GEORGIA: FM VASHADZE DISCUSSES UNOMIG WITH A/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001073

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: FM VASHADZE DISCUSSES UNOMIG WITH A/S
GORDON

REF: A. STATE 59890

B. USUN 583

C. TBILISI 984

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a June 10 meeting focused almost
exclusively on the UN negotiations, Georgian Foreign Minister
Grigol Vashadze made clear that Georgia would stick to its
redlines, even if it meant ultimately killing a UN mission in
Georgia. EUR Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon pushed back
hard, challenging Vashadze to consider what the loss of a UN
mission would actually mean; Vashadze made clear that Georgia
had considered that issue very carefully, and it believed
that the limited impact UN has on the ground, which Russia
undermines anyway, is not worth any erosion in the
international community's recognition of Georgia's
territorial integrity. Gordon sketched out the best mandate
possible in the current environment, and Vashadze showed
little willingness to accept even that. Recognizing that the
negotiations are at an impasse, Vashadze proposed a technical
rollover as a way to put the burden squarely on the Russians
either to accept a continuation or to be the ones to kill the
mission. Gordon said that the worst possible outcome would
be for Georgia and the U.S. to end up in different places.
End summary.


2. (C) A/S Gordon, accompanied by the Ambassador, began the
UNOMIG discussion by saying that the worst possible outcome
would be for Georgia and the U.S. to end up at different
places in the negotiations. He therefore wanted to discuss
details with Vashadze in order to have a clear idea of what
might be possible. He noted that right now, the process
seems to be an impasse, with both Russia and Georgia laying
down demands that seem to irreconcilable. He encouraged
Vashadze to be as flexible as possible, because it looks
extremely unlikely that a resolution and mandate that respect
Georgia's stated redlines can be reached. In particular, he
said a direct reference to Georgia's territorial integrity
would not pass (it might be possible to include an indirect
reference via UNSCR 1808, although even that was unsure); a
name including Georgia would not pass; and no operative
paragraph based on the Sarkozy agreements is likely to pass.


3. (C) FM Vashadze made clear that Georgia is prepared to
kill a mandate that it believes undermines Georgia's
territorial integrity, rather than compromise that
fundamental principle for the sake of a continued UN presence
in Abkhazia. A/S Gordon pushed hard on this, asking in
several different ways whether the Georgians had considered
the impact on the ground of the loss of a UN mission.
Vashadze responded that the Georgians had been discussing
this intensively since January (just before the previous
"technical rollover plus" was passed),and that yes, the
government was well aware of what this position meant. The
limited security protections on the ground were not worth the
international legal concessions Georgia would have to make.
He noted that the current UN mission is not doing much to
protect the security of Abkhazia or its population, and a new
mission would not either. The Russians are already violating
the existing mandate, and they would violate a new mandate
beginning on day one. A/S Gordon noted that at least there
would be a mandate, the violations of which could be
recorded; Vashadze countered that there is a Sarkozy-brokered
Qrecorded; Vashadze countered that there is a Sarkozy-brokered
ceasefire agreement, the violations of which are being
recorded -- but without having any impact on Russian
behavior. Deputy FM Giga Bokeria noted that a mission with
executive police, and a fully demilitarized zone, would be
far more likely to make a real difference in the lives of the
local population, and the Georgians would have to think
carefully about such a proposal -- but that is notwhat is on
the table.


4. (C) Vashadze also pointed out that the EU Monitoring
Mission (EUMM) will still be in place. A/S Gordon replied
that we have heard that the Europeans cannot afford to leave
their monitors all by themselves without a UN mission in
place; Vashadze said the Georgians were hearing different
things from the Europeans. In fact the Estonian FM had told
him just the day before that the EUMM would stay no matter
what happened with UNOMIG, and they had received other such
messages from elsewhere. Vashadze and Bokeria both suggested
that the Europeans may be making such statements in order to
encourage the U.S. and Georgia to be more flexible. Vashadze
also noted that compromising on territorial integrity in the
mandate would open the government to intense criticism within
Georgia, criticism that Bokeria said would be quite valid,
because the government would not have done its duty to

TBILISI 00001073 002 OF 003


protect the country. Both noted that virtually everyone
associated with the 1994 Moscow Agreement, which enabled
Russia to begin this process of undermining Georgia's
territorial integrity, ended up an internal political outcast.


