Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT449
2009-04-06 06:26:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN: SECURITY SERVICES SEEKING TO ENTRAP HUMAN RIGHTS

Tags:  PHUM KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PINR PREL SOCI UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0135
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #0449/01 0960620
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 060626Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0694
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0157
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0215
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0175
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0172
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0175
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0208
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0167
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000449 

SIPDIS
NOFORN SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND INR
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-06
TAGS: PHUM KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PINR PREL SOCI UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: SECURITY SERVICES SEEKING TO ENTRAP HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICER

REF: TASHKENT 277

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Fitzmaurice, Poloff; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000449

SIPDIS
NOFORN SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND INR
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-06
TAGS: PHUM KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PINR PREL SOCI UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: SECURITY SERVICES SEEKING TO ENTRAP HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICER

REF: TASHKENT 277

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Fitzmaurice, Poloff; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: The National Security Service (NSS) appears to
be attempting to entrap the Embassy's Human Rights Officer by
arranging meetings for him outside the Embassy on sensitive topics
that could then be taped. On at least three separate occasions
over the past month, we have strong reasons to believe that NSS
officials have attempted to facilitate meetings between poloff and
individuals with links to suspected religious extremists and
independent (and illegal) Islamic communities. Most likely, these
efforts are aimed at discrediting soon-to-be-departing poloff - who
publicly reports on abuses in Uzbekistan (including those committed
by NSS officers) through the annual U.S. State Department human
rights reports - in the eyes of the country's leadership. It is
also possible that such efforts are organized by elements within
the security services that seek to disrupt further improvement in
relations between Uzbekistan and the United States. End summary.




POLOFF CONTACTED BY FORMER DAO FSN

--------------




2. (S/NF) Poloff was recently contacted by a former Defense
Attache Office (DAO) FSN, who was ostensibly laid off in 2007 due
to budgetary reasons, but who actually was let go because he was
widely suspected by Emboffs and other FSNs of reporting to
Uzbekistan's National Security Service (NSS). The FSN also was
suspected of playing some role in the arrest and beating of another
former Embassy FSN in 2007. While poloff briefly overlapped at the

Embassy with the former DAO FSN prior to his firing, he never had
any direct contact with him before.




3. (S/NF) Poloff met with the former DAO FSN at the Embassy on
March 30 to talk about his current research on Islam in Uzbekistan,
which he explained "would be of great interest" to poloff (the
Embassy's principal Human Rights Officer, whose portfolio includes
Islam and religious freedom issues). The former FSN began the
meeting by explaining that since he left the Embassy in 2007, he
has been working on his PhD dissertation at the Uzbek Academy of
Science's Institute of History, focusing on the Soviet government's
policy towards Islamic communities in Central Asia. The former FSN
noted that he was currently working on translating the works of
American historians on Uzbekistan, referring several times to the
work of a particular AmCit scholar at Indiana University (with whom
poloff once took a class, a fact that he previously mentioned to
other Uzbek scholars.)



FORMER FSN STRONGLY CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT'S RELIGION POLICY

-------------- --------------




4. (S/NF) Unprompted, the former FSN quickly switched gears from
talking about his own research to his views on the current regime's
policy towards Islam, which he claimed (unconvincingly) was just as
repressive as that of the Soviets. For example, he argued that all
imams at state-sanctioned mosques were chosen by the NSS and that
their Friday sermons were pre-screened by censors (the latter is a

TASHKENT 00000449 002 OF 005


well-known fact we have long reported in our annual human rights
reports).




5. (S/NF) More surprisingly, the former FSN claimed that since the
ascension of a new Mufti last year, the government has been
promoting a more conservative strain of Sunni Islam and was
encouraging intolerance of "minority Islamic sects," including
"Sufis" and Shiites (Note: If true, this is all news to us. Rather
than promoting a more conservative brand of Islam, we continue to
see imams quoted in the state-controlled press speaking out against
the import of "alien customs," including the wearing of the hijab.
We also have not heard of growing intolerance for Shiites or Sufis.
End note.) In particular, he claimed that authorities were
especially worried about "independent Sufi leaders," which he
referred to as "black imams" (as opposed to state-approved "white
imams"),who allegedly had hundreds of followers each. He also
accused the new Mufti of being "poorly educated," claiming he was
only chosen because he came from Samarkand, President Karimov's
hometown.



