Managing Uzbek Redlines in Bilateral Consultations

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001535

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/15
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UZ
SUBJECT: Managing Uzbek Redlines in Bilateral Consultations

REF: TASHKENT 1533; ABC AGENDA WITH GOU CHANGES EMAILED TO SCA/CEN

CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: Prior to the arrival in Tashkent of Assistant
Secretary Blake, Foreign Minister Norov summoned the Ambassador for
a meeting in which he reviewed the agenda for the visit and
delivered the GOU's response to the U.S. draft agenda for the
Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC) (REF. B). Although the GOU's
draft ABC agenda reflects most of the U.S. draft, Norov suggested
that A/S Blake should not raise the issues of child labor,
religious freedom or the status of NGOs in Uzbekistan with
President Karimov. The GOU proposals for the ABC agenda also strike
any direct reference to these issues. However, not including these
issues on the ABC agenda seems to be more of a reflection of
presidential neuralgia than an outright denial that these problems
exist. During discussions with A/S Blake, both Norov and National
Security Council Secretary Ataev spoke at length on these issues
and said that the GOU was addressing known shortcomings. The key
here is to work these issues into the agenda without making
specific references to them, which we believe is achievable and
will serve U.S. interests. Our goal should be to have discussions
with the GOU that are focused more on finding solutions and less on
whether or not we specifically enumerate sensitive issues such as
these in the agenda. End Summary.



Red Lines on ABC Agenda

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2. (C) In a meeting on October 10, Foreign Minister Norov told the
Ambassador that the Uzbek side had agreed to most of the U.S.
proposals for the ABC agenda and was strongly supportive of the
process. He said that the GOU wants this initiative to succeed,
despite what he noted was a track record of past efforts that had
withered on the vine during the two previous U.S. Administrations.
The draft agenda that Norov shared with the Ambassador during the
meeting tracks largely with the U.S. draft and adds several agenda
items close to the Uzbek's hearts, such as "military-technical
cooperation", the Navoi Free Trade Zone, and others. What the GOU
does not want on the agenda is child labor, religious freedom or
the status of NGOs in Uzbekistan, which Norov said are not items of
"mutual concern" which should be the defining characteristic of the
ABC.




3. (C) Norov also cautioned the Ambassador that A/S Blake not raise
these issues with President Karimov, saying, "If Blake raises these
issues, he will get a sharp response. You know his character. It
won't help you to raise these issues." Norov said that Uzbekistan
is dealing with these issues in its own way and attributed
criticism to "ideological baggage of the previous Administration."
He said the GOU welcomes President Obama's approach of not seeking
to "impose democracy" and suggested that the ABC process and
U.S.-Uzbek relations in general, should reflect this principle.




4. (C) As is often the case in Uzbekistan, sensitivities about
saving face and avoiding criticism can lead Karimov and the GOU to
dig in their heels, which appears to be the case here. Clearly
Karimov's own neuralgia about having any outsider "grade"
Uzbekistan on issues like child labor means that any document
mentioning this will not get cleared by the Presidential Aparat.
The same is true of religious freedom and NGOs. At the same time,
however, GOU officials and even Karimov himself (REF A) recognize
that Uzbekistan has a long road to travel to develop democracy and
build civil society. As much as officials bristle at any formal
mention of issues like this, they nevertheless refer to them and
say that their government is working on improving the situation.
Both Norov and NSC Secretary Ataev told A/S Blake on Oct. 12 that
they recognize problems in the area of child labor and, although
they maintained that the issue has been overblown by Western NGOs,
they and other Uzbek officials openly say that their government
does not want to have children working in the cotton fields and
that they are taking steps to reform the cotton sector and
eliminate this practice.



The Way Forward

TASHKENT 00001535 002 OF 002


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5. (C) Although disappointing that the GOU will not agree to put
child labor, religious freedom and the status of NGOs on the agenda
of the ABC, it does not come as a surprise and should by no means
be interpreted to mean that we cannot address these issues within
the ABC. These issues are seen by Karimov as political levers that
are used to embarrass him personally and draw unfavorable
comparisons between Uzbekistan and its neighbors, where many of the
same problems exist. What we need to do, rather than pushing back
on the GOU to include these issues explicitly on the agenda of the
ABC, which will only bring us to a stalemate and potentially undo
much of the progress that has been made in rebuilding trust with
Karimov, is to include these issues implicitly. This will be, in
fact, the best way to actually make progress on these issues,
whereas insisting on listing them explicitly would be directly
counter-productive. The Uzbeks acknowledge that these issues are
important to Congress and to many in the U.S. public and will be
willing to work with us as long as they perceive this work to be
constructive and aimed at improving conditions in their country
rather than singling them out for criticism.




6. (C) The problem of child labor, for example, is fundamentally an
economic one driven by the structure of the Uzbek agriculture
sector. Agricultural modernization is an area the GOU has agreed to
work on that would allow us to address the child labor issue while
we actually address the root causes of the problem as well.
Likewise, we have language in the ABC relating to assistance on
judicial procedures and on improving exchanges that provides
latitude to discuss religious freedom and the status of NGOs.




7. (C) We need to be prepared to move incrementally with the
Uzbeks. NSC Secretary Ataev told A/S Blake that he realized that
Uzbekistan had a bad image in the U.S. and that it will take time
to address problems that have contributed to this. In short, the
Uzbeks know what their problems are, even if pride, culture and
their seventy-one-year-old President make it difficult to
acknowledge these openly. We should try to add more ambiguous and
open language to the ABC agenda, but be prepared to move forward
with less than our full complement of issues explicitly spelled
out, with the knowledge that we will be able to discuss them and
with a view to making concrete proposals to improve conditions in
this society.
NORLAND