UZBEKISTAN: THE WAY FORWARD ON HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 TASHKENT 000451

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-06
TAGS: PHUM EAID ELAB ICRC KDEM KIRF KISL KTIP PGOV PREL
SOCI, UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: THE WAY FORWARD ON HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: TASHKENT 323; TASHKENT 395; TASHKENT 361; TASHKENT 226; TASHKENT
343; TASHKENT 271; TASHKENT 277; TASHKENT 194; TASHKENT 222

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Fitzmaurice, Poloff; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: While human rights abuses remain all too common in
Uzbekistan, the government has taken some positive steps in certain
areas over the past year. Uzbekistan is not posed to become a
democracy anytime soon, but we continue to believe that the most
effective strategy for curbing abuses and generating reform remains
diplomatic engagement with officials on selected issues. Over the
next year, we will seek to consolidate recent gains and prevent
backsliding in key areas. This cable outlines a series of specific
steps that we will urge the Uzbeks take on human rights over the
next year on prison conditions, child labor, trafficking-in-persons
(TIP),legal reform and implementation, religious freedom, and
civil society. Consolidating progress in these areas will help us
build trust with government officials, identify potential
reformers, and lay the foundation for more systematic change over
the long term. If we are serious about actually promoting human
rights in Uzbekistan and not only cataloguing abuses, we need to
take the long view. In contrast, adopting a more hard-line
approach with the Uzbeks is likely to be counterproductive. End
Summary.



BUILDING TRUST IS THE KEY TO GREATER REFORM

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2. (C) One of the major hurdles to more open dialogue with the
Uzbeks on human rights remains a lack of trust and lingering fears
over U.S. government intentions. As the fallout from the selection
of independent human rights activist Mutabar Tojibayeva for the
International Woman of Courage award demonstrated (ref A),
President Karimov remains deeply suspicious of U.S. government
motives and still fears that our human rights advocacy efforts are
fundamentally aimed at regime change. President Karimov's paranoia
is most likely fueled by distorted information fed to him by those
in his government who do not favor improved relations with the West
and foreign governments with similar objectives, such as Russia.
At the same time, the Uzbeks are naturally reluctant to make any
bold moves on human rights or any other issue in the bilateral
relationship until the new Administration's policy on Central Asia
comes more into focus. In order to bypass the Uzbek bureaucratic
filter as the Administration develops its policy towards Central
Asia, high-level official visitors need to deliver our message on
human rights and other issues.



KEY POINTS TO DELIVER TO THE UZBEKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

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3. (C) In our diplomatic engagement with the Uzbeks on human
rights, we need to stress several key points. First, we must
disabuse them of any notion that because they are providing
increased cooperation on security issues, including assisting us
with the transport of non-lethal military supplies to Afghanistan,
we will cease discussing our human rights concerns with them. One
benefit of Tojibayeva's selection for the Woman of Courage is that
it sent this message loud and clear. Continuing to have high-level
civilian and military visitors raise human rights issues will
reinforce this message. Second, we continually need to stress to
the Uzbeks, at the highest levels possible, that our efforts are

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not aimed at regime change, but at assisting the government fulfill
its international human rights commitments. Third, we must
emphasize the clear benefits Uzbekistan will reap from improving
its human rights record, and with it, its international prestige.
For example, Uzbek officials routinely complain to us about the
lack of international investment in their country, but they still
fail to understand that one of the reasons (among others) why
international corporations are reluctant to invest in Uzbekistan is
the government's poor human rights record.



GOALS FOR 2009: CONSOLIDATE GAINS; PREVENT BACKTRACKING

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4. (C) For the first time since the violent Andijon events in
2005, Uzbek authorities over the past year have made progress in
some areas, including allowing international observers back into
prisons, adopting legal measures intended to curb child labor,
increasing efforts to combat trafficking-in-persons (TIP),
reforming legislation to strengthen defendants' rights, and
releasing several political prisoners. Our goal for 2009 should be
to consolidate the positive steps taken by the Uzbek government.
At the same time, we need to prevent backtracking in other areas,
including on religious freedom and civil society. The government
has demonstrated a willingness to engage on many of these issues
with the international community, including by publicly committing
itself to improvements during Uzbekistan's recent Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) before the UN Human Rights Council (ref B).




