Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI321
2009-02-17 12:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: ABKHAZ, PROUD BUT NERVOUS -- AND READY TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF MOPS KBTS RU GG 
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0321/01 0481207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171207Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0944
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0178
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2256
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4780
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000321 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZ, PROUD BUT NERVOUS -- AND READY TO
ENGAGE

REF: TBILISI 112

Classified By: Charges d'Affaires A.I. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000321

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZ, PROUD BUT NERVOUS -- AND READY TO
ENGAGE

REF: TBILISI 112

Classified By: Charges d'Affaires A.I. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. During the first official USG
trip to Abkhazia since the August 2008 war, Abkhaz de facto
officials and civil society representatives showed new
confidence in their so-called independence, but also unease
with Russia's increasing influence. They believe Russia's
recognition and increased military presence enhance
Abkhazia's security, but still crave engagement with other
countries, including the U.S. All interlocutors expressed
interest in cross-boundary exchanges, as long as they focused
on practical issues like health care and avoided status
questions. De facto "foreign minister" Shamba, however, said
diplomats accredited in Tbilisi would no longer be allowed to
visit; it is not clear how firm this policy is since the EU
Ambassador from Tbilisi was received by Shamba the same day.
The December 2009 elections for de facto "president" are
already encouraging political posturing and possibly limiting
officials' flexibility, including on the diplomatic access
issue. Russia's contribution to the Abkhaz budget has
increased dramatically; a failure to meet its commitments in
2009 could cause real political difficulties. The USG may be
able to find ways to re-engage with Abkhazia, but will likely
need to be careful how it articulates the goals of that
engagement in light of our support for Georgia's territorial
integrity. (See septel about serious human rights concerns
in Gali.) End summary and comment.

TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE? THE DE FACTO VIEW


2. (C) EUR/CARC Advisor on the South Caucasus Conflicts
Michael Carpenter and EmbOff traveled to Abkhazia February
12-13 and met in separate meetings with de facto "foreign
minister" Sergey Shamba and de facto "presidential"
representative for the Gali region Ruslan Kishmaria.
Carpenter met one-on-one with de facto "national security
council secretary" Stanislav Lakoba, who refused to see a
diplomat accredited to Tbilisi. With the media present,

Shamba began speaking with a confident air about Abkhazia's
so-called independence as an established fact. He expressed
strong disapproval of U.S. policy toward Abkhazia, offering a
historical justification of Abkhazia's claim to independence
and suggesting that U.S. recognition of the new reality was
only a matter of time. Carpenter made clear that the U.S.
policy of commitment to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity remained unchanged. Shamba said that Abkhazia felt
more secure than before its declared independence and saw
enormous economic opportunities with its Russian partner. He
made clear, however, that Abkhazia was interested in
engagement with the rest of the world, including the United
States. He complained that other countries, in particular
the U.S., had pushed Abkhazia into a corner "like a wolf" and
forced it toward its single partner. Kishmaria said
half-jokingly that Abkhazia has been free for 15 years, but
now is independent (i.e., but no longer free). Shamba
expressed support for a continued UN presence in Abkhazia,
although he insisted the name would have to change from a UN
mission in Georgia. Carpenter made clear that the U.S.
valued continued dialogue with Abkhazia, and at the end of
the meeting, Shamba dropped his adversarial pose and remarked
Qthe meeting, Shamba dropped his adversarial pose and remarked
with apparent sincerity on the importance of the U.S.
speaking with Abkhaz "officials" -- a sentiment he later
repeated to the Abkhaz press.


3. (C) Shamba also said, however, that diplomats accredited
in Tbilisi would no longer be welcome in Abkhazia. EmbOff
suggested such a policy would make engagement difficult,
arguing that using this particular issue to make a political
point about Abkhazia's status would hurt its own stated
interest in engagement in return for little, if any, gain.
Shamba did seem to leave the door open for future visits,
saying that meetings might be possible on a case-by-case
basis for specific purposes. (Note: An internal debate among
de facto officials on the wisdom of accepting
Tbilisi-accredited diplomats recently came out in the open in
the Abkhaz press, with Shamba arguing for more flexibility
and Lakoba -- who refused to see EmbOff -- taking a hard
line. Current official policy is apparently not to receive
them; although no one has yet been denied permission to
travel, some Tbilisi-based ambassadors told us that they have
been informally asked not to ask. EmbOff received permission
to travel, however, and EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund
also traveled to Abkhazia February 12, and was received by de

TBILISI 00000321 002 OF 003


facto "officials" so this issue is probably not fully
settled. See also reftel. End note.)


4. (C) A UN political officer in Sukhumi explained some of
the political crcumstances shaping the de factos' attitudes
at the moment. He said the upcoming December 2009 election
of a new de facto president was the foremost issue on
everyone's mind, with the competition already "severe," and
de facto officials were already toughening their stances with
the elections in mind. He also noted, however, that Russia's
support for Abkhazia's budget was planned to increase
dramatically. The budget would rise from the equivalent of
$59 million in 2008 to $144 million in 2009, with Russia
providing the lion's share of the money. A large chunk of
this increase has reportedly been allotted to salaries of
civil servants, including one third of the entire budget
going to law enforcement salaries -- a useful step in an
election year, as the UN officer noted, but not a helpful
investment in Abkhazia's long-term development. He also
questioned whether Russia could maintain this level of
support this year, considering its own financial
difficulties, or into the future, and suggested any default
on these promises would have major repercussions on internal
Abkhaz politics.

