Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT1513
2009-09-23 07:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

Afghan Transboundary Water Training - Include the Neighbors

Tags:  ENRG EAID SENV ECON PREL UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2100
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHNT #1513 2660720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 230720Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1347
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001513 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/23
TAGS: ENRG EAID SENV ECON PREL UZ
SUBJECT: Afghan Transboundary Water Training - Include the Neighbors
from the Start?

REF: KABUL 2933

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard B. Norland, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001513

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/23
TAGS: ENRG EAID SENV ECON PREL UZ
SUBJECT: Afghan Transboundary Water Training - Include the Neighbors
from the Start?

REF: KABUL 2933

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard B. Norland, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) We were intrigued by reftel's proposal to initiate
capacity building for Afghan officials to develop their ability to
negotiate with neighbors, including Uzbekistan, on future
trans-boundary water sharing arrangements. The cable quite rightly
points out that this issue is a tough one for the neighborhood, and
that proposed projects need regional coordination and consultation
in advance if problems are to be avoided. Indeed, we would offer
the suggestion that such coordination begin with the training
process itself: to the extent appropriate and practicable, we might
consider offering legal, scientific or technical training not just
to Afghan officials, but simultaneously to officials from several
or all of the affected Central Asian countries.




2. (C) Joint training would have salutary potential in two
respects. First, even if other Central Asian countries chose not
to participate (and some might well opt out - the Uzbeks, for
example, are notoriously arrogant in thinking their skills are
above those of all their neighbors),at least they could not accuse
us of lack of transparency (whereas if word of Afghan training
seeped out it might fuel paranoid notions that the U.S. was "up to
something" on water in the region, enhancing Afghan capabilities to
the detriment of others). Second, if officials from all the
interested Central Asian countries including Afghanistan were to
take part jointly in training activities, this might build regional
teamwork and lay the foundation for cooperative approaches down the
line, at least at the technical level until politics steps in.




3. (C) Water, we keep being reminded here, is a "life or death"
issue. The Russians misplayed their hand early this year when
President Medvedev told different audiences in the region different
things, which eventually caught up with them and cast real doubt on
Moscow's intentions and credibility. Likewise, the notion of
charging downstream countries for water (reftel para 3) is
explosive and could constitute a casus belli for some; at the very
least it would be the end of Uzbek support for anything to do with
Afghanistan. The proposal to launch training for the Afghans on
water management negotiations is an opportunity to avoid mistakes
by maximizing regional transparency and bringing as many of the
interested parties together as possible early in the game.
NORLAND