PRISON CONDITIONS

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5. (C) As a majority of Uzbekistan's human rights abuses continue
to occur behind prison walls (ref C),one of our main goals for
2009 is for the government to reach agreement with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to continue prison
visits this year. Since ICRC restarted its prison monitoring
program again on a trial basis in 2008, we have received reports of
improvements in conditions at several prisons visited by ICRC. The
main sticking point remains the intransigence of certain officials
to allowing ICRC to visit pre-trial detention facilities operated
by the National Security Service. In a recent conversation with
the Ambassador, the ICRC director in Tashkent noted tension within
the government between reformers, who favor international
cooperation on improving prison conditions, and conservatives, who
instinctively distrust international organizations and seek to
maintain Uzbekistan's relative isolation. We will continue to urge
authorities to expand the access of international monitors to
detention facilities, which we believe is the most effective tool
for promoting improvements in conditions. Meanwhile, we also will
support the government's stated efforts to create several new
ombudsmen to monitor prison conditions. For example, we are in the
process of organizing an International Visitor's program for
relevant officials to study prison administration in the United
States.

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CHILD LABOR

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6. (C) In 2009, we will urge the government to continue
cooperation with UNICEF on combating the use of child labor during
Uzbekistan's cotton harvest, a practice which has continued since
the Soviet era and exists to various degrees throughout Central
Asia. We also will ask the government to formally invite a new ILO
representative to work in Uzbekistan. As the true extent of child
labor in Uzbekistan is still unclear, one of our main goals for
2009 is to encourage the government to allow an independent
assessment during the fall cotton harvest. Though some ILO
officials have expressed skepticism about the practicality of
conducting such an assessment, UNICEF continues to express an
interest. Conducting an assessment is also clearly in the
government's interest, as it is likely to show that some of the
more exaggerated claims made by human rights activists, NGOs, and
political opponents on child labor in Uzbekistan are off the mark.
In addition, we believe that ILO and/or UNICEF could most
effectively engage the Uzbeks in the context of a regional program
involving neighboring countries with similar problems. This way,
the Uzbeks are less likely to feel that they are being singled out
for criticism. Any regional program should not aim at eradicating
child labor overnight (an unrealistic goal),but rather should
present a long-term strategy that addresses broader and related
issues, such as rural poverty, unemployment, labor migration, and
the perverse effects of cotton quotas. The U.S. Department of
Labor can also play a role by providing funding for a regional ILO
anti-child labor project involving Uzbekistan, as they have done in
previous years.



TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (TIP)

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7. (C) We believe that the Uzbek government has demonstrated
sufficient progress to warrant being upgraded again this year in
the annual U.S. State Department's Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
report to Tier 2 from the Tier 2 Watch List. In 2009, we will urge
the government to continue implementation of its anti-TIP National
Action Plan, which was adopted in 2008. To demonstrate its
commitment to working with international partners, we will
encourage authorities to finally register the International
Organization for Migration (IOM),which, despite operating as a
local NGO, enjoys relatively good relations with officials in
Tashkent and the provinces. In addition, the government is close
to opening its own shelter for trafficking victims in Tashkent, the
first clear example of it providing assistance to TIP victims (ref
D). Furthermore, we will suggest that the government allow IOM,
which already operates shelters for TIP victims in Tashkent and
Bukhara, to provide training on best practices for the staff of the
new government-controlled TIP shelter. Meanwhile, it will remain
important for the United States to continue its support for the IOM
shelters, as it will take some time for the state-controlled
shelters to reach professional standards. Unfortunately, as long
as economic opportunities remain limited for Uzbeks, especially
those from rural regions, we will continue to see a significant
number of Uzbeks migrants heading abroad for work, and with it, a
corresponding number of TIP cases (ref E).

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LEGAL REFORM AND IMPLEMENTATION

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8. (C) Over the past year, the government has adopted several new
laws strengthening defendants' rights, including the habeas corpus
law and a new law on defense attorneys. In 2009, we will continue
to urge the government to fully implement these legal reforms and
provide trainings to prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys.
Full implementation of these reforms is likely to require time and
a change in attitudes, which continued training could further
instill. We also will carefully monitor the implementation of the
new defense attorneys' law, which requires all defense attorneys to
pass new exams and receive certification from the government.
While the new requirements will hopefully result in defendants
receiving more competent legal counsel (one frequent complaint
against defense attorneys in Uzbekistan is that they are poorly
trained compared to prosecutors and judges),we will watch that the
government does not use the new law to refuse to certify attorneys
it does not like.



PREVENTING BACKTRACKING ON CIVIL SOCIETY...

