A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: SHOULD THE OSCE MONITOR ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001555

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/27
TAGS: AORC KDEM PGOV UZ
SUBJECT: A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: SHOULD THE OSCE MONITOR ELECTIONS
IN UZBEKISTAN?

CLASSIFIED BY: Peffley, Katrisa, Pol/Econ Officer, DOS, Pol/Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR) officials face a difficult decision as they consider
whether to send a team to monitor Uzbekistan's parliamentary
elections, slated to take place on December 27. Whatever its
decision, the OSCE will be sending a message to the Government of
Uzbekistan. Uzbek elections will not be free or fair by OSCE
standards. Monitoring the elections on the GOU's terms would
convey tacit acceptance of the status quo. On the other hand,
boycotting the elections entirely would be a slap in Uzbekistan's
face-and the GOU would likely respond accordingly. The OSCE's best
course of action under these circumstances is the de minimus option
of "election support." END SUMMARY.



UZBEK ELECTION STAGNATION LEADS TO OSCE FRUSTRATION

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2. (U) An OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) visited
Tashkent on October 21 and 22 in order to analyze and report on
Uzbekistan's pre-election situation. At issue is the utility (or
lack thereof) of sending a team to monitor the elections in
December. The NAM delegation met with Charge and PolEcon Chief on
October 22 to discuss the OSCE's options and the potential
implications of those options. The OSCE team also met with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Election Committee of
Uzbekistan, representatives of all registered political parties,
members of the new Ecological Movement, and representatives of key
embassies, civil society groups, and the media. The ODIHR team was
looking for guidance from member state embassies in Tashkent. (In
a separate debriefing, Anna Chernova from the Parliamentary
Assembly Secretariat urged the Department to instruct USOSCE on the
USG position on this issue.)


3. (C) The OSCE has monitored many Uzbek elections over the
last ten years, with very little to show for its efforts. After
previous observation missions, the OSCE has published reports
enumerating flaws in the election process and making specific
recommendations for improvement. Uzbek authorities have never
followed up on these recommendations. In fact, two changes to
Uzbek election law in 2009-one mandating preferential treatment for
the new Environmental Movement, and the other requiring that
candidates run as a member of a political party-actually make
elections less free and fair. (Previously members of "citizens'
groups" who were not political party members could also run for
office.) Neither of these changes is consistent with Uzbekistan's
OSCE commitments under the Copenhagen Agreement, and members of the
NAM expressed frustration that the GOU would introduce these laws
without consulting OSCE standards. Konrad Olszewski, Deputy Head
of OSCE/ODIHR and head of the NAM delegation, noted that the
Environmental Movement was actually created in violation of
Uzbekistan's own election laws. (NOTE: Despite all evidence to
the contrary, the GOU seems to think that the international
community will see these changes, especially the preferential
treatment of the Environmental Movement, as a positive step. This
is yet another illustration of the disconnect between the GOU and
the international community. END NOTE.) Olszewski bluntly summed
up the situation by stating that the chances of an election
monitoring team seeing progress during the elections are "less than
zero."




4. (C) The members of the NAM believe that meaningful
competition will be wholly absent from the upcoming parliamentary
elections. In Uzbekistan, the Central Election Committee (CEC)
plays an "overwhelming role" in elections. It controls every
aspect of election campaigns, including finance. For example,
donations to any party or candidate must be turned over to the CEC
to be divided equally among all candidates. All campaigns will
receive equal attention from the media, with all media-related
decisions made by the CEC. In a nutshell, the only information
available to voters will be strictly controlled by the CEC. In
addition, the agendas of the political parties are virtually
interchangeable, and are invariably controlled by the presidential
apparatus. For these reasons, OSCE representatives expect that a
report on this election would be identical to, or even worse than
previous reports on Uzbekistan's elections. The OSCE does not wish
to expend significant resources merely to produce an insignificant
report.



OSCE ELECTION MONITORING-OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS


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5. (SBU) Uzbekistan has already invited the OSCE to send a
team of 25 to 30 observers to monitor December's parliamentary
elections. However, the invitation itself puts limits on the size
of such a delegation-making it fairly clear that the GOU does not
have any intention of turning over a new leaf in terms of free and
fair elections. At this point, the OSCE/ODIHR mission must
recommend one of five options for monitoring the elections:



A) Full Observation Team: The first option is to recommend a
full-scale election observation team, which would include long-term
observers who would be present during the run-up to the election,
and short-term observers who would come to Uzbekistan in order to
monitor the elections themselves. Given the pre-set limitations in
the Uzbek invitation, this option is not very realistic. A
full-scale election observation usually includes a team of
hundreds; it is unlikely that the GOU would approve so many
observers. In addition, the NAM fears that such a full-scale
project would be a total waste of OSCE resources.



B) Limited Observation Team: Another possibility would be to
send a limited election observation team, which would not include
any short-term observers. This option is often used in situations
where there is limited value to conducting a full-scale
observation. A team of long-term election observers would publish
a report on their findings and make recommendations to the GOU.



C) Election Assessment Mission: An "election assessment
mission" would include a group of experts deployed to Uzbekistan
for two to three weeks in order to monitor the election process
without critiquing it.



D) Election Support Team: An "election support team" is a
group of five to ten experts deployed to familiarize themselves
with the election process, provide technical support, and maintain
dialogue with the host government officials during the elections
process. An election support team would provide recommendations to
the GOU, but would not publish any statement or report about the
status of the elections.



E) No Election Observation: Finally, and most drastically,
the OSCE could opt not to send any observation team. Such a
decision would loudly and clearly send a message to the GOU that
the OSCE thinks that Uzbek elections are so flawed that they are
not even worth monitoring. The NAM team admitted that this course
of action would probably have negative repercussions on the
diplomatic community in Uzbekistan.



COMMENT

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6. (SBU) COMMENT: If the OSCE sends a mission to observe the
upcoming elections within the parameters set by the GOU, it will
tacitly imply that the OSCE approves of the political status quo in
Uzbekistan (or at least that the OSCE has no intention of pressing
the GOU to ensure free and fair elections). On the other hand, not
sending a mission at all would send a very strong, negative message
which would almost certainly result in a backlash from the GOU
which could affect the entire international community. Post
believes that choosing a middle path and sending an "election
support team" would preserve good working relationships with the
GOU without putting the stamp of approval on elections that will
likely fall far short of OSCE standards. END COMMENT.
NORLAND