GEORGIA: 2ND INCIDENT MECHANISM BETTER, OR MAYBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001045

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: 2ND INCIDENT MECHANISM BETTER, OR MAYBE
NOT

REF: A. TBILISI 0808

B. GENEVA 0183

C. GENEVA 0409

D. GENEVA 0229

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. On May 29 the EUMM and OSCE
co-facilitated the second session of the Joint Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanism (JIPRM) at Dvani on the
South Ossetian administrative boundary line. The
participants engaged on such substantive issues as security
for locals living near the boundary; gas for Akhalgori;
electricity for Akhalgori and Tskhinvali; investigation of
detentions; and joint visits. The South Ossetian de facto
representative agreed to allow EUMM and OSCE to facilitate
the meeting, but insisted that the EU and Russia should
jointly chair the JIPRM in the long term. He also raised the
case of three Ossetians missing since October 2008, stating
that this case -- and the chairmanship issue -- must be
resolved before South Ossetia can participate again. The
Georgian representative proposed a visit into undisputed
Georgian territory to investigate the disappearances,
followed by reciprocal visits to South Ossetia -- but the
South Ossetian refused. The next meeting of the JIPRM,
tentatively scheduled for June 11 in Ditsi, seems unlikely to
happen. Even though this session was closer to the original
mechanism concept than the first, the South Ossetians clearly
put issues of status above progress on concrete concerns --
including those of their own people. End summary and comment.

MEETING ONE, PART TWO


2. (C) In a briefing for diplomatic colleagues on June 4,
Head of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Hansjoerg Haber
continued his practice of referring to the May 29 session as
a continuation of the first meeting of the JIPRM, held April
23 (most of the following is based on his account. See ref A
for the first meeting). His rationale is that the Russian
and South Ossetian participants only provisionally tolerate
the arrangement of joint EUMM-OSCE facilitation, and he did
not want to give them a pretext to boycott the meeting. He
also maintains that the discussion was a continuation of
those points of the original agenda not covered on April 23.
The meeting got off to a more promising start than the first.
OSCE Chief Military Officer Steve Young told Emboff he was
surprised when the South Ossetian participant, Merab Chigoev
(deputy of the de facto "president"'s special
representative),readily agreed to allow EUMM and OSCE to
continue their role as joint facilitators. Haber proposed
that the group start with substantive issues, rather than
procedural ones, which had taken up the entire four hours of
the first meeting, and everyone agreed. Haber detected a
more cooperative attitude from the South Ossetians and told
his diplomatic colleagues he thought the Russians had
prevailed upon them to play nice.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES


3. (C) Deputy Reintegration Minister David Rakviashvili,
leader of the Georgian delegation (he did not participate in
the first session),raised the issue of freedom of movement
for local residents who live near the administrative boundary
lines to access fields and pastures across the boundary. He
said that such villagers, who before the August 2008 conflict
were accustomed to crossing the boundary on a regular basis
and grew dependent on that access for their livelihood,
should be able to return home if they cross the boundary.
Noting the presence of Russian "border guards" along the
QNoting the presence of Russian "border guards" along the
boundary, Rakviashvili directed part of his question to the
Russian representatives, asking what they would do to ensure
the safety of locals. Deputy Head of the OSCE's Conflict
Prevention Center Pascal Heyman, leader of the OSCE
delegation, also saw this as an important issue. Chigoev
admitted the importance of guaranteeing the safety of local
residents, but said that a "border is a border," so that
regular movement back and forth would not be possible. Steve
Young reported Chigoev also rejected the idea of
cross-boundary trade. The Russians did not offer much of a
response, saying only that they would uphold local residents'
rights. (Note: Before the war, the boundary was poorly
defined and control was often not enforced, so that many
locals crossed over to use holdings on the other side on a
regular, even daily basis. Even now, a great deal of
confusion remains over the precise definition of the boundary
in many places. Even if the South Ossetians or Russians seek
to impose a hermetic seal, they will face considerable
difficulty in doing so, and detentions, confrontations, and
occasional violence will likely occur. Also, trade
restrictions will likely harm South Ossetian villagers, who

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have no other realistic partners, more than those south of
the boundary. End note.)


4. (SBU) Haber raised another access issue -- the ability of
locals to cross the boundary to visit cemeteries and
religious sites. Neither the Georgian nor the South Ossetian
side expressed any objections to such visits. The EUMM
undertook to prepare a list of such sites and ultimately to
facilitate such movements.