...CLAIMS HE WAS INTERROGATED BY NSS AFTER LEAVING EMBASSY

-------------- --------------




6. (S/NF) Next, the former FSN reported that approximately three
months after he left the Embassy, he was interrogated by the NSS as
a potential witness in a case against 20 Uzbek military officers
accused of religious extremism. The officers reportedly included
an individual who participated in the U.S. Defense
Department-supported "Aviation Leaders Program" exchange program
and had studied in the United States from 1999 - 2001. The former
FSN said he last saw the officer in 1999 and could not remember his
name.




7. (S/NF) The former FSN reported that he was interrogated by the
NSS on three separate occasions at a pre-trial detention facility
in Tashkent. He described the interrogations as "less than a
pleasant experience," noting that a NSS officer threatened him with
arrest if he lied about anything. In the last two meetings, he
claimed that the NSS spent most of the interrogation asking
questions about the Embassy, which he speculated might have been
the real reason he was contacted by the NSS in the first place.
The former FSN said he "played dumb" and told the NSS as little as
possible. Since those interrogations, he said he was not contacted
by the NSS again. The former FSN observed that he might also have
raised NSS suspicions since he traveled to Andijon on official
Embassy business shortly after the violent events there in 2005.



...OFFERS TO INTRODUCE POLOFF TO "UNOFFICIAL" IMAMS

-------------- --------------




8. (S/NF) Towards the end of the meeting, the former FSN asked
whether poloff would be interested in meeting with him periodically
outside of the Embassy to continue their discussions. He also
offered to introduce poloff to Islamic leaders, including "black

TASHKENT 00000449 003 OF 005


imams." In return, he asked for poloff's assistance in making
contact with professors and research institutions in the West. He
added that he had no interest in remaining in Uzbekistan and
wished to complete his PhD somewhere abroad. Poloff thanked the
former FSN for sharing his work and insight, but made no
commitments to meet with him again.




9. (S/NF) Comment: As with the other cases outlined below, we
believe it is possible that the former FSN was attempting to
arrange meetings for poloff outside the Embassy with members of
independent (and illegal) Muslim communities, which then would be
taped and shown to higher-level officials as proof of U.S.
government "meddling in Uzbekistan's internal affairs." We have no
intention to meet with the former FSN again. After the poloff
previously refused to meet with the individuals described below, it
is possible that the NSS then attempted to use the former FSN to
lure poloff into such meetings. End comment.



NSS ALLEGEDLY TOLD NUR MEMBER'S WIFE TO CONTACT POLOFF

-------------- --------------




10. (C) Over the past few months, Uzbek authorities have pursued a
widespread crackdown on suspected members of "Nur," a banned
conservative (but not extremist) religious organization associated
with Turkish scholar Fethullah Gullen. One of the men imprisoned
as part of the crackdown - Abudaliziz Dadahanov, a U.S. government
exchange program alumnus who studied in Connecticut - was the
subject of a March 10 article on the CNN.com website which included
shocked reactions from his American friends (reftel).




11. (S/NF) On March 11, a Public Affairs Section (PAS) FSN who
previously studied with Dadahanov, reported to Emboffs hearing from
a mutual acquaintance that Dadahanov's wife Aziza had been
frequently called into the NSS since her husband's arrest in August

2008. After a meeting with the NSS in early March, Aziza
reportedly told the mutual acquaintance that the NSS had instructed
her to contact the PAS FSN to set up a meeting with poloff at a
public location outside of the Embassy. The NSS allegedly told
Aziza that the meeting would be taped, a transcription of which
would then form the basis of a letter that would be delivered to
the MFA, possibly accusing the United States of meddling in
internal Uzbek affairs. The NSS reportedly told her that if she
cooperates with them, they would ensure that her husband would be
amnestied or at least would be transferred to a prison with better
conditions. They also allegedly warned her that if she did not
cooperate, they would ensure that her husband would be sent to the
Jaslyk prison in Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan's most notorious
prison). After talking with Aziza, the mutual acquaintance then
warned the PAS FSN, who subsequently informed Emboffs. The PAS
FSN, the mutual acquaintance, and Dadahanov had all attended the
same Turkish-Uzbek high school in the 1990s (reftel).




