GEORGIA: DIPLOMATIC PARTNERS DISCUSS UNOMIG WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001078

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DIPLOMATIC PARTNERS DISCUSS UNOMIG WITH
A/S GORDON

REF: A. TBILISI 1073

B. STATE 59890

C. USUN 583

D. TBILISI 984

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tfft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a June 11 meeting with European
ambassadors and heads of the three monitoring missions, EUR
Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon reviewed the state of
UNOMIG renewal negotiations and possible ways forward.
Everyone agreed that losing UNOMIG had potentially serious
disadvantages for Georgia, but protecting key principles --
notably the international community's explicit affirmation of
Georgian territorial integrity -- was also important.
Although the meeting participants did not fully agree on just
how much of a risk the closure of UNOMIG presented, they did
agree that Georgia must ultimately be allowed to make the
final decision on what was acceptable -- and that Russia must
be blamed for a failure to achieve a new resolution.
Although some argued for continuing to try to reach a
compromise, all recognized that a deal was unlikely, and a
technical rollover might be the best hope at this point. End
summary.


2. (SBU) Participants in the meeting with A/S Gordon and
Ambassador Tefft included the following: British Ambassador
Denis Keefe; French Ambassador Eric Fournier; German
Ambassador Patricia Flor; Head of the EU Monitoring Mission
(EUMM) Hansjoerg Haber; OSCE Deputy Head of Mission Gottfried
Hanne; and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) Johan Verbeke.

IF UNOMIG GOES, WHAT DO WE LOSE?


3. (C) To begin, A/S Gordon asked his colleagues what Georgia
would lose if the UN mission closed down. SRSG Verbeke
answered first, saying that the single most significant
feature of UNOMIG is the signal it sends to the world that
Georgia still has an unresolved conflict. If UNOMIG closes,
the rest of the world could pay less and less attention to
Georgia's concerns over time. Although he admitted that the
UN had done little to resolve the conflict in its fifteen
years of existence, he said that closure might send the
(incorrect) message that the conflict had finally been
resolved -- and this was precisely the impression the
Russians wanted to convey. Ambassador Flor echoed this
point, also seeing great symbolic value in the very existence
of UNOMIG.


4. (C) Several interlocutors expressed concern about the
impact on the local population, in particular in Gali.
Ambassador Flor noted that another exodus of newly displaced
persons into undisputed Georgian territory was possible;
Ambassador Keefe expressed the same concern. Keefe
acknowledged, however, that there was some debate on the
extent of the threat, especially considering that the local
population faces difficulties even with a UN presence.
Ambassador Tefft pointed out that in the past, many Gali
residents had left for undisputed Georgia, then returned,
suggesting that it is difficult to predict just how the
locals will react. Flor added that a UN departure would also
close one of the few windows we have on the situation inside
Abkhazia, so that it would be far more difficult to stay
informed about the true state of affairs.


5. (C) Ambassador Keefe also said that closure would put
Georgia and Russia in more of a direct confrontation and
would risk upsetting what he called a "delicate balance"
between the sides. He suggested that the Georgians, with
Qbetween the sides. He suggested that the Georgians, with
their absolute focus on protecting the principle of
territorial integrity, might not fully appreciate all the
possible ramifications of a UN departure. A/S Gordon and
Ambassador Tefft responded that their conversations with the
Georgians on the topic, in which they pushed the Georgians on
this very point, had convinced them that the Georgians had
indeed thought the issue through quite thoroughly (ref A).
Keefe also noted that a UN departure could jeopardize such
international structures as the Geneva process; EUMM Head
Haber echoed this concern, pointing to the Joint Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanism as another potential
casualty.

DO WE GAIN ANYTHING -- OR AT LEAST NOT LOSE TOO MUCH?


6. (C) Even while enumerating the potential disadvantages of
a UN departure, SRSG Verbeke also noted that there might be
some advantages as well. In particular, he said that

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cancelling the mission -- especially considering the kind of
language that Russia was likely to demand -- would avoid
legitimizing the Russian presence inside Abkhazia.
Ambassador Fournier did not say that a closure would have
advantages, but he did downplay the disadvantages, suggesting
it would not be the end of the world. He shared a message
sent to French officials around the world from President
Sarkozy, in which Sarkozy said that defending core
principles, in particular territorial integrity, was the most
important thing. Sarkozy suggested that UNOMIG should be
seen "not as a jewel, but a tool" -- a potentially useful
one, but not an end in itself.


