Uzbekistan: Border Security Training Courses at Termez

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 000941

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, EXBS FOR JEFF HARTSHORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/06/08
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV KNNP PHUM ASEC UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Border Security Training Courses at Termez

REF: STATE

CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, State, Pol-Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: From April 5 through April 17, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection trainers conducted border interdiction and rail
interdiction training courses for Government of Uzbekistan
officials at Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan. Uzbek
participants actively participated in the training activities and
shared information about conditions at the border. While Uzbek law
enforcement officials who participated appeared highly
knowledgeable, shortfalls in basic equipment may limit their
effectiveness and low salaries suggest a potential for corruption.
Uzbek participants were grateful for the training event, with some
citing modules on concealment methods, trafficking-in-persons,
detecting impostors, and behavioral analysis as especially
valuable. In addition to enhancing the expertise of Uzbek
officials, such courses expand awareness of human rights among
Uzbekistan's law enforcement community and provide a platform for
us to learn sensitive information about conditions at Uzbekistan's
borders. End summary.




2. (C) A team of Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) trainers, with support from State's Export Control
and Related Border Security Program (EXBS),taught two courses on
International Border Interdiction Training (IBIT) and International
Rail Interdiction Training (IRIT) for 11 Uzbek Customs and Border
Guard officials at Termez from April 5 through April 17. (Note:
Despite an invitation for over 24 Government of Uzbekistan (GOU)
officials, only 11 could participate due to Uzbekistan's
requirement to maintain a minimum number of personnel on the border
during this timeframe. Nine of the participants worked at the
border with Afghanistan, while two flew down from Tashkent. End
note.) The Government of Uzbekistan provided its own
facilities-the Surkhandarya Province Customs Headquarters-for this
training.




3. (SBU) The International Border Interdiction Training course
spanned a host of topics-including targeting, tools, and
technology, containers and seals, behavioral analysis, examining
commodities, vehicle examinations, document analysis, passenger
selectivity, explosives, and trafficking in persons-and included
classroom and practical exercises. During the second week, the
International Rail Interdiction Training course examined some of
the same topics in a rail context as well as rail examinations of
freight, risks, safety, and passengers. The Uzbek participants
were engaged in this training, actively participated in
discussions, and frequently asked (and responded to) questions.



Conditions at Border

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4. (C) At the opening of the first training course, Uzbek Customs
and Border Guard officials shared information about conditions at
the border with Afghanistan and their respective roles. Customs
officer Daniyar Maksumov stated that Uzbekistan detects radioactive
materials crossing its borders about twice per year, and these
incidents tend to take place on railway lines. A Customs officer
named Norkobilov said that Uzbekistan has 44 officers at the border
crossing point with Afghanistan, and revealed that 140-160
passengers, 80-100 vehicles, and 180-200 rail cars cross the border
each day. All are subject to Customs inspections, he continued,
and Uzbekistan inspects everything here very carefully due to
Afghanistan's proximity.

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5. (C) CBP trainers observed conditions at the border during
practical exercises. The border crossing point is open from 0600
to 1800 each day. All photography at the border crossing point,
including at tourist sites nearby, was prohibited. The Government
of Uzbekistan maintains strict control of the border with
Afghanistan, with a depth of approximately two miles between the
entrance and exit of the border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.
The border has three lines of defense consisting of personnel from
Uzbekistan's Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, and
Customs, all of whom have radio communications with one another.
Physical security is excellent, and Ministry of Internal Affairs
units, equipped with fully automatic modified AK-47s, allow only
two vehicles and one truck into the inspection site at any given
time on the inbound and outbound lanes. GOU officials use vehicle
racks and pits for all personal and commercial vehicles to drive
over, enabling the officer conducting the inspection to safely look
under the vehicle in question. There also is a fixed walk-over
approximately 25 feet high and 80 feet long to enable the officer
to walk the length of the vehicle rack and pit to see the tops of
all commercial vehicles. Border Guards were armed with pistols
(some Border Guards at the border fence also carried fully
automatic modified AK-47s). Customs officers made up the tertiary
line of defense, and CPB trainers observed no weapons at the
inspection site. Customs indicated, however, that weaponry
appropriate for any situation is available for officers if needed.





6. (C) The GOU is able to monitor the border from multiple
watchtowers. The border perimeter fence has approximately twenty
feet of open dirt that Uzbek officials track every day, laying an
even surface to help determine whether anyone has attempted to
cross it. The fence also is electrified each night when the gate
is closed, and has barbs every two to three inches to deter
unauthorized crossing. GOU officials at the border remarked that
in the 1990s, there had been coordination between the GOU and
Government of Afghanistan officials across the border, but this was
no longer the case. In the wake of the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan, the Taliban had overrun Uzbekistan's lines, and so
Uzbekistan had built the electric fence along the border.




7. (C) Pedestrians and vehicles must pass through radiation portal
monitors (RPMs) that are under camera surveillance. CBP trainers
observed that the radiation portal monitor console was up-to-date
with current software and is user-friendly. The RPM console showed
crisp pictures of all rail cars and identification numbers that had
passed through the border, and displayed approximately 21,000
entries since its inception. Uzbek officers indicated that
information about radiation alarms is instantly relayed to Tashkent
and officers must also report such information to their
supervisors. All officers appeared to have a good working
knowledge of the RPM system.