5. (C) Early in the meeting, Vashadze sketched out a
compromise deal the Georgians could live with: reference to
UNSCR 1808 and all previous resolutions; a name with Georgia;
and clear basis in the Sarkozy agreements. Absent these
elements, Vashadze said Georgia could not accept a mandate.
After considerable discussion, the Assistant Secretary
sketched out what he thought would the best deal possible
right now (although making clear that he could not guarantee
even these points): a reference to UNSCR 1808; a reference to
the Sarkozy agreements in the preambular language and in the
call for a UNSYG report on their implementation; but no
reference to Georgia in the name. He then asked if the
Georgians could live with such a resolution/mandate.
Vashadze did not quite say no, but he said it would be very
difficult. He and Bokeria both explained that giving up
Georgia in the name would be a huge step backward for Georgia
and a huge victory for Russia in its quest to erode Georgia's
territorial integrity. Although the Georgians found the
reference to 1808 (versus an explicit reference to
territorial integrity) acceptable in the previous technical
rollover resolution, they would find it harder to accept in a
resolution establishing a whole new mission; again, it would
be a huge step backward for them and a huge victory for the
Russians, especially if at the same time Georgia did not
appear in the name.


6. (C) Vashadze recognized that it is unlikely that language
acceptable to both Russia and Georgia could be found at this
point. He therefore proposed a technical rollover. He said
that Georgia was prepared to go it alone, killing an
unacceptable mandate even if the U.S. decided it could not
afford to jeopardize an improved relationship with Russia and
therefore supported a compromise resolution. However, he
said that if the U.S., and ideally the Europeans, were
willing to stand with Georgia and propose a technical
rollover, then Russia would find itself in the position of
either going along or being the one to kill a second
international mission within a few months. He predicted that
Russia will panic if the U.S. hangs tough and presents Russia
with that choice. If a technical rollover passes, Vashadze
noted that we will have retained the name of UNOMIG, the
presence of a UN mission (which not only protects security
but reminds the world there is an ongoing conflict),and
Georgia's claim to territorial integrity, while avoiding
legitimizing Russia's "new reality."


7. (C) A/S Gordon did not commit to taking Vashadze's
suggestion and pursuing a technical rollover. He did repeat
his statement that the worst possible case would be for the
U.S. and Georgia to end up at different places, because in
that scenario, first, the U.S. would appear unwilling to
stand up to Russia and Georgia would be blamed; and second,
there would be no UN mission. He also said that ultimately,
the Georgians must be the ones to judge what is best for
their country. Finally, if the mission is not renewed, he
said we are better off if Russia is the one blamed. Vashadze
Qsaid we are better off if Russia is the one blamed. Vashadze
provided the draft text of a technical rollover resolution,
which he proposed could serve as a proposal to present to the
Russians, possibly even directly from the U.S. (see paragraph
8). A/S Gordon noted that the Russians might not even accept
the technical rollover language; Vashadze repeated that at
least the Russians would then be the ones to kill the UN
mission. Vashadze said that other than a technical rollover,
he saw two other possibilities: kill the mission, or table
the German draft (an option he thought the Europeans would be
unlikely to pursue).

GEORGIAN DRAFT TEXT OF TECHNICAL ROLLOVER


8. (SBU) Vashadze provided the following draft text.

(Begin text.)

The Security Council

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Georgia, including
resolutions 1808 of 15 April 2008 (S/RES/1808),1839 of 9
October 2008 (S/RES/1839) and 1866 or 13 February 2009
(S/RES/1866),

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May
2009 (S/RES/254),


TBILISI 00001073 003 OF 003


1) Decides to extend the mandate of the UN mission for a new
period terminating on 25 September 2009;

2) Requests the Secretary-General to further elaborate the
recommendations concerning the security regime on the ground
and future activities of the UN mission by September 1, 2009,
taking into account future deliberations at the Geneva
Discussions of July 1, 2009 and afterwards;

3) Decides to temporarily leave in force the security regime
set forth in the resolution 1866 of 13 February 2009
(S/RES/1866);

4) Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.

(End text.)


9. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Gordon.
TEFFT