgian, it is in fact
Qin lower Gali conduct classes in Georgian, it is in fact
illegal to do so (the UN human rights officer in Gali said
that he does not believe that teaching in Georgian is
technically illegal). Beyond the legal question, however,
the representatives said the de facto authorities are making
it more difficult to maintain the Georgian-language system in
practice by refusing to pay the salaries of Georgian-language
teachers. In the past, the Georgian government supported
these teachers, but now that the boundary is more closed,
that support cannot get throug. According to the Human
Rights Center representatives, parents themselves must
therefore support the Georgian-language teachers, but that is
becoming more difficult for the same reason.

PASSPORTIZATION


4. (C) Carpenter asked Kishmaria about reports of
passportization in Gali (i.e., compelling ethnic Georgians to
accept Abkhaz so-called passports and renounce Georgian
passports and/or citizenship). Kishmaria said that the
process of making the document available had begun, with
7,000 applications already lodged, but only a small number
issued (a UN political officer estimated the number issued at
200). Kishmaria said the process would speed up and possibly

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finish by the end of the year, but no one would be forced to
accept an Abkhaz so-called passport, with a prospective
permanent resident card eventually being offered instead.
The latter would not bestow all the rights of a so-called
citizen, however, such as voting rights, but Kishmaria said
individuals would have access to basic services, such as the
issuance of a driver's license. He insisted that no one's
civil rights would be violated because of his or her
identification document, and that no one would have to
renounce Georgian citizenship. Some NGO representatives in
Gali, however, said that, in fact, applicants had to write
out by hand a renunciation on a blank line at the bottom of
the form. Thus there would be no evidence of the requirement
on the form itself, but it would not be processed without the
statement. The UN political officer in Sukhumi said that no
one was being forced to give up his or her Georgian passport
to receive an Abkhaz document, and the interlocutors in Gali
agreed. (Note: Were it implemented, such a step would
greatly inhibit the local population's freedom of movement
into the rest of Georgia. End note.) He also noted,
however, that those with Abkhaz so-called passports would be
eligible to receive a Russian pension, which is not generous,
but nevertheless significant.


5. (C) Regarding passportization, Shamba said that no one
would be compelled to accept an Abkhaz so-called passport,
because in fact the de facto authorities had no great
incentive to empower the population of Gali politically. He
even stated the authorities did not want the Gali residents
to vote in large numbers, although he backed off a bit when
asked why the de facto authorities would not want residents
of Abkhazia to participate in the political process.

OPTIONS ARE DWINDLING -- AND PEOPLE MAY BEING LEAVING


6. (C) An older couple on the street in the city of Gali
indicated they were seriously considering leaving their
lifelong home to live with their daughter in Tbilisi. They
were concerned with both the economy and the security of the
region, and for them, the deciding factor would be whether
the UN mission remains. If it goes, the wife will lose her
job, which is their primary means of support; also, they will
not feel safe. The husband said that "they" (understood to
mean the Abkhaz) will be able to do whatever they want if the
UN leaves, making a slashing motion across his neck. He said
that many of their neighbors are also thinking about leaving.
He confirmed the story about the unofficial requirement to
write out a renunciation of Georgian citizenship on the
application for an Abkhaz so-called passport.

IDPs -- PERHAPS A RETURN TO GALI, BUT NOT BEYOND


7. (C) All the ethnic Abkhaz interlocutors showed discomfort
when asked about the return of ethnic Georgian internally
displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia. No one rejected the
idea outright, but no one embraced a comprehensive or swift
process either. Shamba agreed that Georgians should
eventually be allowed to return to Gali, but said returns to
the rest of Abkhazia would difficult, because old passions
could result in renewed violence. The ethnic Abkhaz civil
society representatives expressed the same concern. One
representative of the Center for Humanitarian Programs in
Sukhumi, which was originally founded to help victims of the
QSukhumi, which was originally founded to help victims of the
war in the early 1990s, went farther than the de facto
officials by suggesting that no one should be allowed to
return until Abkhazia is recognized as independent. She
thought perhaps the right to return could be one element of a
negotiated final settlement -- a bargaining chip for
recognition. Only Khashig Inal, editor of the independent
newspaper Chegemskaia Pravda, recognized that the IDPs gave
Georgia the moral high ground to any extent, calling the
issue Georgia's only "trump card," but even he saw problems
with any returns outside Gali.


8. (C) When asked about a possible process for returning the
IDPs, Shamba protested that there had been a plan, but that
the Georgian government had not upheld its part -- i.e., had
not allowed a census of the IDPs to proceed. He alleged that
the number of IDPs was greatly exaggerated, and therefore the
Georgian government did not want to produce an accurate
estimate. The CHP representative also suggested that the
numbers were inflated because the Georgian government still
counted those who had already returned as IDPs. Inal, who
adopted the most objective attitude toward the IDP issue,
estimated there to be 180,000 IDPs remaining. (Note: The
Georgian government estimates there to be around 230,000.
End note.)

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LOGSDON