7. (C) EUMM Head Haber said that, from the perspective of the
EUMM, the departure of UNOMIG would not actually change too
much on the ground. He said that at that point the EUMM
would become first and foremost a tripwire. A/S Gordon asked
whether the EUMM would in fact stay if the UN left; Haber
said it certainly would in the short- to medium-term. He
said it would be important, however, for the EU to avoid
making long-term commitments in order to keep both the
Georgian and the Russian sides honest. In his view, one of
the EUMM's biggest contributions is its firm policy of
non-recognition of the territories, which will not change and
which does not require any concessions by Georgia. In other
words, although Georgia would likely have to make certain
concessions to keep a UN presene, it does not have to make
any to keep the EUMM.

WHAT NEXT?


8. (C) Ambassadors Flor and Keefe both advocated for
continuing to push for an acceptable substantive resolution.
They both acknowledged that reaching a compromise text that
all sides -- including both the Russians and the Georgians --
could accept would be difficult, but they both felt strongly
that the risks of losing UNOMIG were considerable, and all
parties should therefore make every effort to find a
solution. SRSG Verbeke suggested that it was possible to
protect basic principles and renew the mission; in fact, he
said, salvaging the mission would itself support those same
principles, because the existence of the mission sends a
strong message on the unresolved nature of Georgia's
territorial conflicts. Acknowledging the Georgians'
legitimate concern about maintaining the UNSC's commitment to
the country's territorial integrity, Verbeke said that,
although the Russians would certainly not accept a direct
reference to territorial integrity, they might accept an
indirect one via reference to UNSC Resolution 1808.


9. (C) A/S Gordon said that, even if the Russians were to
accept a reference to 1808, the acceptability of a resolution
would also depend on what else it contained, noting for
example the Georgians' interest in references to the Sarkozy
agreements. SRSG Verbeke and Ambassador Flor offered a note
of caution on that point, explaining that in their draft the
Russians had finessed those reference very cleverly. Thus,
if their text survived, the Russians could argue that
compliance with the ceasefire and its implementing measures
could be considered not the primary benchmark, but only one
of several -- and thereby maintain a position that it is in
compliance with the resolution and mandate (if not with the
ceasefire).


10. (C) All participants, including Flor and Keefe, agreed
Q10. (C) All participants, including Flor and Keefe, agreed
that ultimately the Georgians must be the ones to decide if a
mandate is acceptable or not, and all parties should respect
Georgia's decision. A/S Gordon and Ambassador Fournier also
argued strongly for the importance of putting the blame for a
failed negotiation on the Russians, and everyone agreed.
Fournier noted that this point had been part of Sarkozy's
message to French officials. A/S Gordon said that the worst
case scenario would be a strenuous effort on the part of
western partners to find language acceptable to the Russians,
but which the Georgians decided they could not accept: then
the Georgians would be isolated, the Russians would perceive
that the international community is prepared to bend over
backwards to please them, and last but not least, there would
be no UN mission.


11. (C) All participants agreed that achieving a text
acceptable to both Georgia and Russia at this point was
unlikely, and another technical rollover may therefore be the
best we can hope for. SRSG Verbeke noted that technical
rollovers are not historically used for extended periods of
time -- and at seven months and counting, UNOMIG's ongoing
technical extensions are therefore a historical achievement.
Everyone also agreed that even a technical rollover text

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would require at least a reference to UNSC Resolution 1808,
as the previous two resolutions have had, but it was not
clear that the Russians would accept such a reference.


12. (C) A/S Gordon suggested that, if the UN mission in
Georgia does close, the international community might need to
get creative about maintaining its attention to the
situation. He proposed that the partners consider making a
coordinated effort to raise Georgia in the UNSC every year
anyway, even if a mission is lacking, as a way to keep the
conflicts on the world's front burner. EUMM Head Haber
agreed with this approach, saying that the EU will do so
anyway in its periodic reviews of the EUMM. Verbeke
cautioned that adding a new item every year to the UNSC
agenda was not so easy, but Ambassador Tefft thought that the
Georgians themselves would find a way to keep everyone's
attention.


13. (U) A/S Gordon did not have the opportunity to review
this telegram prior to his departure.
TEFFT