Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT423
2009-04-01 09:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

Uzbekistan: MFA Discusses Regional Security, Economic Issues

Tags:  PREL PGOV ASEC ENRG PTER PINS ECON SENV KTIA UZ 
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DE RUEHNT #0423/01 0910911
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010911Z APR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0673
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0005
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 000423 

SIPDIS SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDRESSEES)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC ENRG PTER PINS ECON SENV KTIA UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: MFA Discusses Regional Security, Economic Issues

REF: TASHKENT 200

TASHKENT 00000423 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 000423

SIPDIS SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDRESSEES)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC ENRG PTER PINS ECON SENV KTIA UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: MFA Discusses Regional Security, Economic Issues

REF: TASHKENT 200

TASHKENT 00000423 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: Uzbekistan's Acting Americas Department Chief at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared his views of a wide range of
regional security and economic issues in a recent meeting with us.
His remarks tracked closely with comments we have recently heard
from GOU officials--Uzbekistan remains concerned about the
situation in Afghanistan and skeptical of its government, while
supportive of U.S. and NATO efforts to promote regional security.
Uzbekistan also has no plans to participate in the CSTO's Rapid
Reaction Forces. On energy, Uzbekistan welcomes proposals for
pipelines that bypass Russia in order to promote Uzbekistan's
national interests and sovereignty. Mamadjanov expressed hope that
continued dialogue with the United States could spur trade and
deeper economc ties, citing General Motors' operations in
Uzbekistan as a model for others to follow. He also expressed
concern about the potential for "double standards" to be applied to
Uzbekistan on human rights and democracy, but stated his interest
in U.S. support on democratization and civil society. End summary.


2. (C) In a meeting with Poloffs on March 23, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Acting Americas Department Chief Takhir Mamadjanov echoed a
number of familiar GOU positions in a wide-ranging discussion of
regional security and economic issues. Mamadjanov described the

relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan as improving
and asserted that it would continue to improve in the future. He
noted Uzbekistan's particular interest in cooperation on promoting
regional security and stability, counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, and combating organized crime and
narcotrafficking. Uzbekistan is optimistic about the new
administration in the United States and was pleased by recent
positive statements (he did not specify which) from the U.S.

Still Concerned About Afghanistan, Supportive of NATO-US Efforts
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Mamadjanov noted that Afghanistan is Uzbekistan's greatest
security concern, and he expressed disappointment with the current
situation there. He lamented that the positive results achieved
during the past eight years of the Coalition's presence have been
insufficient. The Government of Afghanistan lacks the support of
the local population and is corrupt, while ordinary Afghans see
little of the significant material assistance the international
community provides to Afghanistan. Moreover, Coalition forces
undertake certain measures without taking into account local
traditions and have not made socioeconomic issues a high enough
priority, he claimed. Mamadjanov acknowledged that the United
States and Uzbekistan do not see eye-to-eye on the "6 plus 3"
proposal that President Karimov had espoused at the NATO Summit in
Bucharest last April. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan will continue to
support NATO's efforts in the region and welcomes the transit of
non-lethal NATO and U.S. shipments across Uzbekistan's territory.
Uzbekistan also welcomes new ideas and approaches from the United
States on Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan's "Special Opinion" on CSTO
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Though Uzbekistan signed an agreement related to the
Collective Security Treaty Organization's Rapid Reaction Forces
(CSTO RRF),Uzbekistan had attached a "special opinion" to the
agreement, Mamadjanov continued. He emphasized that Uzbekistan's
view on the RRF differs from that of other CSTO members.
Mamadjanov indicated that Uzbekistan has no plans to participate in
the Rapid Reaction Forces, but did not close the door to this
entirely, suggesting that "if there is an urgent need, we'll be
ready to participate."

Interest in a Mutually Acceptable Solution on Water Usage
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Mamadjanov asserted that all decisions on the use of
transboundary water from Amu Darya and Syra Darya be based on the
consent of all affected countries and should be consistent with

TASHKENT 00000423 002.2 OF 004


United Nations principles on the use of water. Furthermore,
ecological effects should be taken into account. Uzbekistan
continues to oppose attempts to build large-scale hydropower
stations upstream, and Mamadjanov expressed concern about there
being insufficient water to support Uzbekistan's agricultural
needs. Citing UN-affiliated experts, Mamadjanov asserted that
these projects can damage the environment of the region. "If
independent experts conclude that there is no threat to the
environment, we'll be ready to support such projects," he said.

Energy Policy and Foreign Economic Relations
-------------- --------------
---


6. (C) Uzbekistan does not export oil, but exports about 40 percent
of its natural gas. (Comment: If Mamadjanov's figure correctly
reflects current GOU gas export policy, this marks yet another
uptick in the proportion of natural gas that Uzbekistan exports,
reftel. End comment.) Mamadjanov said that the GOU is ready to
consider any alternate routes for exporting natural gas, with an
eye toward a proposed route's economic benefits. (Comment: He
launched into a clearly well-prepared statement in response to a
broader question about global energy demand trends that had not
mentioned pipelines, suggesting that he was looking for an
opportunity to deliver pre-cleared talking points emphasizing
Uzbekistan's willingness to consider pipeline routes that bypass
Russia. End comment.) For the time being there is only one
(major) export route in place--the northern route through
Russia--but additional routes are in Uzbekistan's interest because
they increase the country's independence. Uzbekistan is interested
in having relations with many partners to avoid dependence on one
country, he continued. He stated repeatedly that Uzbekistan is
open to all pipeline proposals and is willing to study each of
them. Uzbekistan would pay particular attention to proposals'
economic benefits to the country, but would also look for ways to
make projects generate acceptable returns for investors.
Furthermore, the GOU prefers to use "civilized" means to make
agreements and aims to establish mutually beneficial terms.
Mamadjanov asserted that Uzbekistan's location at the heart of
Central Asia makes the development of any other route through the
region impossible without Uzbekistan's support.


