Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI1057
2009-06-08 15:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: PEREVI -- STILL COMPLICATED

Tags:  PREL MOPS KPTS RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3263
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1057/01 1591502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081502Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1688
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0236
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4854
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001057 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: PEREVI -- STILL COMPLICATED

REF: A. TBILISI 0808

B. TBILISI 0674

C. 08 TBILISI 2413

D. 08 TBILISI 2111

E. 08 TBILISI 1988

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001057

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: PEREVI -- STILL COMPLICATED

REF: A. TBILISI 0808

B. TBILISI 0674

C. 08 TBILISI 2413

D. 08 TBILISI 2111

E. 08 TBILISI 1988

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. Russian forces still occupy the
small village of Perevi, which is located in undisputed
Georgian territory and outside South Ossetia -- a fact even
the Russians do not dispute in private. The EUMM reports the
Russians may be preparing finally to withdraw, thereby
resolving an unambiguous violation of their ceasefire
commitments, although the EUMM has been saying this for
months. The Georgians have also heard about a possible
withdrawal, but intend to downplay it if it happens,
concerned lest the Russians turn such a long-overdue move
into a public relations victory. Meanwhile the OSCE reports
Perevi villagers are concerned about the recent arrival of
South Ossetian militia in villages near Perevi, where some
ethnic Georgians have reportedly been robbed. The U.S. and
other international partners may be in the best position to
encourage a resolution of the situation without handing
Russia undeserved recognition. End summary and comment.

ARE THE RUSSIANS FINALLY LEAVING?


2. (C) On June 4, Head of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
Hansjoerg Haber told Tbilisi-based diplomats that Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin told him during the
May 18-19 Geneva talks that the Russians are getting ready to
pull out of Perevi. Haber has since followed up with various
Russian contacts, including General Proshkin, who
participated in the Geneva talks and the first Incident
Prevention Meeting in Ergneti (ref A); Proshkin said the
Russian military would continue activities until June 15, at
which point they would undertake a handover. It was not
clear to Haber, however, to whom such a handover would be
made: the Georgians, the South Ossetians, or even the
Russians' own Border Guards. Russian officials, such as
Russian Ambassador to the EU Chizhov, have given Haber
promises of an imminent departure before (ref B); Karasin and
Chizhov have both admitted to Haber that Perevi is outside
South Ossetia. The Russians have explained to Haber that
they intend to leave, but they want to avoid a repeat of

their aborted departure in December 2008, when they claim the
arrival of large number of Georgian special forces forced
them to return. The Russians also want to avoid a public
declaration of victory by the Georgian side, such as the
statement President Saakashvili made on December 12. The
EUMM's position has been to agree to the Russian terms of a
quiet handover in order to facilitate a rapid departure.


3. (C) Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria told the
Ambassador on June 5 that he had heard the Russianswere
looking to depart Perevi soon. He said the Georgian
government would of course welcome such a move, but would
avoid giving the event too high of a profile. Since the
Russians should have departed Perevi last October, he
explained, and since the Russians admit that Perevi is
outside South Ossetia, then the Georgian government would not
want the Russians to get too much credit for something they
should have done long ago. Furthermore, Bokeria said that a
withdrawal from Perevi would have minimal impact on the
Russians' larger, ongoing violations of the ceasefire; he
would not want the Russians to get away with casting this
action as a major, or even the final step in fulfilling its
Qaction as a major, or even the final step in fulfilling its
commitments.

MEANWHILE, LIFE IN PEREVI IS STILL PRECARIOUS

4 (SBU) The OSCE, the EUMM, and almost all other
international organizations have not had access to Perevi for
months; except for December 12-13, 2008, the Georgian
government has not had access since the war. On June 4, OSCE
monitors observed World Food Programme (WFP) personnel
distributing food aid to Perevi villagers; WFP remains one of
the only organizations that can still enter the village. On
the same day, OSCE monitors also observed a Russian military
helicopter flying along the administrative boundary.


5. (SBU) On June 8, the OSCE received reports from villagers
in Perevi that South Ossetian militia had moved to nearby
villages just across the administrative boundary inside South
Ossetia: 300 in Sinaguri, just north of Perevi, and 50 in
Karzmani, just east of Perevi. Those in Karzmani reportedly
robbed some ethnic Georgians of such property as cattle. The
Perevi villagers expressed serious concern to OSCE about the
presence of these militia and said they would consider
leaving if the militia remained so close. Because of their

TBILISI 00001057 002 OF 002


lack of access to Perevi or South Ossetia, the OSCE cannot
confirm these reports.

COMMENT: LONG OVERDUE -- BUT NOT ENOUGH


6. (C) Although of little strategic importance, Perevi
remains one of the most conspicuous examples of Russia's
ongoing violations of the ceasefire. If Haber's reports are
accurate, even the Russian MFA is embarrassed by the Russian
military's presence there and would prefer to withdraw. The
community of several hundred that live in Perevi face real
hardships and fears, and a Russian withdrawal would resolve
those concerns immediately (although not those of the ethnic
Georgians across the boundary inside South Ossetia). At the
same time, DFM Bokeria's concerns are valid: a withdrawal
from Perevi is a minuscule, if important, step toward the
fulfillment of Russia's commitments, and it should not be
portrayed in any other way. Georgia finds itself in the
peculiar position of not pushing too hard for a withdrawal
from Perevi to avoid giving Russia a potential public
relations victory, or a bargaining chip in the Geneva
discussions or elsewhere. The U.S. and our other partners
may have the most leverage to press Russia to do the right
thing without having to trade something else away.
TEFFT