Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT469
2009-04-07 11:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

Uzbekistan: DTRA and Uzbek Officials Review Biological

Tags:  TBIO TSPL PTER PINS PGOV PBTS PREL ASEC SENV UZ 
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FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0723
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0022
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000469 

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AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01
TAGS: TBIO TSPL PTER PINS PGOV PBTS PREL ASEC SENV UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: DTRA and Uzbek Officials Review Biological
Threat Reduction Cooperation

CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000469

SIPDIS SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01
TAGS: TBIO TSPL PTER PINS PGOV PBTS PREL ASEC SENV UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: DTRA and Uzbek Officials Review Biological
Threat Reduction Cooperation

CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: A Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) delegation
met with officials from the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) in
mid-March to discuss cooperation under the framework of the
Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP). The GOU showed up in
force and at a high level--with many Deputy Ministers
present--during the Executive Review/Implementing Program Review of
the BTRP on March 16, and office calls that DTRA conducted at
various ministries were productive and positive. The DTRA
delegation also visited several Regional Diagnostic Laboratories
built in Uzbekistan's provinces with BTRP support. The delegation
met both of its primary objectives: highlighting for the Government
of Uzbekistan the importance of an improved alignment of Uzbek laws
and regulations with Threat Agent Detection and Response processes
as well as establishing a roadmap toward official acceptance of the
Electronic Infectious Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) developed
collaboratively with the GOU and funded by DTRA. Also notable were
comments that GOU officials made about Uzbek threat perceptions,
including the MOD's view that water shortages could lead to war
down the road and its concern that terrorists could employ
bioterrorism against Uzbekistan's armed forces. End summary.

Executive Review/Implementing Program Review
-------------- --------------
-



2. (SBU) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Director Rear Admiral
John Byrd (ret.) and CTR Policy Director Jim Reid led a Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) delegation that met with officials
from the Government of Uzbekistan on March 13-18 to discuss
cooperation under the framework of the Biological Threat Reduction
Program (BTRP). Ambassador Norland accompanied the DTRA delegation
to the Executive Review and Implementing Program Review for the
BTRP at the International Business Center in Tashkent on March 16.
The Government of Uzbekistan displayed its seriousness of purpose
with a presence of some 30 officials drawn from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA),Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES),
Ministry of Defense (MOD),Ministry of Health (MOH),and Ministry
of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR). GOU officials present
included Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations Lt. Col. Khakimjon
Abdulazizov, First Deputy Foreign Minister Khamidulla Karamatov,
Deputy Minister of Defense Maj.-Gen. Rustam Niyazov, Deputy
Minister of Health Bakhtiyar Niyazmatov, and Deputy Minister of
Agriculture and Water Resources Shermat Nurmatov.


3. (SBU) Admiral Byrd expressed his appreciation for the great
cooperation that the U.S. and Uzbekistan have enjoyed over the
years in combating the threat of bioterrorism. Ambassador Norland
indicated that both the U.S. Government and U.S. Embassy are strong
supporters of collaboration on the BTRP, the value of which to date
has exceeded $130 million. He cited this as an example of
pragmatic cooperation, and that it serves our mutual interests to
move forward on this initiative.


4. (C) Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations Abdulazizov
responded that the U.S. and Uzbekistan are fighting a threat that
can appear at any time, and cited the appearance of an unknown
powder at the U.S. Embassy on December 30. "Terrorism has no
boundaries. We must fight it together," he asserted. He called
the development of Uzbekistan's capabilities to detect and respond
to especially dangerous pathogens an "urgent issue."

Recent BTRP Accomplishments
-------------- -


5. (SBU) The DTRA delegation highlighted a number of recent
accomplishments in Uzbekistan that have taken place under the BTRP.
Some of these accomplishments fall under BTRP's Biological Safety
and Security/Threat Agent Detection and Response (BSS/TADR)
Project. (Note: TADR seeks to reduce the risk of theft, diversion,
or accidental release of pathogens by strengthening safety and
security measures. It also establishes an integrated, secure, and
sustainable network to detect and respond to deliberate or

