The Path to the Sea - The Larger Implications of NDN for

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000717

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, S/SRAP, SCA
PASS TO USAID
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/12
TAGS: ELTN MARR PREL AF UZ ZK
SUBJECT: The Path to the Sea - The Larger Implications of NDN for
Uzbekistan and Central Asia

REF: TASHKENT 669; TASHKENT 707

CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: The establishment of the Northern Distribution
Network (NDN) connecting Central Asia and Afghanistan has the
potential to transform regional commerce and transportation.
Uzbekistan and some of the other Central Asian states have
relatively well-developed rail networks that, as legacies of the
Soviet period, are linked to Europe (and to a lesser extent Asia)
via Russia. Afghanistan, apart from a few kilometers of track
between Termez, Uzbekistan and Hairaton, has never been connected
to this network in a significant way. For Uzbekistan, Afghanistan
is the primary obstacle to linking its (and Central Asia's) rail
network to ports in Iran and Pakistan. Currently, as TRANSCOM
Commander General McNabb was informed during his recent visit (ref
A),the Uzbeks are very actively pushing plans to extend the rail
line from Hairaton to Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan, a line that
they believe their companies could build, with a view to relieving
congestion in Hairaton in the near term and reaching the southern
sea ports in the longer term. This has important implications for
U.S. interests in the region. The extension of rail connections
between Central Asia, Afghanistan and its southern neighbors would
not only facilitate our own supply efforts, but it would also
provide a needed boost to regional commerce on a north-south axis
between Central and South Asia. Moreover, it would ease the hold
Russia has over transportation links in the region, giving all of
Central Asia access to vital ports and bolstering the political
autonomy of its states while, at the same time, providing a foil to
Iranian efforts to bring Afghanistan into its transportation and
commercial sphere of influence. This is a project with the
potential to have a profound and lasting impact to which the U.S.
should lend its full backing to ensure that financing is
forthcoming for its realization. End Summary.




2. (C) The signing of the exchange of letters with Uzbekistan on
April 3 enabled shipments to move through the NDN to Afghanistan.
Already in the first several days since the GOU issued transit
authorizations, over a thousand containers are set to transit
Uzbekistan by rail to Hairaton, Afghanistan. NDN has created the
ability to move supplies to our forces with relative speed and in
large volumes (the transit time from Riga to Hairaton is eight
days). NDN's rail shipping routes originate in Riga, Latvia and
Poti, Georgia, from where all trains must transit Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, entering Afghanistan at Hairaton, the terminus of the
rail line. With the volume of NDN shipments set to pick up, the
Uzbeks have voiced concern about Hairaton becoming a choke point,
effectively limiting capacity and causing backups throughout
Uzbekistan's rail network. While upgrades in Hairaton can likely
remedy any problems in the short term, this issue underscores the
larger problem of Afghanistan's continued isolation from the
transportation networks of Central Asia.




3. (C) A solution that the Uzbeks have advocated for some time is
the extension of the rail line from Hairaton some sixty kilometers
to Mazar-e Sharif, on Afghanistan's ring road. Our GOU
interlocutors tell us that Uzbek companies have the technical
capacity and experience to build this extension quickly, if
financing were available. The Asian Development Bank is financing
a feasibility study for the project (apparently not the first such
feasibility study that has been done). The Uzbeks would like to
have their own companies build the rail line and believe that they
have been unfairly shut out of Afghan reconstruction contracting to
the benefit of large firms from donor countries. Having Uzbekistan
involved in reconstruction projects in Afghanistan may have merit
in its own right by giving Tashkent a greater stake in the

TASHKENT 00000717 002 OF 002


development and stability of its neighbor. However, beyond the
immediate question of getting business, Uzbekistan (and the other
Central Asian countries) has an economic and strategic interest at
stake in the building of this rail line that coincides with U.S.
objectives in Afghanistan and the larger region.




4. (C) Central Asia has a well-developed rail network that is a
legacy of Russian and Soviet rule in the region, beginning in the
late nineteenth century. Also a legacy of this Russian-built
network (and the decades of chaos in Afghanistan) is its northern
orientation. Apart from the trans-Caspian line, Russia remains the
hub of Central Asia's rail spokes. Russian dominance of the
economies of Uzbekistan and the region spans the spectrum of
economic sectors, but at the heart of it all lie transportation
links.




5. (C) Uzbekistan's interest in extending the rail line from
Hairaton to Mazar-e Sharif is only the first step in what many
Uzbeks view as a "game changer" for their country and the larger
region. One of the consequences of Afghanistan's instability has
been to prevent the development of a link between Central Asia and
ports in Pakistan and Iran. Some Uzbeks believe that Moscow would
just as soon things remain that way, perpetuating Central Asia's
links to its former colonial master - the fact that the Soviets
never embarked on a project to extend rail lines into Afghanistan
during their ten-year occupation is cited as evidence. Whatever the
case may be, the north-south commerce that would bring Central Asia
and Afghanistan closer together cannot fully develop without
concomitant "lines of communication," of which rail is an essential
element.




6. (C) Comment: Supporting the Uzbeks on construction of a rail
line to Mazar-e Sharif would pay multiple dividends. First of all,
it would increase the efficiency of NDN. Second, it would help
encourage trade between Afghanistan and Central Asia (and possibly
serve as a force multiplier for the proposed Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan). Third, it would serve to open
paths to the sea for the landlocked Central Asian states and, in
the process, give them options for managing Russian influence in
the region (Note: We are not proposing to lock the Russians out;
this is not the "Great Game."). Fourth, supporting an Uzbek bid to
build the line would secure political support in Tashkent for NDN
and give the GOU a greater stake in success in Afghanistan.
Finally, integration of Afghanistan into the Central Asia rail
network would balance out Iranian plans to connect Herat to
Tajikistan across northern Afghanistan, ensuring a larger economic
role in Afghanistan for the secular Central Asian states. This is a
project with enormous potential to which the USG should lend its
full backing for financing and construction.
NORLAND