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9. (C) Last year, for the first time since the Andijon events, the
government granted registration to two U.S.-based NGOs: the
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Institute for New
Democracies (IND). This year, however, authorities are once again
threatening to backtrack on civil society by denying accreditation
to foreigners working at NGOs in Uzbekistan, including the new
AmCit director of IND, a USAID grantee which had played a lead role
in recent years in advocating legal reform and providing training
for officials (ref F). Authorities also recently forced the
departure from the country of the expatriate director of the German
Konrad Adenauer Foundation and three expatriates at French
humanitarian NGOs. Other international NGOs continue to complain
about Uzbek bureaucracy hampering their activities. Some local
NGOs, including the Ezgulik human rights group, also have come
under renewed pressure recently.



...AND REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

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10. (C) The first few months of 2009 have seen persistent pressure
on Evangelical groups suspected of proselytism (which is illegal
Uzbekistan) and a nationwide crackdown on suspected members of the
conservative Turkish "Nur" Islamic group (ref G). This is a very
sensitive issue in Uzbekistan, but we believe we have a chance to
effect positive change by reaching an agreement with the government
on a letter outlining specific steps it can take to improve
religious freedom and to have itself removed from the U.S. State
Department's Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) list. On March
30, MFA Americas' Section Chief Takhrir Mamajanov told the
Ambassador that the government was still considering the letter,
and, as he put it, "how to seize the current opportunity." At its

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recent UPR at the UN Human Rights Council, the Uzbek delegation
also announced forthcoming amendments to the current religion law
(Note: While we no information yet on what the amendments will be,
we hope they will make the law less, not more, restrictive. End
note.)



POLITICAL PRISONERS

--------------




11. (C) Last year, the government released greater numbers of
political prisoners than in previous years. Since we submitted a
list of political prisoners to the government in early 2008, Uzbek
authorities have released several individuals on the list,
including Tojibayeva, who, at the time, was Uzbekistan's most
high-profile political prisoner. At the same time, the government
imprisoned a journalist and human rights activist in
Karakalpakstan, creating two new political prisoners.
Nevertheless, the total number of political prisoners decreased in

2008. Human Rights Watch currently lists a total of 11 political
prisoners in Uzbekistan. While we will continue to urge the
government to release more political prisoners this year, the total
number of such prisoners here is less than in many other countries
with whom Uzbekistan is frequently compared. Some independent
activists claim there are thousands of "political prisoners" in
Uzbekistan, but the vast majority of cases they cite involve
individuals who were sentenced on religious extremism charges.
While we are concerned that at least some of those individuals were
imprisoned on the basis of coerced or fabricated evidence, they are
not "political prisoners" in the same sense as imprisoned
opposition members, human rights activists, or journalists.



OTHER POSSIBLE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENT

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12. (C) In addition to the key areas outlined above, we should
seek to engage the Uzbeks on other human rights issues, including
the rights of vulnerable groups such as the disabled and women. For
example, the government recently has adopted the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Disabled and announced a forthcoming law "On
guarantees of equal rights and opportunities for women and men,"
both of which provide us with opportunities to increase dialogue
with the Uzbeks on these issues and offer assistance. During
Uzbekistan's UPR, Uzbek officials also did not reject out of hand a
recommendation to adopt the UN Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees. While this is a more sensitive issue for the government,
it remains a serious area of concern (refs H and I).



POLITICAL REFORM

--------------




13. (C) Unfortunately, political rights remain an area where the
government has made little progress. December 2007 saw another
flawed Presidential election, and the Parliamentary elections this

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December, despite featuring the trappings of democratic
infrastructure, are unlikely to be free or fair. Uzbek citizens
are consistently deprived of basic rights, including freedom of
speech and assembly. Human rights and opposition activists are
still routinely harassed, while media remains highly restricted.
Promoting political reform is naturally much more difficult in a
country like Uzbekistan than getting the government to address
other human rights concerns. Nevertheless, through sustained
engagement over time, we may be able to build enough trust with
authorities through cooperation on other issues to eventually
convince them to ease the clamp on political expression. We need
to acknowledge that, as happened in neighboring Turkmenistan, the
demise of the sitting president is not going to produce overnight
change in this conservative, clannish society.




14. (C) At the same time, Uzbekistan is not North Korea or
Turkmenistan, as is sometimes imagined by outside observers.
Spontaneous demonstrations over socio-economic conditions occur in
rural areas, especially during the winter, and such demonstrators
are usually not dealt with harshly by authorities (political
protests, however, are routinely disrupted). Articles criticizing
socio-economic conditions also occasionally feature in local
semi-independent media. While political and human rights activists
face frequent harassment (and occasionally worse),authorities more
or less tolerate the existence of a small independent civil society
here. Print media is strictly controlled by the government, but
the number of internet users, especially in urban areas, is on the
rise. Many (but not all) independent websites are blocked, though
most computer-savvy Uzbeks can still access them through proxy
servers. However, most ordinary Uzbeks, especially in rural areas,
are more focused on their daily struggle for economic survival than
following politics or participating in civil society.