12. (S/NF) On March 11, Aziza attempted but failed several times
to get in contact with the PAS FSN. On March 12, she directly
called poloff to request a meeting outside of the Embassy to
discuss her husband's case. When poloff suggested that they meet
inside the Embassy and that the Ambassador would also be interested

TASHKENT 00000449 004 OF 005


in meeting with her at the Embassy, Aziza explained she was afraid
to come to the Embassy. Aziza said she would "think it over" and
call poloff back (Comment: We suspect that Aziza felt she needed to
clear any meeting at the Embassy with the NSS first. End comment.)
After trading a few more phone calls, Aziza eventually stopped
calling poloff.



WITNESS IN NUR CASE ALSO TRIES TO MEET WITH POLOFF

-------------- --------------




13. (S/NF) On March 24, a different PAS FSN reported being
contacted by Khamza Jumaev, a well-known television journalist who
served as a witness in the trial against Dadahanov and other
suspected Nur members. Jumaev requested that the PAS FSN set up a
meeting with poloff. While he has not been charged with any crime
so far, Jumaev told the FSN that he was worried that he could still
be charged with Nur membership. He allegedly wanted to ask
poloff's advice about whom to hire as a defense attorney, as he
reported having difficulty finding an attorney who was willing to
represent him on his own. On March 25, Jumaev directly contacted
poloff and asked to meet with him outside of the Embassy. When
poloff asked Jumaev to come to the Embassy for a meeting, Jumaev
reported he was afraid to come to the Embassy. Like Aziza, Jumaev
said he would "think about it" and call poloff back. So far,
Jumaev has not contacted poloff again (Comment: Given the
similarities in the cases, we believe the NSS likely attempted to
have Jumaev arrange a meeting with poloff after he did not meet
with Aziza. End comment.)



PAS FSN CALLED IN BY NSS

--------------




14. (S/NF) The PAS FSN who was contacted by Jumaev was also called
in for questioning by the NSS on March 20, who told her that they
were investigating whether the FSN and her husband had completed
their government service obligation for the former "Umid"
Scholarship Program. Under the program, which was ended in the
1990s, the Uzbek government paid for Uzbek students to study
abroad, who were then obligated to work for the government for five
years upon completion of the program. Over the past several years,
authorities have harassed several FSN who are alumni of the program
by accusing them of not completing their service obligation and
threatening them with having to pay back the full cost of their
education abroad. The PAS FSN also had previously been visited at
home by a NSS official after meeting with Jumaev earlier this year
(reftel).



COMMENT

--------------




15. (S/NF) It is impossible for us to confirm that these incidents
are related and that any of the individuals were instructed by the
NSS to seek meetings with poloff. However, the timing of events

TASHKENT 00000449 005 OF 005


suggests repeated attempts by the NSS to arrange meetings for
poloff outside of the Embassy with "enemies of the people," which
could then be taped. Poloff will be departing post in May, so the
NSS could be looking to discredit him without resorting to PNG
tactics, thereby complicating things for his successors. The
ultimate motive of the NSS is unclear, though such efforts are
likely aimed at discrediting poloff, who publicly reports on abuses
in Uzbekistan (including those committed by NSS officers) through
the annual U.S. State Department human rights reports, in the eyes
of higher-level Uzbek government officials. We also cannot dismiss
the possibility that such efforts are organized by elements within
the security services that seek to disrupt further improvement in
relations between Uzbekistan and the United States. In addition,
it is also possible that the NSS is deliberately seeking to feed
poloff damaging information regarding Uzbekistan's human rights
record, knowing that such information could then be reported
publicly, further disrupting relations. Such efforts are nothing
new: poloff and his predecessors long have been singled out for
criticisms by Uzbek officials, including by President Karimov, with
periodic hints of expulsion, suggesting that previous meetings
Emboffs have held outside the Embassy with human rights and
religious contacts also have been taped.




16. (S/NF) The incidents also highlight the difficulty of
conducting human rights reporting and advocacy in environments like
Uzbekistan. Ironically, the more aggressive Emboffs are in
investigating alleged human rights abuses, the more opportunity we
provide to the security services to twist the intent of our work in
the eyes of the country's leadership.




17. (S/NF) Our first priority remains the protection of the
Embassy's local employees. RSO has been alerted about these
incidents, and we have instructed all FSNs to keep us informed if
they are approached by the NSS again.
NORLAND