8. (C) At the inspection site, Uzbek officers displayed a working
knowledge of inspection of vehicles, trucks, and railcars. The CBP
trainers drew attention to several areas of trucks that Uzbek
officials should search more thoroughly, however. They also showed
Uzbek officers how Customs' seals-which they had previously put
much faith in-can be easily defeated.



Assessment of Border Security Equipment

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9. (C) CPB trainers observed that the buster at the border needed
to be calibrated. (Note: This is a 7000 USD piece of equipment
that measures cargo densities. End note.) The trainers attempted
to do this themselves but failed, and advised that it be sent out
to be serviced, but Uzbek officials have no plans to ship the unit
back to the U.S. for repairs because of the shipping costs. The
fiber optic scope at the border was fully functional. Trainers saw
an MKC-A08 (a Russian radioisotope identification device),a bomb
mirror with an extension pole, and other miscellaneous equipment
including a drill and large flashlights at the site.



Personnel Knowledgeable, but Poorly Paid and Equipped

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10. (C) The CPB trainers assessed Uzbek officials at the border as
highly professional, dressed in impeccable uniforms, eager to
learn, and quick to offer assistance to fellow officers.
Nevertheless, they found that these officials lack some of the
basic tools needed for their jobs, including brass hammers, probes,
simple screwdrivers, vehicle disassembly equipment, and appropriate
flashlights with batteries. While officials did have bulky
flashlights, they were unable to use these effectively to look into
small crevices. CBP trainers recommended providing Uzbek officials
with small flashlights with battery-driven lights or hand-crank
systems. Furthermore, Uzbek officials lacked basic first aid
materials aside from a few band aids and performed potentially
dangerous inspections with thin cloth gloves and without safety
glasses.




11. (C) Customs officials make roughly 300 USD a month and are all
paid through electronic funds transfers. Customs officials
complained, however, that the state-owned banks in Uzbekistan
"double-dip"-the Government of Uzbekistan charges a 20 percent
commission on top of taxes when Customs officials withdraw their
money. They also wondered how a former Customs officer who lives
in the area had been able to purchase a huge house.




12. (C) The CBP trainers also suggested that providing Uzbekistan
with a rail Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS),which
would require relatively little maintenance, could assist border
security efforts. Uzbek officials, however, expressed more
interest in a mobile VACIS to give themselves more flexibility.
CBP trainers recommended further U.S. Border Tactical Control Unit
(BORTAC) training for Uzbek officials to improve their ability to
handle diverse situations that could potentially arise at the
border. (Note: BORTAC is a CBP special response team that has
performed a wide variety of missions including international
training, counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations,
interdiction and patrol operations, and more. End note.)



HAZMAT Response Capabilities Questionable

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13. (C) Termez lacks an onsite HAZMAT response capability. GOU

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officials here instead use an unspecified offsite company. Thus,
the length of time before HAZMAT response personnel would arrive in
the event of an incident is unclear. CBP trainers told Poloff that
if funding is available, providing GOU officials with
Russian-language copies of Hazardous Material Response Emergency
Books would help address this gap.



How Would Uzbekistan Respond to Threats to Transiting Cargo?

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14. (C) When asked to address how Uzbekistan would respond to
information suggesting a threat to cargo transiting Uzbekistan's
borders, the Uzbek participants were silent for a long period. One
noted the existence of a hotline that anyone can use 24 hours a day
to report such information to Uzbekistan's authorities. Another
alluded to a "special unit" that would work with such information.
Others said they would simply report to appropriate officials if
they became aware of such threats. Participants did not appear to
be proactive in seeking information about potential threats to
cargo shipments or observations of anything out of the ordinary
from drivers who cross the border between Uzbekistan and
Afghanistan. They noted that drivers always try to cross the
border quickly and silently.



Feedback from Students

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15. (SBU) GOU participants wrote favorable comments about both the
IBIT and IRIT courses in their feedback forms. On IBIT, four
participants cited the module on methods of concealment in
commercial and cargo vehicles as one the most valuable aspects of
the course, with one officer adding that this had been very useful
given the large volume of goods that transit the country by
vehicles and the numerous attempts to hide illicit goods that the
GOU has discovered. Students also highly praised the modules on
trafficking in persons, detecting imposters, and behavioral
analysis of persons crossing the border. Students only highlighted
one module-on the entrance authorization process-as being not
valuable, as it was geared toward new officers.



Comment:

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16. (C) These border security training courses not only improved
the expertise of Government of Uzbekistan officials, but also
provided a useful platform from which we were able to glean data
about conditions and vulnerabilities at Uzbekistan's borders that
would be difficult to obtain otherwise. Moreover, in addition to
enhancing Uzbekistan's ability to secure its borders, this
course-with its well-received module on
trafficking-in-persons-illustrates how security cooperation also
helps to raise the Uzbek law enforcement community's awareness of
human rights.
NORLAND