Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI1517
2009-08-10 08:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ABKHAZIA AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PBTS EAID SOCI AID GG 
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VZCZCXRO8517
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1517/01 2220849
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100849Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2007
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001517 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID SOCI AID GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ABKHAZIA AND
SOUTH OSSETIA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001517

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID SOCI AID GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ABKHAZIA AND
SOUTH OSSETIA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. Immediately following the August
2008 war between Russia and Georgia, our small USG aid
programs in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were closed, with the
exception of HALO Trust's demining program in Abkhazia.
Other international donors, including the European Commission
(EC),temporarily halted their programs, but resumed
operations in Abkhazia after the security situation
stabilized. Due to continuing access obstacles and the
precarious security situation in South Ossetia, ICRC remains
the only international organization working there. Numerous
international organizations, however, continue to operate in
Abkhazia and report that, even after the departure of UNOMIG,
all remains "business as usual." Despite the de facto Abkhaz
authorities attempts to politicize international assistance,
they need and want this aid, as well as the links to the
international community that come with it. After some
blustering over semantics, the Abkhaz have eventually backed
down and accepted western aid directed for Georgia which does
not specify an independent Abkhazia. The U.S. can look at
programs operated by other international donors as possible
models for any potential future U.S. assistance. We will
provide our thoughts septel in the coming weeks as to howthe
USG might want to approach assistance programs in the
occupied territories. End summary and comment.

NO ACCESS TO SOUTH OSSETIA MEANS NO MONEY


2. (C) The South Ossetian de facto authorities refuse to
allow international aid organizations entry into the region
from the south through undisputed Georgia, effectively
closing the region to international assistance. Only ICRC
continues to operate in South Ossetia by quietly managing
their program through their office in Russia. The unstable
security situation in South Ossetia further deters aid
organizations from resuming their activities. The EC is
currently considering funding several confidence building

programs with South Ossetian communities with third country
dialogue programs -- which would essentially avoid the access
hurdles. The EC is also planning to provide funding for
confidence building activities via a local implementer to a
school director in Alkhalgori, who is resident there and able
to freely travel between the regions.

INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN ABKHAZIA


3. (C) According to UNHCR, their presence in Abkhazia
includes a total of ten staff persons in Gali, four of whom
are internationals; and two local staff in Sukhumi. UNDP has
six local staff in Sukhumi, and UNICEF and World Food Program
(WFP) each have one local staff member in Sukhumi. Based on
anticipated 2009 funding from the EC, the UN development
organizations plan to increase their presence in Sukhumi to a
total of 15 persons, three of whom would be international
staff members. Other international NGOs present in both Gali
and Sukhumi include Action Contre la Faim (ACF),
Premiere-Urgence (PU),World Vision International (WVI),
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Danish Refugee Council
(DRC). In Sukhumi, these organizations have a total of 51
local and international staff; no numbers are available for
Gali. The HALO Trust, funded by the State Department and
other international donors, has approximately 160 local
staff, including both ethnic Georgians in Gali and ethnic
Abkhaz in Sukhumi. Expats with HALO Trust travel into
QAbkhaz in Sukhumi. Expats with HALO Trust travel into
Abkhazia several times a year and in spite of the Abkhaz de
facto authorities' allergy to Tbilisi-based diplomats, a
mission poloff was recently permitted to visit Abkhazia as
part of a HALO Trust delegation.

EC FUNDING IN ABKHAZIA


4. (U) The EC is currently providing over seven million Euros
of funding for four types of projects in Abkhazia:
income-generation, school attendance and dialogue, economic
rehabilitation, and humanitarian aid and recovery.
Income-generation projects include the development of
agro-services and vocational and business skills, implemented
by WVI and PU. The DRC is implementing a project aimed at
increasing attendance in primary schools. The EC is funding
a comprehensive set of economic rehabilitation programs in
the conflict zone to improve living conditions for
populations on both sides of the administrative boundary
line, including improvement in basic services and public
health, as well as improvements to the Enguri power plant.
DRC and PU are both implementing shelter rehabilitation, food
security and income generation assistance.


5. (C) The EC is providing 15 million Euros for projects
under their instrument for stability, a quick response

TBILISI 00001517 002 OF 002


mechanism not subject to recipient country approval, which
serves as a bridge between post-conflict and humanitarian
aid. Current projects under this umbrella deal with housing
issues and civil society support on IDP issues. The EC is
finalizing the second phase of the instrument for stability,
a total of 14 million Euros, which is aimed at mitigating
consequences of the August 2008 conflict. These activities
will include confidence building and people-to-people
contacts, civil society capacity building, and socio-housing
support. (Note: The EC instrument for stability is designed
to be an immediate response fund. It is an internal EC
regulation which does not require host government approval;
this funding could prove problematic in the future if the
Georgians decided to raise concerns about how their spending
may conflict with the Law on Occupied Territories. End Note)

OTHER INTERNATIONAL FUNDING


6. (C) Some individual EU countries are also funding projects
in Abkhazia. The British Embassy is supporting several small
peace and conflict resolution projects through International
Alert and Conciliation Resources. They are also hoping to
fund some projects directly with local partners in Abkhazia
in the future. The Swiss Embassy has a soup kitchen and film
festival project implemented via local NGOs.

BUSINESS AS USUAL IN ABKHAZIA


7. (C) The international organizations working in Abkhazia
report that they have functional relationships with both the
Georgian and de facto authorities. However, de facto
authorities and local implementers do politicize the EC's
efforts, despite the EC's attempts to keep the dialogue
focused on the actual assistance. For example, the EC
reported that local NGOs have threatened not to work with the
EC over phrases in EC documentation such as "...in Georgia,
including in South Ossetia and Abkhazia." Eventually the
local NGOs give in rather than give up the money. The
international organizations do not generally experience
access issues into or within Abkhazia. However, UNHCR notes
that while international staff and local staff based in
Abkhazia can travel freely between undisputed Georgia and
Abkhazia, local staff based in Zugdidi are prevented from
doing so by Abkhaz de facto authorities. The EC and UNHCR
report that despite the Government of Georgia's ecouraging
rhetoric regarding assistance to the regions, the GOG has not
gone out of its way to help them. Also, the implementing
rules of the Law on Occupied Territories, about which the EC
has serious concerns, has still not been finalized. The EC
anticipates the government will again raise the issue of the
implementing rules in September.


8. (C) One issue that the Government of Georgia may raise is
the payment of salaries and reimbursement of expenses to
local implementers in Abkhazia. Currently, the EC provides
these funds via direct bank transfer from an EC country into
an Abkhaz bank, as do other international organizations,
including the HALO Trust. The Law on Occupied Territories
raises questions about the legality of such actions.
However, there is currently no viable alternative, and if the
Georgians want these programs to continue, as they say they
do, they may have to allow these types of practices. So far
the government has not designated any EU practices a
violation of the Law on Occupied Territories, but some EU
representative fear the government could undertake more
Qrepresentative fear the government could undertake more
vigorous oversight of the assistance this fall, when the EU
expects to reopen the conversation about the still
unfinalized decree implementing the Law.
TEFFT