Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI171
2009-01-30 14:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: GOVT AGREES TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG 
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O 301447Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 2250
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0869
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0175
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4773
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3989
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000171 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: GOVT AGREES TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY
NEAR TERRITORIES

REF: A. TBILISI 82

B. STATE 5642

C. USOSCE 13

D. 08 TBILISI 2271

E. 08 TBILISI 2495

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000171

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: GOVT AGREES TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY
NEAR TERRITORIES

REF: A. TBILISI 82

B. STATE 5642

C. USOSCE 13

D. 08 TBILISI 2271

E. 08 TBILISI 2495

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. In a briefing for diplomats, EU
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) staff provided information about
the January 26 agreement between the EUMM and the Georgian
Ministry of Defense (MOD). The EUMM military advisor judged
that the limitations the Georgians voluntarily imposed upon
themselves with this agreement significantly limited their
ability to conduct offensive capabilities against Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. EUMM Head Hansjorg Haber had hoped for
more extensive limitations, but he saw this agreement as the
beginning of a process; UK Ambassador Keefe noted the details
were less important than the fact of the agreement. The EUMM
signed a similar agreement with the Ministry of Internal
Affairs in October; Haber expressed some concerns about
"creeping militarization" among MOIA forces, but the EUMM
maintains an ongoing dialogue with the MOIA on these
concerns. Haber said the next step was to encourage Russia
to sign a similar agreement, but expressed little hope for
success. French Ambassador Fournier noted the agreement
provides a robust answer to criticism in Vienna of Georgia's
refusal to permit a Russian military inspection under the
OSCE Vienna Document process. Although the Georgians have
room to improve, they have made a good effort to do their
part to show their commitment to avoiding military escalation
along the boundaries. End summary and comment.

THE MOD MOU


2. (SBU) On January 26, Haber and Georgian Defense Minister
Sikharulidze signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
called the "Provisional Arrangement for the Exchange of
Information between the Ministry of Defence of Georgia and
the European Union Monitoring Mission" (text emailed to
EUR/CARC). The key elements remain the same as those
reported in ref A, with the final compromises being Georgian
willingness to sign one agreement covering both Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and EUMM acceptance of a 15-km zone, versus

20-km, outside Abkhazia. The MOD had sought U.S. input on
the agreement (ref A),which EmbOff and Deputy DATT provided
to MOD Analytical Department Director David Nardaia on
January 23 per ref B. According to the text, the agreement
will be available in "the public domain"; Haber explained
that it will probably not be posted on a website, but will be
provided to anyone who asks for it, and has already been
passed to Russia.


3. (C) At the EUMM's weekly briefing for the diplomatic
community on January 29, the EUMM's military advisor, Clive
Trout (from the UK),went through the key elements of the
agreement and offered the overall assessment that its
limitations made it difficult for Georgia to mount offensive
operations against either Abkhazia or South Ossetia. He
added that, because Georgia agreed to inform the EUMM of any
major military movements, and the EUMM had the ability to
inspect Georgian military installations within a day's
notice, it would be very difficult for Georgia to take any
steps to prepare for an offensive without the EUMM's
knowledge. Head of Mission Haber said the EUMM had sought
more extensive limitations on the Georgian military, such as
Qmore extensive limitations on the Georgian military, such as
a 20-km zone outside Abkhazia and a larger zone outside South
Ossetia that would have included parts of the east-west
highway, but decided that this initial agreement was
worthwhile and would begin a process of cooperation between
the EUMM and MOD. The agreement calls for fortnightly
meetings between the EUMM and MOD. UK Ambassador Denis Keefe
noted that in any case the fact of the agreement was more
important than the details of the text.


4. (C) French Ambassador Eric Fournier expressed considerable
indignation at the criticism levied against Georgia in Vienna
in the context of Georgia's refusal to accede to Russia's
request to conduct OSCE Vienna Document inspections (ref C).
He pointed out that the MOU provided much more transparency
on Georgia's military than OSCE commitments provided, because
it allowed an international body present in Georgia virtually
unrestricted access to installations and movements.

