Uzbekistan Scenesetter for General Petraeus

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-02-11
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan Scenesetter for General Petraeus

REF: a) TASHKENT 141

CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D)

For General Petraeus from Ambassador Norland




1. (C) Summary: Your visit to Uzbekistan is the first by a senior
U.S. official since the new Administration took office and comes at
a pivotal moment in regional politics. In Tashkent, as elsewhere
in the region, there is concern about the course of events in
Afghanistan and doubts as to whether or not the United States and
NATO have a strategy for success and the will to see it through.
The situation surrounding Manas has only added to this uncertainty,
leading many to question whether or not Russia is actively seeking
to undermine our mission as it reasserts its influence in its "near
abroad." In the conspiratorial logic of the region, Uzbekistan and
the other states imagine themselves as the object of great power
rivalry. Unsurprisingly, our difficulties with Kyrgyzstan are
fueling speculation here as to our next steps and adding to doubts
about the strength of our commitment in Afghanistan. The overall
objective of your discussions with President Karimov and other GOU
officials should be to listen to their concerns and then help put
these doubts to rest by demonstrating that the U.S. has a
comprehensive plan to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan that
makes use of the full spectrum of our military and civilian
resources. Knowing that we are committed to this mission and that
the Taliban will not be returning to power in Kabul will go a long
way towards eliciting greater GOU cooperation on a host of related
issues, including the Northern Distribution Network (NDN),counter
narcotics and others. This is a time of strategic reassessment for
the Uzbeks who, with time, may again be willing to consider closer
cooperation with the U.S., including use of a base. The question
of bases will inevitably be in the background of your visit, but is
best not addressed explicitly at this juncture. End Summary.



Political Context

--------------


2. (C) Uzbekistan is the largest country in Central Asia in terms
of population, its 27 million people nearly as many as the other
four former Soviet republics combined. Although less developed
economically than neighboring Kazakhstan, it has nonetheless
managed to maintain economic growth and remain substantially better
off than the other states in the region, all in a context of
authoritarian political stability. Uzbekistan, however, has proven
to be a difficult partner for the United States, a non-democratic
regime with a troublesome human rights record in the center of a
strategically important, but unstable region.




3. (C) Bilateral relations with Uzbekistan in this decade have gone
from close cooperation in the aftermath of 9/11 and the beginning
of operations in Afghanistan to a virtual severing of relations
following the May 2005 events in the city of Andijon when the U.S.
and Europe publicly condemned the regime and threatened sanctions.
Since reaching a nadir in early 2007, we have gradually begun to
rebuild our relationship with Uzbekistan through a strategy of
quiet engagement, but a significant level of mistrust remains on
both sides. Although there has been some progress on beginning a
dialogue on human rights, religious freedom and other issues, this
progress is still tenuous and the Uzbeks remain highly sensitive to
criticism and pressure.

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4. (C) President Karimov and the close circle of insiders that
holds power in Uzbekistan believe themselves to be encircled by
threats from within and without. (Note: Uzbekistan has faced real
terrorist threats from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and
the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),whose members have reportedly found
refuge in the border areas of Pakistan. End Note) In this
worldview, political and economic liberalism are sources of
instability and vectors of foreign influence, both of which Karimov
has sought to contain and control. Karimov, 71, remembers
Gorbachev's downfall and believes "color" revolutions were aimed at
regime change here. This view permeates perceptions of the U.S.,
Russia and the other states in the region, leading Karimov to adopt
a foreign policy of constant balancing and realignment as political
winds shift. Although this behavior has made Uzbekistan
unpredictable, it has also enabled Karimov to maintain a greater
degree of autonomy vis a vis other actors such as Russia, limiting
the ability of Moscow to pressure Uzbekistan in the way that its
weaker neighbors know all too well.



Uzbekistan and Russia

--------------


5. (C) Even when relations with the West were at their worst,
Uzbekistan never fully aligned with Russia in the way that Moscow
hoped and has limited its engagement with Russian-dominated
organization such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO),Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Community
(EURASEC). The Uzbeks seem to be in another period of strategic
reassessment in light of Kyrgyz announcements about the closure of
Manas and the suspicion that Russia is behind this. The Uzbeks,
although linked to Russia by history, culture and economics, are
suspicious of their former colonial rulers. We have been careful
never to lend credence to the "Great Game" interpretations of
politics in Central Asia. The Uzbeks, however, believe that they
are in the middle of this chess board and must calculate their
moves accordingly. Although we should discount facile conjecture
that the Uzbeks are "leaning" one way or another, we do believe
that the present moment provides an opportunity for the GOU to
pursue greater engagement with the U.S. across a range of issues,
beginning with Afghanistan.