7. (C) He expressed satisfaction with the prices Uzbekistan
receives for its natural gas exports to Russia, which he described
as based on market prices. Mamadjanov declined to comment further
on the recent gas price negotiations or prospects for future
negotiations beyond stating simply that Uzbekistan's prices would
reflect world prices.


8. (C) On specific projects, he noted that Uzbekistan had agreed to
increase the capacity of the Central Asia-Centre pipeline.
Uzbekistan had also agreed to allow Turkmenistan to ship gas
destined for China through Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan will derive
benefits simply for allowing the use of its territory for the
transit of Turkmenistan's gas, but Uzbekistan will consider
exporting some of its own gas via that route if the project proves
successful. Mamadjanov called Nabucco "just an idea," and said
that no one had pursued steps to make it a concrete
project--questions about who will build it and who will finance it
remain unanswered.


9. (C) Russia is Uzbekistan's primary economic partner, with trade
turnover exceeding four billion USD per year, Mamadjanov noted.
Uzbekistan and Russia cooperate on over 800 joint ventures, and
some 300 Uzbek enterprises are operating in Russia. Russia is
continuing to invest in Uzbekistan, and the GOU has not observed
any interruptions in its trade or economic relations with Russia.
He said that both countries are observing and implementing their
long-term economic agreements.

Domestic Effects of the Global Financial Crisis
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Mamadjanov stated that Uzbekistan's economy does not depend

TASHKENT 00000423 003.2 OF 004


on energy exports alone, in contrast to some other energy-producing
countries. Uzbekistan has been working toward a balanced,
diversified economy by developing several sectors simultaneously.
He said that such efforts had helped to insulate Uzbekistan from
the worst effects of the global financial crisis because Uzbekistan
had invested money in diversification while other countries had
invested too much money in "speculative investments and short-term
projects." He acknowledged that Uzbekistan is not entirely
insulated against the effects of the global crisis because it is
part of the world, and anything that affects the country's partners
will have an indirect effect on Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is thus
taking "concrete steps" to protect itself from the effects of the
financial crisis. He also asserted that Uzbekistan being closed to
speculative capital is not such a bad thing for the country.
(Comment: Though Mamadjanov did not seem troubled by the effect of
the global financial crisis on Uzbekistan, other sources suggest
that this is an issue of growing concern for Uzbekistan. MFA
recently delivered a copy of President Karimov's most recent
book--which addresses the crisis and steps Uzbekistan must take to
deal with it--to us. We also have obtained a copy of the agenda
for the recent Eighteenth Plenary Session of the Senate of the Oliy
Majlis--it lists "On the roles of local authorities for
unconditional fulfillment of the anticrisis program 2009-2012" as
its lead item. End note.)

Hoping to Rejuvenate the Bilateral Relationship
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Mamadjanov said that he hoped Uzbekistan's relationship
with the United States will be restored to its previous level of
closeness. (Comment: Though he stated, in traditional GOU
parlance, that this should happen "step-by-step" to restore trust
and openness. End comment.) He also hoped to spur trade and
economic ties. He praised the operations of General Motors (GM) in
Uzbekistan in particular, citing this as an example for other
investment projects and business operators to emulate. Mamadjanov
also said that the bilateral relationship should not be subjected
to "double standards" as far as human rights and democracy are
concerned, and he hoped that these issues would not create
obstacles to the bilateral relationship. He hoped that the U.S.
would take a pragmatic and objective stance on these issues, taking
into account local "realities" in the region. Mamadjanov also
expressed interest in U.S. support for further work on
democratization and civil society in the country, including U.S.
assistance on drafting legislation. He described direct contact as
key to reestablishing the relationship, noting that all too often,
relationships could sour because of misunderstandings or due to
"information from other sources."

Comment:
--------------


12. (C) Mamadjanov's positive tone and his call for direct contact
and engagement are encouraging. Embassy LES Political Assistant
has described him as a cautious and career-oriented man, suggesting
that many of his comments had been blessed by more senior
leadership in the GOU prior to this meeting.

Biographic Note:
--------------


13. (C) Takhir Mamadjanov, Acting Chief of the Americas Department
at MFA, is an ethnic Uzbek who was born in Ferghana Province and
graduated from the Tashkent Institute of Foreign Languages. His
position at MFA between 2004 and 2006 is unknown. He served as
Uzbekistan's Ambassador to France from 1997 until 2003 (he often
uses French during interactions with Ambassador Norland).
Mamadjanov also was a senior consultant in the Presidential Apparat
from 1995 until 1997, and served in various capacities in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1987 and 1995. According to
Embassy LES Political Assistant, Mamadjanov is from a powerful
Tashkent clan (though he was born in Ferghana Province),and his
career benefited from the influence of a relative in the Government
of Uzbekistan who had handled personnel assignments. Mamadjanov

TASHKENT 00000423 004.3 OF 004


rose quickly through the ranks. Embassy LES noted that later on,
however, clan rivalries resulted in the ouster of Mamadjanov's
relative as well as Mamadjanov's recall from France and demotion to
his current position. The GOU has failed to confirm Mamadjanov in
his post for the past three years.
NORLAND