At Times Angry Karimov Says Afghan Transit Can Continue,

S E C R E T TASHKENT 000323


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034-03-18
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PHUM PINR UZ
SUBJECT: At Times Angry Karimov Says Afghan Transit Can Continue,
Seeks "Cooperative Approach" with U.S. on Democratization

REF: TASHKENT 281
STATE 24316
07 TASHKENT 2026 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard B. Norland, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (S) Summary. President Karimov told the Ambassador
March 18 that his earlier understanding with General Petraeus
regarding commercial transit of non-lethal cargo through Uzbekistan
to Afghanistan remains in place, despite Karimov's evident
embarrassment at the public recognition accorded human rights
activist Mutabar Tadjibaeva during the March 11 "women of courage"
event in Washington, which he believes had a political agenda aimed
at him. He expressed a desire to work with the U.S. on
democratization and human rights in Uzbekistan but asked that we
adopt an approach that avoids public "pressure," which he termed
counter-productive. He warned that Russia is trying to make itself
the sole gatekeeper on Afghanistan, and urged us to acknowledge the
key role that Uzbekistan plays on rail transit into Afghanistan.
Interestingly, officials around Karimov seem to grasp that their
president over-reacted to this event and appear anxious to keep
relations on track. We need to seize the opportunity to engage with
these officials in a more structured dialogue sooner rather than
later if we are to advance a comprehensive agenda with this key
regional player. Meanwhile, we intend to resume our dialogue with
MFA on finalizing our transit agreement (ref B). End Summary.


2. (S) Following Foreign Minister Norov's icy March 13
demarche to the Ambassador on Tadjibaeva (ref A),the Ambassador
requested a meeting with President Karimov to seek clarification of
Norov's implicit threat to suspend transit of cargo for U.S. forces
in Afghanistan via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Karimov
received the Ambassador for an hour and a half on March 18, with
Norov in attendance. As the meeting wore on, it became clear that
Karimov -- alternately angry, cajoling, mocking and wise -- wanted to
vent but did not intend to pull the plug on U.S.-Uzbek cooperation.


3. (S) Karimov began by asking the Ambassador to explain the
"women of courage" event and what was meant by presenting the award
to Tadjibaeva at such a high-profile occasion. The Ambassador
described what the event was and what it was not: it was intended to
recognize the accomplishments of individual women in advancing
international human rights, to which Secretary Clinton and First Lady
Obama were personally committed and which occupied a high place on
the U.S. policy agenda. It was not the product of any overall U.S.
policy review of Central Asia or Uzbekistan, as this review was still
in progress, nor was it intended to single out Uzbekistan or suggest
that we endorsed any opposition political group or agenda. In fact,
the Ambassador said, Tadjibaeva was someone who advocated engagement
with the authorities rather than sanctions or isolation as a way to
advance human rights, a view which had earned her criticism from some
human rights groups at home and abroad.


4. (S) Karimov called this description "superficial" and said the
event seemed to represent "old thinking." He criticized the previous
Administration's foreign policy and said he had been waiting to see
where the new Administration was headed. He recognized that the
economic crisis required immediate attention to domestic affairs, but
he was confident that the U.S. economic system was resilient enough
to right itself. Meanwhile, the March 11 event, with its high
profile "PR" content, had damaged trust between the U.S. and
Uzbekistan. He had sought in 2007 to re-start relations with the
U.S. from a "clean slate," focused on "step-by-step" efforts to build
trust based on mutual respect rather than pressure or "instruction"
from abroad. But recognizing Tadjibaeva in such a prominent way was
a mistake. Calling her a "swindler," he accused Tadjibaeva of
cohabitating with an Interior Ministry official and betraying other
activists. He seemed especially angry that Tadjibaeva might be seen
as a political figure in her own right being cultivated to challenge
him. Calming down, he finally took the tack that Tadjibaeva did not
deserve much attention at all, which was why she had been released in
the first place last year in a step designed to meet the U.S.
halfway. "Put yourself in my place," he asked plaintively -- "would
you trust me if I had done this?" The Ambassador reiterated that
this event was an opportunity to inspire women around the world but
it would be a mistake to view it as the sum total of U.S. policy on
Uzbekistan; the U.S. remained interested in finding ways to build
trust with Uzbekistan and make effective progress on the full range
of issues.


5. (S) Saying he would take the Ambassador's comments under
advisement, Karimov turned to a lambasting of Russian policy in the
region. He accused President Medvedev of aggressively seeking to
restore a Russian sphere of influence in the Near Abroad and
pointed to an event at the Russian Ministry of Defense yesterday
at which Medvedev and the Russian defense minister reportedly
declared an intention to confront NATO in the region. He accused
Russia of seeking to stoke conflicts that its CSTO rapid reaction
force could then move in to resolve (including in Georgia, where he
did not rule out a clash this spring),and he said forcefully that
Uzbekistan would have no part in such efforts to "militarize" the
region. He also accused the Russians of seeking to control Central
Asia's water supplies. The relevance of his tirade became clear when
he urged the U.S. not to alienate Uzbekistan given its key role in
standing up to Russian ambitions. However, he went on to plead for
closer cooperation with the U.S. on human rights and democratization
-- "we need your help, I want Uzbekistan to be a flourishing,
democratic country." Such help just should not come in the form of
"diktats" or pressure, which was "counterproductive," he said.


6. (S) Addressing Afghan transit, Karimov pointed to NDN
test shipments that had just reached Afghanistan and criticized the
Russians for acting as if the "door" to Afghanistan was their door.
He pointed to Russian FM Lavrov's visit to Kabul as an example of
efforts, in advance of the SCO conference on Afghanistan in Moscow
later this month, to make the U.S. and NATO believe that "all the
keys to Afghanistan lie in Moscow." He claimed that Russia had
decided Karzai should stay in office (curiously, Karimov said he was
giving us this information "for free, but it cost a lot" -- implying
perhaps it came from intelligence sources). He made a half-hearted
pitch for his "6 plus 3" negotiating format on Afghanistan, and
praised us for plans to bring Iran into discussions on next steps in
Afghanistan. Finally, he confirmed a couple of times that the
understandings he had reached with General Petraeus in January
remained in effect, but he urged us to remember the key role
Uzbekistan plays -- "don't thank Russia" (he claimed that former
President Bush had thanked then-President Putin for the fact that
Uzbekistan had put the K-2 air base at U.S. disposal in 2002).


7. (S) Ambassador's Comment: Clearly Karimov was concerned
that the U.S. had made a policy decision to abandon cooperation with
him. Equally clearly, pressuring him (especially publicly) could
cost us transit through Uzbekistan into Afghanistan, not to mention
the ability to engage on human rights and other issues. What is most
interesting is that senior staff around him appear to be letting on
to us (for the first time) that they know his behavior can harm Uzbek
interests and even contradict those positions which he himself
espouses. We should seize this opportunity to engage with these
officials in a more structured dialogue. The approach of working
around Karimov at the margins (see ref C - 07 TASHKENT 2026 NOTAL)
may be galling in the face of his intransigence, but ultimately it is
likely to get us further on issues across-the-board pending the
political succession that inevitably will occur here one of these
days. Meanwhile, we intend to convey ref B response to the latest
Uzbek proposal on the exchange of letters regarding Afghan transit
(NDN) shortly.


NORLAND