Uzbeks and Afghanistan

--------------


6. (C) Sharing a border, religion, history and culture, the Uzbeks
believe that they understand Afghanistan. Additionally, many
Uzbeks have first hand experience in Afghanistan and view the
conflict through the prism of their role in the Soviet occupation.
Consequently, they tend to view Afghanistan with a measure of
skepticism, coupled with the fear that the U.S. and NATO will not
have the will to stay for the long haul. The message that has been
conveyed to us at all levels in Tashkent is that the GOU does not
have confidence that our strategy will succeed. They believe the
government of President Karzai is hopelessly corrupt and, having
failed to win the fealty of regional tribal leaders, cannot
effectively govern the country. The Uzbek preference is for a
'strong man' to replace Karzai.




7. (C) At the same time, our Uzbek interlocutors tell us that an
increase in military forces in Afghanistan will not bring

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stability. In fact, they worry that it will further alienate the
population, driving more Afghans into the arms of the Taliban.
This skepticism accounts for or justifies the heretofore limited
Uzbek engagement in the post-2006 period, which has been largely
limited to the provision of electricity, the facilitation of some
transit and repeated calls for a revival of the 6 plus 3 format, a
forum combining Afghanistan's neighbors plus Russia, the U.S. and
NATO that we have opposed on the grounds that it excludes the
legitimate government of Afghanistan. However, the Uzbeks would
also like to reap a share of reconstruction contracts in
Afghanistan and have talked about their ambitions to participate in
railroad construction as a means of establishing a southern
corridor to ports in Pakistan and Iran. Reality for Uzbekistan is
that Afghanistan will always be its neighbor and if a war weary
West allows the country to degenerate to its pre-2001 status,
Tashkent could be faced with a Taliban regime on its doorstep
again.




8. (C) Your meetings with GOU officials are an opportunity to help
turn these impressions around. Listening to Uzbek concerns,
engaging them on these issues and reinforcing our view that
additional forces are the key to the stability that is the sine qua
non of any development in Afghanistan, will go a long way towards
assuaging these fears and achieving some of our key objectives.



Other Key Objectives and Points

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9. (C) Northern Distribution Network - The GOU has been generally
supportive of NDN since giving its commitment to General McNabb in
November. However, progress has been slower than we hoped as we
attempt to agree on an acceptable format for an agreement. The
Uzbek side has proposed an exchange of letters at the level of
Ministers of Defense that is currently under review in Washington.
Key for the Uzbeks are assurances that NDN will be used only for
non-lethal cargo and that they have visibility into the pipeline
through a system of pre-clearances. We are hopeful that we will
find an acceptable mechanism. Another problem has been a GOU
prohibition on commercial air cargo operations between Uzbekistan
and Afghanistan, although we have some indications that this policy
could be revisited, possibly coinciding with your visit. Your
discussions are an opportunity to stress the importance of NDN and
push for quick agreement on the issues that leaves us with maximum
flexibility, including the ability to use commercial air cargo
between Navoi and Afghanistan.




10. (C) Local Purchase - DLA came to Tashkent in January to assess
the prospects for local purchase of construction materials,
prepared foods, beverages and fresh fruits and vegetables in
support of NDN. The GOU pulled out all the stops to accommodate
DLA, which is an indication of the importance the Uzbeks attach to
this issue. GOU officials, including Foreign Minister Norov, have
said to us that the lack of economic benefit and local purchase was
a major factor influencing the decision to close the base at
Karshi-Khanabad (K2). We believe this is an essential element to
secure cooperation on NDN and you should use the opportunity to
reiterate our commitment to local purchase.




11. (C) Counter Narcotics (CN) - We have been working to secure the
return of DEA to Uzbekistan in 2009 (DEA was forced to leave in

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early 2007). The GOU is concerned about narcotics trafficking from
Afghanistan and Tajikistan and views this as a major threat to
Uzbekistan's national security. The GOU is very interested in CN
assistance from CENTCOM, which we have said is contingent upon our
successful re-establishment of a "counter narcotics section" in the
Embassy staffed by DEA personnel, as DEA must be the coordinating
agency for U.S. CN efforts. This is an opportunity to reiterate
this point.




