UZBEKISTAN: STAFFDEL DISCUSSES COUNTERTERRORISM WITH MVD

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-30
TAGS: PTER SOCI PGOV PREL PINS UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: STAFFDEL DISCUSSES COUNTERTERRORISM WITH MVD

REF: a) TASHKENT 777, b) TASHKENT 1288, c) IIR 6 955 0062 09
d) TASHKENT 878, e) TASHKENT 20, f) TASHKENT 1266

CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: On December 15, House Foreign Affairs Committee
staffers and Emboffs discussed counterterrorism with several
officials from Uzbekistan's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).
The MVD officials held that Uzbekistan is stable and a system of
information-sharing with other ministries and other states is in
place, but perceived other Central Asian states as lagging behind
Uzbekistan in counterterrorism legislation. The MVD also believed
that it was difficult for extremist ideas to survive in an
environment like Uzbekistan, and that certain extremist ideas were
largely incompatible with the Uzbek mentality. Although many of
the MVD's remarks about Uzbekistan's counterterrorism efforts were
vague, their comments about the role that the mahalla (or
neighborhood) plays in detecting and countering Islamic extremism
in Uzbekistan were notable. Religious extremist groups are
certainly less publicly active in the country now than was the case
ten years ago, and the GOU's crackdown on such groups over the
years as well as its efforts to promote a moderate form of Islam
among the populace appear to have contributed to this.
Nevertheless, the GOU's measures remain imperfect and abuse occurs.
End summary.

Information-Sharing and International Cooperation
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--------------


2. (C) On December 15, House Foreign Affairs Committee staffers
Brent Woolfork and Taylor Morgan and Emboffs discussed
counterterrorism with officials from Uzbekistan's Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD),including First Deputy Head of the
Counterterrorism Department Nurmuhamedov, Counterterrorism
Department Section Chief Petrochenko, Counterterrorism Department
Deputy Head Haydarov, and International Relations, Organizational
and Inspectorial Department Senior Inspector Agzamkhojaev.


3. (C) Petrochenko said that the MVD considers Uzbekistan to be
stable. While terrorist acts cannot always be predicted in any
country, at the moment, there is no obvious terrorist threat in
Uzbekistan. In response to a question about the extent of MVD's
counterterrorism information-sharing with other ministries and
countries, Haydarov said that it's hard to name any that Uzbekistan
does not cooperate with. The MVD interacts in particular with the
National Security Service on these matters. "We have a system of
information-sharing in place," he continued. "If we know there's a
threat to Tajikistan, for instance, of course we'll tell them."
Petrochenko elaborated that Uzbekistan shares information on
counterterrorism and counterextremism within the framework of
various international treaties and organizations including the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Uzbekistan also
participates in international fora and conferences, and Petrochenko
cited one that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe had sponsored a month earlier.


4. (C) Petrochenko noted that one of the first documents Uzbekistan
adopted after independence was a law on combating terrorism and was
proud of the "strong legislative basis" that guides Uzbekistan's
efforts in this regard. He complained that Uzbekistan's other
Central Asian neighbors do not have similar legislation in place.

Prevalence of Islamic Extremism, Efforts to Combat It
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--------------


5. (C) In response to a question about the prevalence of Islamic
extremism in Uzbekistan, Petrochenko replied that this was much
more of a problem ten years ago. Uzbekistan, however, addressed
the problem by pursuing a set of preventive measures and
punishments. After the meeting, and away from the office,
Azgamkhodjaev elaborated on Petrochenko's very general comments by
describing some of the measures Uzbekistan has pursued to counter
the threat of extremism. Uzbekistan also uses mahalla

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(neighborhood) committees, he said, and thanks to this "community
policing," authorities become aware very quickly if there are any
indications of extremism arising in a mahalla. "It is hard for
extremist ideas to survive in an environment like Uzbekistan
because of the mahallas," he said. "Even if a baby goes hungry for
a little while when its parents are away, the other members of the
mahalla will know it quickly." Agzamkhodjaev said that community
policing forms the basis for a strong state. Furthermore, old wise
men in a mahalla promote a moderate form of Islam among the
populace, and the mahallas also focus on certain groups such as
women and youth. (Note: Mahallas are headed by "aksakals," or
"white beards," who receive government salaries and serve two and a
half year terms. End note.) Agzamkhodjaev believed that certain
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) ideas are incompatible with the Uzbek
mentality, and this is an additional factor that impedes the spread
of extremism among the populace. "According to HT, a son must
separate from parents who do not also subscribe to HT. Such ideas
are not well-received in the populace," he said.

Comment:
--------------


6. (C) The MVD's comments about the declining support in Uzbekistan
for Islamic extremism are consistent with views we have heard from
other sources, including human rights activists and Imams in the
Ferghana Valley, the traditional hotspot for religious extremism in
Central Asia (ref A). Moreover, while individuals continue to be
charged with membership in religious extremist groups and receive
long prison sentences, the total number of such cases appears to
have declined in the past year. Nevertheless, we cannot confirm
the MVD's information, and state-controlled media also has recently
reported on the Islamic Jihad Group actively recruiting inside of
Uzbekistan (reftel B). Religious extremist groups, such as Hizb
ut-Tahrir, are certainly less publicly active in the country now
than was the case ten years ago. This is partially the result of a
large-scale government crackdown on such groups that has been
carried out since the late 1990s. Many of their members may
already be in prison, while others have likely been driven deeper
underground or to other areas, such as the regions of the Ferghana
Valley in Kyrgyzstan (reftel C). The government also appears to
have been more successful in recent years in promoting a tolerant,
moderate form of Islam, which may have further sapped support for
extremism (reftels B and D). Especially interesting from the MVD
meeting was the additional detail about the role that the
mahalla--a social institution that we suspected may serve partly as
an instrument of state control--plays in Uzbekistan's efforts to
counter extremism among the populace. We have long reported that
mahalla leaders use informers (called "posbons") to keep tabs on
community members. The reliability of the information provided by
such informers may be suspect, however, especially considering that
some of the individuals who have been imprisoned on religious
extremist charges over the years have had at most only tenuous
links to groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir. Some of these
individuals--who previously may not have harbored such
sentiments--could become radicalized after being locked up with
hardcore extremists. One of our concerns is that Uzbek prisons are
becoming incubators for extremism, and we believe the GOU is
increasingly concerned about this though it has not settled on a
policy to address it other than through state controls. We remain
concerned that individuals charged with religious extremism are
frequently denied due process of law and are abused.


7. (C) Despite the MVD's claim that counterterrorism
information-sharing is ongoing with neigboring states, it is
difficult to judge the extent to which this actually takes
place--and longstanding prickly relations with Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan's near-silence in response to U.S. counterterrorism
demarches over the past year would seem to cast doubt on Uzbekistan
actively sharing counterterrorism information with many other
states. While the MVD officials provided some additional
information that complements what they told Poloff during his first
meeting with them in January, their comments on the whole continued
to avoid specific details about Uzbekistan's counterterrorism
efforts.
NORLAND

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