TASHKENT 00000469 002 OF 005


accidental release of Especially Dangerous Pathogens (EDPs). End
note.) Recent TADR-related accomplishments include: the
installation of the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance
System (EIDSS) into all six constructed Regional Diagnostic
Laboratory (RDL) facilities in Uzbekistan (Note: Regional
Diagnostic Laboratories are intended to provide real-time detection
of Especially Dangerous Pathogens (EDPs) using modern technology.
The GOU also can use such labs for other research and diagnostic
purposes consistent with promoting biosafety and security. End
note.); installation of, training on, and acceptance of the
Pathogen Asset Control System for inventory of strains at two RDLs
with strain repository capabilities; the completion of an analysis
related to giving the GOU the capability to produce its own
bacteriological media; the creation of working groups to facilitate
BTRP implementation; and preparation for training exercises in
Samarkand and Karshi this spring. Recent accomplishments in
promoting biosafety and biosecurity include: continued support of
the creation and implementation of biosecurity and biosafety
procedures at all of Uzbekistan's BTRP-related facilities;
additional security upgrades at the Center for Prophylaxis of
Quarantine of Most Hazardous Infections (CPQMHI) in Tashkent;
upgraded training rooms at the Chief Veterinary Directorate for
Especially Dangerous Pathogens (CVD-ESP) in Tashkent, which
oversees animal disease surveillance systems in Uzbekistan; and
additional security improvements at the Uzbek Scientific Research
Institute of Veterinary Science (UzSRIV). BTRP has recently
trained over 1,300 lab staff, epidemiologists, and clinicians in
the country. BTRP also has completed assessments of plague,
anthrax, tularemia, and arbovirus infections across Uzbekistan
through Collaborative Biological Research (CBR) projects that fund
research for the GOU and sometimes result in publications.

BTRP Plans for the Coming Year
--------------


6. (SBU) The DTRA delegation also discussed a series of activities
projected through March 2010 for BTRP. BTRP plans to commence
construction of additional labs in the Ferghana Valley; continue to
provide maintenance, sustainment, and training to seven Regional
Diagnostic Laboratories; continue long-range sustainment planning
for the transition of the Threat Agent and Detection Response
(TADR) network to the GOU; and conduct additional studies on
pathogens in Uzbekistan, among other activities. DTRA noted that
Policy has agreed to the construction of one limited capacity
BioSafety Level Three (BSL-3) Laboratory in Tashkent. Given this
decision, the GOU should prioritize the construction of Regional
Diagnostic Laboratories, Epidemiological Support Units (ESUs) and
the BSL-3. In conjunction with the training, supplies, and
equipment provided over the next four years, Uzbekistan can achieve
implementation of the Threat Agent Detection and Response Network.


BTRP Long-Term Vision
--------------


7. (SBU) BTRP's long-term vision for Uzbekistan revolves around
five central goals: first, strengthening the surveillance,
reporting, and response system for especially dangerous pathogens.
Second, consolidating Uzbekistan's especially dangerous pathogens
in a safe, secure repository. Third, developing strategic research
partnerships between Uzbek scientists conducting
internationally-funded research and high-priority domestic
research. Fourth, bringing Uzbekistan into compliance with
International Health Regulations under the World Health
Organization and World Organization for Animal Health reporting
guidelines; and fifth, continuing peaceful scientific pursuits.


8. (SBU) Abdulazizov thanked the DTRA delegation for the
comprehensive review as well as the training that BTRP had provided
for Uzbek personnel in 2008. In response to policy issues the
delegation had raised, such as the issue of the GOU transferring
strains to the USG in accordance with a previous agreement, the GOU

TASHKENT 00000469 003 OF 005


encouraged the U.S. side to communicate its views on such issues
via diplomatic note so that GOU officials could coordinate their
responses.

Meeting with Officials in Kashkadarya Province
-------------- --------------
-


9. (SBU) Ambassador Norland traveled with the DTRA delegation to
Karshi in Kashkadarya Province on March 17, where they examined the
first DTRA-funded Karshi Joint Regional Diagnostic Laboratory
(Human and Veterinary). (Note: Karshi Joint RDL construction began
in August 2007 and the lab will service Kashkadarya and
Surkhandarya Provinces. End note.) RDL officials were grateful for
DTRA's efforts here, and one RDL official told them that the lab
tests several hundred samples from 14 districts for cholera and
anthrax daily.


10. (C) Ambassador Norland and the delegation then met with First
Deputy Hokim of Kashkadarya Province E. Mamadiyorov. Mamadiyorov
gave them a warm welcome and spoke at length about the history of
the province, also noting that President Karimov himself had served
as Hokim of the province in the late 1980s. Admiral Byrd described
DTRA's work in the province on the joint lab, noting that this will
be operational soon after the delivery of some additional
equipment. The state-of-the-art lab will have the ability to
rapidly detect especially dangerous pathogens that occur naturally
or have resulted from a terrorist attack. Byrd noted that the lab
personnel the delegation had met with are excited about the
facilities they'll be able to work in, and DTRA's efforts support
the health of the region. The lab is part of a large program being
implemented throughout the former Soviet Union intended to counter
bioterrorism.


