Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI275
2009-02-10 11:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:
GEORGIA: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING UPS AND DOWNS
how-toVZCZCXRO7249 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSI #0275/01 0411141 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 101141Z FEB 09 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0918 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEANFA/NRC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHSI/ODC TBILISI GG PRIORITY RUEHSI/USDAO TBILISI GG PRIORITY RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY RHMFISS/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000275
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL KNNP DOE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING UPS AND DOWNS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (B)
AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000275
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL KNNP DOE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING UPS AND DOWNS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (B)
AND (D).
1. (C) Summary and Comment. Despite making great strides in
combating nuclear smuggling, Georgia lacks a reliable system
for effectively responding to incidents of nuclear and
radioactive material detection. The Department of
Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/Office of
Second Line of Defense (SLD) conducted an international
workshop in Tbilisi in January, which was an acknowledgment
of Georgia's continued progress in this arena. The Georgians
continue to show improvement in deterring the illicit
trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material. However,
presentations during the workshop also highlighted some of
Georgia's shortcomings. In particular, the Georgians need to
develop an effective inter-agency concept of operations to
respond to detection incidents. End summary and comment.
SLD WORKSHOP
2. (U) On January 20-22, the Office of Second Line of Defense
conducted an international workshop in Tbilisi for the
advancement of radiation detection and response to deter,
detect and interdict the illicit movement of nuclear and
other radioactive material. Participants from Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Greece,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, the European Commission, IAEA and
the United States attended the workshop. Topics addressed
during the workshop included training, equipment maintenance,
radiation alarm response, opportunities for regional
cooperation, and an overview by a representative from each
country on their radiation detection program. As hosts of
the conference, the Georgians were active participants and
gave presentations on training curriculum, considerations
related to alarms due to orphan sources, and national
response plans. The Georgians also provided tours of two
border crossing installations - Red Bridge and Sadakhlo. The
presentations by the Georgians showed how committed they are
to strengthening their ability to combat nuclear smuggling.
LACK OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE PLAN
3. (C) The Georgians acknowledge, however, that they have
work to do, which was highlighted in a story told by Archil
Pavlenishvili, the Captain of Nuclear Smuggling Initiative,
Special Operations Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MOIA). He said that in mid-December, a gentleman called an
MOIA contact, saying that he had an "inheritance" of
radioactive material from his father that he wanted to
dispose of. Officers from the MOIA met the gentleman outside
of Tbilisi on a Friday afternoon and had him place the
material, which was in a plastic bottle in his car, in a
local field. The current response procedure to the detection
of radioactive material is to call one of two Nuclear and
Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) staff on their personal cell
phones. The fact that it was a Friday afternoon, coupled
with the fact that there was no readily available "pig" (a
container to safely store radioactive material),led to a
delay of three to four hours from the time the authorities
discovered the source to the time someone from NRSS arrived
Qand safely contained it.
4. (C) The two NRSS employees who were "on-call" admitted
that they missed calls regarding the detection of a source
because they did not have their cell phones on them or
because they were out of the country or otherwise
unavailable. The lack of "pigs" has also been an ongoing
problem in Georgia; they often do not have "pigs" available
for large sources. Pavlenishvili has asked the U.S.G. for
assistance in obtaining such containers and has also said
that he would like Georgia to be able to produce them on
their own, as their heavy weight could lead to issues with
importation.
5. (C) The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and other U.S. agencies have strongly suggsted that NRSS
develop a procedure for how to respond to the detection of
radioactive material (for example, have customs or patrol
police call a dedicated 24/7 number at the Ministry or NRSS
instead of specific individuals),and have offered their
assistance in doing so. NRSS has stated that they are
currently working on such a plan and will submit a draft to
the NRC for review. The development and effective use of
TBILISI 00000275 002 OF 002
such a response plan would greatly strengthen Georgia's
ability to combat nuclear smuggling. We will continue to
track the development of the plan and provide assistance
where appropriate.
LOGSDON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL KNNP DOE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING UPS AND DOWNS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (B)
AND (D).
1. (C) Summary and Comment. Despite making great strides in
combating nuclear smuggling, Georgia lacks a reliable system
for effectively responding to incidents of nuclear and
radioactive material detection. The Department of
Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/Office of
Second Line of Defense (SLD) conducted an international
workshop in Tbilisi in January, which was an acknowledgment
of Georgia's continued progress in this arena. The Georgians
continue to show improvement in deterring the illicit
trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material. However,
presentations during the workshop also highlighted some of
Georgia's shortcomings. In particular, the Georgians need to
develop an effective inter-agency concept of operations to
respond to detection incidents. End summary and comment.
SLD WORKSHOP
2. (U) On January 20-22, the Office of Second Line of Defense
conducted an international workshop in Tbilisi for the
advancement of radiation detection and response to deter,
detect and interdict the illicit movement of nuclear and
other radioactive material. Participants from Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Greece,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, the European Commission, IAEA and
the United States attended the workshop. Topics addressed
during the workshop included training, equipment maintenance,
radiation alarm response, opportunities for regional
cooperation, and an overview by a representative from each
country on their radiation detection program. As hosts of
the conference, the Georgians were active participants and
gave presentations on training curriculum, considerations
related to alarms due to orphan sources, and national
response plans. The Georgians also provided tours of two
border crossing installations - Red Bridge and Sadakhlo. The
presentations by the Georgians showed how committed they are
to strengthening their ability to combat nuclear smuggling.
LACK OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE PLAN
3. (C) The Georgians acknowledge, however, that they have
work to do, which was highlighted in a story told by Archil
Pavlenishvili, the Captain of Nuclear Smuggling Initiative,
Special Operations Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MOIA). He said that in mid-December, a gentleman called an
MOIA contact, saying that he had an "inheritance" of
radioactive material from his father that he wanted to
dispose of. Officers from the MOIA met the gentleman outside
of Tbilisi on a Friday afternoon and had him place the
material, which was in a plastic bottle in his car, in a
local field. The current response procedure to the detection
of radioactive material is to call one of two Nuclear and
Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) staff on their personal cell
phones. The fact that it was a Friday afternoon, coupled
with the fact that there was no readily available "pig" (a
container to safely store radioactive material),led to a
delay of three to four hours from the time the authorities
discovered the source to the time someone from NRSS arrived
Qand safely contained it.
4. (C) The two NRSS employees who were "on-call" admitted
that they missed calls regarding the detection of a source
because they did not have their cell phones on them or
because they were out of the country or otherwise
unavailable. The lack of "pigs" has also been an ongoing
problem in Georgia; they often do not have "pigs" available
for large sources. Pavlenishvili has asked the U.S.G. for
assistance in obtaining such containers and has also said
that he would like Georgia to be able to produce them on
their own, as their heavy weight could lead to issues with
importation.
5. (C) The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and other U.S. agencies have strongly suggsted that NRSS
develop a procedure for how to respond to the detection of
radioactive material (for example, have customs or patrol
police call a dedicated 24/7 number at the Ministry or NRSS
instead of specific individuals),and have offered their
assistance in doing so. NRSS has stated that they are
currently working on such a plan and will submit a draft to
the NRC for review. The development and effective use of
TBILISI 00000275 002 OF 002
such a response plan would greatly strengthen Georgia's
ability to combat nuclear smuggling. We will continue to
track the development of the plan and provide assistance
where appropriate.
LOGSDON