12. (C) Termez Transit - U.S. personnel assigned to ISAF are able
to transit Uzbekistan on a case by case basis via the German Air
Bridge at Termez. Unfortunately, the clearance process for this
transit has proven to be overly complex and unreliable. As a
consequence, we have requested from the GOU via diplomatic note
that U.S. personnel be allowed to use the German Air Bridge under
the same conditions as other NATO nations - i.e. without
pre-clearance. You should remind the GOU of the importance of this
issue.




13. (C) Mil to Mil Cooperation - Uzbekistan will host the CENTCOM
Action Officer Working Group (AOWG) meetings 24 - 27 February 2009.
There are 33 small scale military-to-military contact events on
this year's slate plus the Marshall Center courses, plus continued
assistance at Kagan and conferences. This is an increase from just
14 events the year before and formed the basis for expanded
cooperation during the U.S.-provided assistance at Kagan last
summer and during initial NDN discussions in Fall 2008. The GOU
sent the Deputy Defense Minister to the Change of Command in
October 2008. In the next months, the GOU will likely send a
general officer to the CENTCOM Central Asia Chiefs of Defense
Conference in late March 2009 and Deputy Defense Minister
General-Major Rustam Niyazov will attend ARCENT's Land Force
Symposium in late April 2009. The U.S. has offered to provide a
final EOD expert visit on 27 March 2009 in order to help prepare
GOU EOD experts for render-safe procedures to tackle remaining
unexploded ammunition dangers at Kagan and at other deteriorating
ammunitions storage sites in Uzbekistan.




14. (C) Human Rights - We have continued to make the point to the
Uzbeks that we consider human rights to be part of the full
spectrum of our bilateral relations. Although we are making
efforts not to isolate or antagonize the GOU, we have continued to
raise these issues and underscore the importance of sending
positive signals, particularly with a new Administration having
just taken office in Washington. One area of progress on this
front last year was the resumption of prison visits by the
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). Although this
program was successful, the ICRC was not given access to all
detention facilities and is currently trying to get GOU agreement
for access to facilities run by the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and
the National Security Service (NSS). Raising this point would serve
as a useful reminder that security cooperation will not supplant
our engagement on human rights issues.



Bases: Not Never, but Not Now

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15 (C) We doubt that any GOU official will raise this issue
explicitly. Nevertheless, there will be substantial interest in
the situation surrounding Manas, combined with a certain feeling of

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vindication on the part of the Uzbeks, who have long maintained
that Kyrgyzstan was a corrupt and unreliable partner. Despite
their sometimes mixed messages, the Uzbeks share a border with
Afghanistan and therefore may see higher stakes in U.S. success
than their Kyrgyz neighbors, inevitably begging the question of
whether or not the U.S. can win in Afghanistan without use of a
base in Central Asia. The Uzbeks are guided by a go slow approach
to rapprochement with the U.S. ("postepenno" in Russian, or
"step-by-step"). Although we do not exclude the possibility that
conditions could permit some U.S. use of an Uzbek base in the
future (reftel),raising that issue now would send a signal of
desperation that the bazaar mentality of Central Asia is quick to
exploit. Furthermore, it is simply unlikely that the Uzbeks are
ready to take this step, particularly given indications that they
may be under strong Russian pressure to reduce military cooperation
with the U.S. for now. We suspect that the base issue will remain
the quiet elephant in the room.



Your Meetings

--------------


16. (C) We anticipate that you will have two meetings with GOU
officials in Tashkent. First you will meet with Foreign Minister
Norov and Defense Minister Berdiyev, who will likely be joined by
the Chairman of the National Security Council Atayev (Atayev will
likely take the lead in this meeting). We have arranged breakfast
with Ambassador Miroslav Jenca, head of the UN's regional
preventative diplomacy center based in Ashgabat, who should have
useful insights into regional dynamics post-Manas. We also plan a
short meeting with the local ICRC rep to signal to the Uzbeks that
we take the prison visit issue seriously (Adm. Fallon and Gen.
Dempsey did the same).




17. (U) We look forward to welcoming you to Tashkent.
NORLAND

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