CROSS-BOUNDARY OPPORTUNITIES


5. (C) Carpenter asked if Shamba saw opportunities for
engagement across the boundary. Shamba said he saw value in
practical projects, such as those on the human level that
would improve the lives of Gali residents, but warned that
the specifics were important. The goal must not be the
re-establishment of Georgia's territorial integrity, and he
could not accept contacts with organizations affiliated with
the Georgian government. He approved of contacts between
NGOs, adding that some connections already exist. He said a
good first step would be to allow Abkhaz students who are
offered U.S. scholarships, such as Fulbrights, to travel on
their existing (i.e., Russian) passports. According to him,
past cases in which students earned a scholarship, but were
then asked to travel on a Georgian passport, sowed resentment
toward the U.S. among the Abkhaz people. He added the
public attitude toward the government's actions would be
especially important this year, as Abkhazia moves towards
so-called presidential elections in December. Shamba also
expressed acceptance of the dispute resolution mechanism
currently under negotiation in the Geneva talks.


6. (C) Kishmaria likewise expressed approval of
cross-boundary engagement, noting that some contacts have
been maintained all along. He was particularly receptive to
cooperation in health care. He objected to Georgian official
involvement, as well as that of the Abkhaz
government-in-exile. Kishmaria said that local residents
fear Georgian provocations and the only solution was a
tightly controlled boundary, with barbed wire and six
official crossing points. When asked about sniper and other
attacks on Georgian police officers, Kishmaria did not deny
that they had happened, but again said a strong boundary was
the answer. He expressed willingness to cooperate with a
dispute resolution mechanism, although he questioned whether
such institutions, such as the previous quadripartite
meetings in Chuburkhinji, added much value.

TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE? CIVIL SOCIETY'S VIEW
QTO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE? CIVIL SOCIETY'S VIEW


7. (C) Representatives of non-governmental organizations also
expressed genuine pride in Russia's recognition; one said
that "by the way, we are separated, not separatists anymore."
Although they generally recognized that Russia's influence
was growing in ways that were not necessarily in Abkhazia's
best interest, and in some cases could be a catastrophe for
Abkhazia, they also felt that the August war had made
cooperation with Georgian organizations more complicated.
Representatives of the Center for Humanitarian Programs
(CHP),which has been quite active in bringing Georgians and
Abkhaz (and Ossetians) together for reconciliation
activities, said that some in Abkhazia were now questioning
the appropriateness of such activities as confidence
building, peacebuilding, or even dialogue. Some in fact
wanted to turn away from Georgia and Georgians completely,
believing that Georgia's so-called aggression against South
Ossetia could just as easily have been directed against
Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the CHP representatives did still
see engagement as important, focusing on such concrete
possibilities for cooperation as AIDS prevention. They

TBILISI 00000321 003 OF 003


objected to calls for projects that included a provision that
the project promote the reintegration of Georgia, however.


8. (C) Khashig Inal, editor of the independent newspaper
Chegemskaia Pravda, welcomed Abkhazia's recognition by Russia
and noted that many were still "dizzy" in their excitement.
He added, however, that it was easy to sit back and think
that nothing more needs to be done, allowing Russia to take
responsibility for such specific elements of Abkhazia's
so-called independence as security and the budget -- and
thereby render newly "independent" Abkhazia dependent.
Echoing the UN political officer, he noted that 60% of
Abkhazia's budget is currently paid by Russia, but that only
the intellectuals currently understood the implications of
that fiscal dependence. He pointed to InterRAO's deal with
the Georgian government to manage the Enguri Hydropower
Station as an example of how Russia tends to make decisions
about Abkhazia without consulting Abkhazia. Inal also blamed
the U.S. for encouraging this dependence on Russia,
suggesting the obligatory "territorial integrity" language in
projects alienated the Abkhaz and pushed them toward Russia
in the social, economic and military spheres. Hesaid that,
unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia has never wanted to be part of
Russia -- but if Abkhazia's economic dependence on Russia
continues, it will probably join Russia in ten years or so.
He encouraged increased U.S. and European investment in
Abkhazia, but said that, no matter how much money was
offered, Abkhazia would never re-enter Georgia.


9. (C) Ethnically Georgian members of the Human Rights Center
in Gali expressed their interest in economic connections
across the boundary. They said other areas that needed
attention from outside Abkhazia were human rights issues and
legal assistance. They proposed information centers that
would help inform people about their human rights and how to
protect them. Likewise, a small business center, perhaps
that issued grants, would be helpful. They suggested that
joint Abkhaz and Georgian businesses could work together to
strengthen the local economy and protect themselves against
criminal activity (see septel on human rights concerns in
Gali).

COMMENT: THE TIME IS RIPE, BUT GO EASY


10. (C) It is clear that representatives of all different
groups and levels of Abkhaz society are sincerely interested
in renewed engagement with the United States. Although
Russia's recognition has given them a new level of
confidence, even arrogance, about their political future, it
has also driven home the reality of their current isolation
in the shadow of their northern neighbor. Thus, while they
will be even less willing to make compromises on questions of
status (hence their ill-conceived policy of not accepting
Tbilisi-accredited diplomats),they will be perhaps even more
willing to establish relationships with various partners
(hence their unwillingness to commit fully to the
"no-Tbilisi-diplomats" policy). If Russia does not deliver
the promised huge increases in fiscal support, there will
likely be a significant political backlash against both the
current de facto authorities and their Russian backers -- and
therefore even more opportunity for greater engagement with
others. The task for the USG is to identify programs and
projects that address specific needs and start to rebuild
Qprojects that address specific needs and start to rebuild
connections across the boundary, while avoiding too blatant a
discussion of any underlying goals of promoting Georgia's
territorial integrity. Recent conversations with Georgian
officials suggest they will support renewed engagement as
well, although not at the cost of recognition -- or anything
that might imply recognition.
LOGSDON