5. (C) In an emotional appeal, Chigoev raised the specific
case of three Ossetians who disappeared in October 2008, who
the de facto authorities suspect were detained by Georgian
authorities. He went on to insist that the issue must be
resolved before South Ossetia will participate in another
session of the JIPRM. (Note: The South Ossetians have raised
this case frequently in the past, including with the EUMM and
at the Geneva talks. They did so at the most recent meeting
on May 18-19, and EU Special Representative Pierre Morel
suggested that this was exactly the kind of case that the
JIPRM was designed to tackle. Haber told his diplomatic
colleague the EUMM was willing to conduct investigations into
the case, including with the Georgian Ministry of Internal
Affairs, but it had no executive authority to do much more
than ask questions. End note.) In Steve Young's words,
Rakviashvili then called Chigoev's bluff, saying that Georgia
would be willing to allow a South Ossetian de facto
delegation to visit the area where they believe the three
were detained, if the South Ossetians would then be willing
to allow a Georgian delegation into South Ossetia to
investigate cases of concern on that side of the boundary.
(Note: The Geneva-sourced document that establishes the JIPRM
envisions, but does not mandate, just such joint visits --
see ref B. End note.) Chigoev refused the offer.


6. (C) Chigoev also raised the issue of gas deliveries to
Akhalgori and electricity deliveries to Akhalgori and
Tskhinvali, complaining that the Georgian side had not yet
delivered on its commitments to ensure steady deliveries into
South Ossetia. Although Rakviashvili suggested that the
second Geneva working group was a more appropriate forum to
discuss such issues (see refs C, D),Haber pushed back,
saying that there was no reason for the JIPRM to limit itself
to certain topics. Regarding the gas question, Heyman noted
that the South Ossetians themselves had not yet fulfilled the
recommendation of the OSCE expert to install a second
pressure gauge on the South Ossetian side in order to help
track the deliveries more precisely.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES


7. (C) The sides did not reach agreement on the chairmanship
of the JIPRM. The EUMM and OSCE's position is that they
should serve as chairs, because they are the two Geneva
co-chairs represented in the JIPRM, which itself derived from
Geneva; Georgia supports this position. Chigoev repeated
South Ossetia's refusal to accept the OSCE as a co-chair and
proposed instead the EUMM and Russia, arguing that the Geneva
process itself derives from the ceasefire agreement and its
implementing measures, of which EU and Russia are the
"parties" (sic). Furthermore, Chigoev stated that South
Ossetia would not be able to participate in another JIPRM
meeting until this issue is resolved.


8. (C) Rakviashvili repeated Georgia's interest in holding
JIPRM meetings on both sides of the boundary. (Note: The
Georgian position derives from their commitment to joint
visits on both sides of the boundary; they believe that an
Qvisits on both sides of the boundary; they believe that an
inability to hold even JIPRM meetings on both sides
undermines the principle of access, which is necessary for
joint visits to incident locations. End note.) Chigoev, who
did not object to the idea in principle on April 23 (ref A),
expressed South Ossetia's objection to holding the meeting
anywhere other than on the boundary. Haber told his
diplomatic colleagues that, in a private conversation in
Geneva, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin told
him that Russia agreed that confidence-building measures
should take place on both sides, but that he was not the
"foreign minister" of South Ossetia.


9. (SBU) The parties agreed in principle to hold the next
session on June 11 at Ditsi, on the administrative boundary.

COMMENT: A STEP FORWARD -- OR MAYBE NOT


10. (C) Haber and his staff portrayed the second session of
the JIPRM in a fairly rosy light, suggesting that finally the
parties started to get down to the real issues the mechanism
was designed to handle. Steve Young was also guardedly
optimistic, calling the meeting "interesting" in the positive

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sense of having elements that might hold promise for the
future. The issues raised are important ones, and further
discussion could possibly lead to mutually acceptable
solutions -- so in that sense, May 29 was indeed a step
forward. Based on South Ossetia's two preconditions for the
next meeting, however -- a resolution of the three
disappeared Ossetians and the chairmanship issue -- Post is
less sanguine. Despite Chigoev's emotion over the fate of
the three missing, he would not consider Georgia's reasonable
proposal -- provided for in the Geneva document establishing
the JIPRM -- to implement a joint visit to investigate the
incident. It is clear that South Ossetia's attitude toward
the JIPRM is colored first and foremost by status
considerations and only secondarily by an interest in
practical issues that directly affect the South Ossetian
population. His objection to cross-boundary trade, which
would benefit South Ossetians more than anyone, reflects this
same hierarchy of values. The only conceivable venues for
resolving either the disappearances or the chairmanship
issues are the JIPRM itself and Geneva -- so unless South
Ossetia backs away from its conditions, the JIPRM will not be
meeting again anytime soon.
TEFFT