11. (C) Byrd added that it is important to be able to rapidly
detect and diagnose a disease outbreak so that emergency services
can respond appropriately, reducing the risk of an endemic or
pandemic outbreak. Thanks to techniques DTRA has provided in
Karshi, an outbreak that stemmed from natural causes or a terrorist
attack can be detected in hours. This is a significant improvement
over the several days that would have been necessary using earlier
lab techniques. CTR Policy Director Reid noted that controlling a
disease outbreak is a national security imperative and newly
emerging diseases can arise anywhere--in fact, a unique strain was
discovered in Karshi in 2002 and named the "Karshi virus."


12. (C) Surprised, First Deputy Hokim Mamadiyorov said that this
virus was news to the staff of the Hokimiyat. He had visited the
Karshi lab several times, and was pleased and impressed with the
facilities there. Mamadiyorov praised DTRA's collaboration on
early detection of diseases as timely and useful.

MOD Wants a Bigger Piece of the Pie...
-------------- --------------


13. (C) On March 18, Director Byrd and Policy Director Reid met
with Deputy Defense Minister Maj-Gen. Niyazov at the Ministry of
Defense. Niyazov expressed his gratitude for DTRA's efforts in
Uzbekistan, but noted that while DTRA has spent some 130 million
USD on the BTRP, the MOD has received only 1.5 million USD from
this total. He suggested that as the "Executive Agent" of the
program in Uzbekistan, MOD has been receiving too small a share of
these resources. (Note: The Executive Agent acts as the liaison
between the Government of Uzbekistan and the United States
Government. Responsibilities include coordinating on all site
access, arranging meetings with the appropriate ministries involved
in the BTRP, and overseeing operations related to overall
implementation of the BTRP. End note.) Niyazov claimed that MOD
is easier to work with than other GOU agencies, is accurate, and
precise. (Comment: This was a perfect example of the interagency
tug-of-war over resources that takes place in the GOU. End
comment.) Niyazov repeatedly asked for more U.S. funding for MOD

TASHKENT 00000469 004 OF 005


projects including the construction of additional facilities on the
military side.


14. (C) Director Byrd and Policy Director Reid responded that it is
important to be mindful of the program's key objectives--BTRP is
aiming to consolidate pathogens already in Uzbekistan's possession;
establish comprehensive surveillance networks to diagnose and
respond to potential disease outbreaks; enhance safety for those
who will come into contact with pathogens; and increase the
engagement of scientists with the international community. It is
important for MOD to explain in writing its role and participation
in this program and to help them understand how further assistance
for MOD would assist them in achieving their program objectives.
If the MOD has needs outside of the program, they may be able to
help identify other donors or agencies that can help. Niyazov
appeared disappointed, but thanked them for the clarification,
stating that he would discuss the issue with the Minister. He
noted that time and time again, when there is an emergency, people
turn to the army for assistance. He cited Hurricane Katrina and a
recent earthquake in China. Mr. Reid pointed out that if the MOD
is unhappy being the "Executive Agent" and did not want the
responsibility anymore, Policy would consider moving this
responsibility to another Ministry, possibly the Ministry of
Emergency Situations.

... and Shows Concern Over Water, Terrorism
-------------- --------------


15. (C) At one point, an innocuous comment from Director Byrd about
the rainy weather prompted a speech from Niyazov about what a
critical issue water is for Central Asia. He lamented that while
the Amu River used to flow into the Aral Sea and the Caspian, the
river cannot even reach the Aral now. Niyazov predicted that there
could be wars over water down the road. He also noted that many
terrorists remain in Afghanistan and are planning strikes against
Central Asia. Bioterrorism could be one of the weapons that they
will use. Uzbekistan has "reliable evidence" that terrorists are
targeting the armed forces of Uzbekistan, and so Uzbekistan must
appear powerful in order to deter potential attacks. "If I live in
a house, my neighbor may be combative--but if he knows I'm strong,
he won't try to mess up my garden!" he said. He warned that
terrorists are getting stronger. "Maybe I sound pessimistic, but I
served in Afghanistan for a while," he continued, and warned
ominously, "I assure you that more problems will be coming." He
also took a jab at bureaucracy, stating that terrorists are
successful because they don't have to fill out as much paperwork as
governments.