THE GOU NEEDS TO BE OUR PARTNER ON HUMAN RIGHTS

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15. (C) Independent civil society remains weak and fragmented, and
the only entity in the country actually capable of affecting human
rights reforms is ultimately the government. The current regime
faces long-term challenges, but it is stable and there is no real
threat of collapse on the horizon. The government's imprisonment
of a large number of suspected religious extremists might be
fueling the growth of religious extremism in prisons, but there is
little evidence of religious extremism growing among the general
populace. In fact, all indications point to extremist religious
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir being much weaker today than they were
five or ten years ago. Uzbekistan under President Karimov is not
Iran under the Shah.




16. (C) Rather than isolating government officials, we should be
seeking to further engage and identify potential reformers. While
opaque, the Uzbek government is not monolithic, and is composed of
many different competing groups, some of them are more pro-Western
than others. President Karimov is not going to be around forever,
and we need to be in a position to have influence with whatever
group comes to power after the dust settles. We also have the
opportunity to strengthen the hand of potential pro-Western
reformers through greater direct contact with them.

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ENGAGEMENT IS EFFECTIVE...

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17. (C) It is notable that the organizations that have gone to the
greatest lengths to engage the government on their respective
issues - including ICRC, UNICEF, and IOM - have had the greatest
relative success in the past year in promoting reform. In
contrast, Human Rights Watch (HRW),which consistently has taken a
rather hard line on the Uzbeks, had its country director thrown out
of the country and its office effectively shut down for the second
year in a row in 2008. While HRW's heart is in the right place, it
has pursued a counterproductive strategy as far as promoting reform
is concerned. However, there are signs that HRW has begun to
recognize this. Its current researcher on Uzbekistan, Igor
Vorontsov (who was denied accreditation in Uzbekistan and continues
to cover the country from abroad),is leaving the organization, and
it appears that HRW will move forward with nominating a new
candidate to serve in Tashkent.



...WHILE A HARD LINE APPROACH IS UNLIKELY TO WORK

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18. (C) Isolating the Karimov regime might please a small but
vocal group of Uzbek exiles, but it will make things worse for
activists remaining in the country and ordinary Uzbeks. We must
remember these exiles have their own agendas and should not be
relied upon to provide an objective analysis of human rights
developments inside Uzbekistan. Safely residing in the West, these
individuals have little to lose by calling for Western governments
to break off relations with the Karimov regime. On the other hand,
it is the human rights activists still in Uzbekistan who will pay
the price later if relations between the United States and
Uzbekistan go south. A majority of activists inside Uzbekistan
consistently support warming relations with the West and further
engagement. We have not seen any proof over the years that the
Karimov regime responds well to outside pressure, a view shared by
nearly all Western diplomats currently in Tashkent.



GETTING BEYOND THE TIRED OLD NARRATIVE

--------------




19. (C) As cooperation between the United States and the Uzbek
government continues on the Northern Distribution Network and other
issues, we can expect more knee-jerk reactions from international
rights groups like HRW and Uzbek exiles that Western governments
are seeking to downplay human rights concerns to pursue closer
cooperation on Afghanistan. We need to finally get beyond this
tired old narrative that Western governments need to choose between
pursuing either security interests or promoting human rights in
Uzbekistan. In reality, we need simultaneous engagement on
security and human rights. Our efforts to promote political reform
are aimed at reinforcing Uzbekistan's long-term security. At the
same time, as security cooperation improves, this will provide us

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with more of a forum (and leverage) to effectively engage in
dialogue on human rights, to which we believe that the government
is open.




20. (C) The value-added of the U.S. government with regard to
human rights is not our ability to impose sanctions and isolate the
Uzbeks, but the fact that we can engage officials through private
diplomatic channels, where the Uzbeks are more open to dialogue.
Uzbekistan is far from becoming a democracy, but we can work with
reformers within the regime to curb abuses and lay the foundation
for long-term progress. We are unlikely to change the views of
international human rights groups like HRW, but we must be prepared
to weather their criticisms in the short term in order to make
substantive progress on human rights over the long term.
NORLAND