THE MOIA MOU

TBILISI 00000171 002 OF 003




5. (C) The MOU complements a similar agreement signed between
the EUMM and the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA)
on October 10, 2008. Haber reported that the EUMM is
concerned by recent MOIA moves that have caused a "creeping
militarization" of the adjacent areas. In one case, the EUMM
undertook surprise inspections on January 27 of four MOIA
posts near the boundaries, at Rukhi outside Abkhazia and
Jria, Ergneti and Odzisi outside South Ossetia. The MOIA
allowed immediate inspections in three of the posts, and the
EUMM found the MOIA to be in full compliance with its MOU
(e.g., no specialized or heavy weaponry). The MOIA did not
allow an immediate inspection at Odzisi, however; after
several phone calls, the EUMM was finally allowed in, but was
not given access to one building. Minister of Internal
Affairs Merabishvili later admitted to Haber that the refusal
to allow an immediate and complete inspection was a violation
of the MOU. He explained that the one restricted building
was a highly sensitive surveillance station collecting
signals intelligence from Russian and South Ossetian posts in
Akhmaji and the Akhalgori Valley, adding that its cover had
now been revealed to the Russians and the site would have to
be relocated.


6. (C) The EUMM has also observed some equipment held by the
MOIA that Haber described as showing a certain "lack of
discipline" in its commitments to avoid militarizing the
adjacent areas, which he will raise with the MOIA. EUMM
monitors have observed rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs),
sniper rifles, and around January 18 at Koshka (just outside
the South Ossetian administrative boundry, east of
Tskhinvali),a tripod for an RPG launcher. The EUMM
continues to question the MOIA's use of armored COBRA
vehicles as well (refs D and E),although Haber admitted they
did not violate the MOIA's agreement with the EUMM. (Embassy
note. Minister Merabishvili has argued to the Ambassador
that it is unfair of the EUMM to insist that their monitors
needed armored vehicles to be safe along the administrative
boundaries of the separatist territories, while objecting to
the Georgian desire to ensure that their police personnel
were equally safe. We and many of our European colleagues
think that Merabishvili has a point. End note.) Haber noted
that the EUMM has observed several flights by Russian
helicopters over areas adjacent to South Ossetia in recent
days (west of Perevi January 27; above Perevi and Jria
January 24; above Sakorintlo January 24 and 21; and above
Jria January 20) and speculated that the Russians were trying
to keep their eye on Georgian movements, including those in
particular by COBRAs and other vehicles.

RUSSIA'S TURN


7. (C) Haber said the next step was to approach the Russians
and seek a similar agreement, and in fact the EUMM has
already begun this process by sharing the text of the MOU
with Russia. Haber had been hoping for a "soft landing" with
the Russians, and he was pleased that their initial response
to the MOU was no response at all; he had feared some kind of
negative statement. Haber reported that Russian Ambassador
to the EU Chizhov in Brussels had remarked privately to him
that the MOU does not go as far as the fourth point of the
six-point cease-fire agreement (Haber commented to the
Qsix-point cease-fire agreement (Haber commented to the
assembled diplomats that the Russians still have some work to
do on the fifth point). Haber said he had little expectation
of immediate or substantive steps toward such an agreement
with Russia, and he thought the international community might
need to use other fora, such as bilateral engagement or the
Geneva process, to make any progress. Nevertheless he
thought approaching the Russians would still be useful in
putting the diplomatic ball in their court.

COMMENT: THE GEORGIANS ARE TRYING HARD


8. (C) Although the EUMM wanted to sign the MOU earlier, the
Georgian government's caution in making these voluntary
commitments is understandable. Its willingness to do so
shows a sincere interest in being both cooperative and
transparent with the international community. Even though
the EUMM did not get as restrictive an agreement as it
wanted, it is satisfied that Georgia's ability to mount
offensive operations is significantly impaired. As the EUMM
points out, the government's good will now deserves the
reward of a serious expectation from the international
community that Russia will reciprocate. Russia may counter
that Georgia continues to militarize the adjacent areas --

TBILISI 00000171 003 OF 003


but such allegations must be kept in context. Although the
MOIA's record of compliance with its MOU is apparently not
100%, it has maintained a regular dialogue with the EUMM.
Merabishvili's admission of a violation, not to mention the
rather remarkable revelation about sensitive intelligence
operations, demonstrates an openness about internal
operations that few sovereign nations would suffer on their
own soil. The MOD MOU also establishes regular
consultations, and we expect the MOD and EUMM will remain
similar engaged. Furthermore, no international monitors have
reported suspicions of active Georgian attacks against
Russian, Abkhaz or South Ossetian forces. Instead monitors
have continued to file regular reports about attacks against
Georgian forces, as well as the installation of heavy
equipment along the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides of the
administrative boundaries.
TEFFT