Meeting with Ministry of Emergency Situations
-------------- --------------


16. (C) Director Byrd and Policy Director Reid also met with Deputy
Minister of Emergency Situations Abdulazizov and other
representatives of MES on March 18. Byrd and Reid noted that they
had raised the possibility of elevating the Ministry of Emergency
Situations over the Ministry of Defense as Executive Agent for
BTRP. While there have not been problems in interacting with MOD,
it has seemed that MES has been doing the work of the Executive
Agent and coordinated with MOH and MAWR concerning outbreaks of
infectious diseases. The Department of Defense is ready to make
this change if the MES and GOU would find this useful.


17. (C) Byrd and Reid stressed the importance of Uzbek personnel
being able to demonstrate that equipment provided and training
received under the auspices of BTRP has been effective, and this
can be confirmed during upcoming exercises. During their visits to
multiple laboratories in the provinces of Uzbekistan, they had
observed a few problems that need to be addressed, however. First,
the Uzbek Scientific Research Institute of Veterinary Sciences
(UzSRIV) Regional Diagnostic Laboratory/Brucellosis Laboratory in
Samarkand is supposed to be part of the TADR network to allow the
flow of EDP samples. Byrd and Reid had no objection to local

TASHKENT 00000469 005 OF 005


authorities using the lab for research, to the extent that research
does not interfere with the processing of samples to diagnose
potential outbreaks of disease. The Ministry of Agriculture and
Water Resources has indicated that it will integrate UzSRIV with
the larger TADR network so that suspected pathogens can be analyzed
at UzSRIV rather than Tashkent.


18. (C) Second, some laboratories--particularly UzSRIV--showed
problems with their facilities. At UzSRIV, lights blinked in the
corridor. Serious voltage control issues at the lab need to be
resolved. The temperature was very hot, which risks damaging
sensitive equipment. The air conditioning had been unplugged,
apparently to save electricity, despite the fact that the U.S. is
paying for this electricity. Other problems were apparent at the
Republican Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Surveillance
(RSES) of the Ministry of Health. They had observed many boxes and
fridges with wax seals. (Note: According to Uzbek law, seals must
be applied to storage equipment three days prior to accepting
visitors at RDLs. End note.) The director had not identified the
contents. This raises biosecurity and biosafety concerns. (Note:
RSES is responsible for detecting, verifying, and responding to
epidemics and outbreaks of infectious diseases as they occur and is
the main laboratory within the larger Sanitary and Epidemiological
Surveillance (SES) system. End note.) Byrd and Reid expressed
hope that Uzbekistan's Ministries would take ownership for such
labs in the future, and asked for the GOU's assistance in
identifying ways to make this transition.


19. (C) Abdulazizov expressed his gratitude for the work done on
the Biological Threat Reduction Program and noted that it is
important for the U.S. and Uzbekistan to jointly identify
shortcomings and priorities of the program. This can verify that
funds spent are serving BTRP objectives. Abdulazizov said that
there should be experts and professionals at all levels as well as
properly maintained equipment to ensure a rapid response to a
potential disease outbreak. He offered up several proposals.
First, that MES coordinate with the Ministry of Agriculture and
Water Resources and the Ministry of Health to draft rules and
requirements for personnel at Regional Diagnostic Laboratories to
properly use and maintain equipment. Second, that MES experts be
integrated into Regional Diagnostic Laboratories. Third, emergency
response teams could be created. He suggested that the U.S. and
Uzbekistan jointly develop technical requirements for such teams
that address personnel issues, training and equipment, and rules
and regulations. Abdulazizov asserted that without emergency
response teams, Uzbekistan would be unable to respond to an
outbreak. He pledged that Uzbekistan would address the
shortcomings Byrd and Reid mentioned with regard to the Ministry of
Agriculture and Water Resources and Ministry of Health facilities
and make them work properly. Finally, Abdulazizov said that his
leadership will examine the issues raised during the meeting and
asserted that Uzbekistan wishes to sustain the network the U.S. has
provided.

Comment:
--------------


20. (C) DTRA's Biological Threat Reduction Program, which is
currently the largest U.S. program in Uzbekistan, has clearly made
substantial progress in training and equipping Uzbekistan to deal
with potential disease outbreaks. The DTRA delegation accomplished
both of its primary goals: emphasizing the importance of revising
Uzbek regulations in accordance with Threat Agent Detection and
Response processes and establishing a roadmap toward official
acceptance of a disease surveillance reporting system.
Nevertheless, inspections of some labs in Uzbekistan's provinces
indicate that not all facilities are being well-maintained by the
directors. Hopefully, further engagement with Uzbekistan will
result in improved rules and regulations that more effectively
safeguard dangerous pathogens in support of our mutual interests in
countering the threats of bioterrorism and bio-agent proliferation.
NORLAND