AFGHANISTAN - MANAGING THE NEIGHBORS: UZBEKISTAN

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/19
TAGS: PGOV PREL UZ AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - MANAGING THE NEIGHBORS: UZBEKISTAN

REF: STATE 85136

CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) We have urged the Uzbeks to play a constructive role as the
Afghan elections unfold. Ambassador discussed reftel points with
Deputy FM Karamatov on Aug. 17, and CENTCOM Commanding General
Petraeus delivered the message in his meetings with President
Karimov, the Uzbek Foreign and Defense Ministers, and the National
Security Council Secretary on Aug. 18.




2. (C) Post's responses are keyed to reftel questions:



A) Analysis of Uzbekistan's likely strategic interests in the
Afghan election: Uzbekistan has a long-standing interest in
Afghanistan and has been following developments there very closely.
Although there are ethnic and historical ties between Uzbekistan
and Afghanistan, Tashkent's primary interest has been and remains
the stability of Northern Afghanistan and the security of its own
southern border, as well as the Afghan-Tajik border. The GOU fears
both a return of the Taliban to power in Kabul and the currently
more real possibility that extremists will move from the border
areas with Pakistan into Central Asia. Northern Afghanistan
represents a crucial buffer zone for Uzbekistan in the case of
either contingency. President Karimov made this point in his
August 18 meeting with Gen. Petraeus, urging the U.S. to pay
special attention to the development of the North.



Karimov and FM Norov told Petraeus that Uzbekistan does not meddle
in Afghanistan and has absolutely no connection or dealings with
Gen. Dostum, saying that he is an unreliable figure who has become
largely "irrelevant" in Afghanistan. At the same time, the Uzbek
leadership has no confidence in Afghan President Karzai and Karimov
and others have repeatedly maintained that Afghanistan needs a
stronger, more charismatic leader who can effectively wield power
from the center. In his conversation with Petraeus, Karimov said
he was convinced that Karzai will win re-election on either the
first or second round and that this will be a "U.S. problem," as
Karzai will be incapable of implementing any of the key goals of
U.S. strategy. Tashkent is resigned to an extension of the status
quo in Afghanistan and thus attaches little importance to the
August 20 elections.



B) Assessment of whether Uzbekistan would be likely to urge
restraint and play a positive role, publicly or privately: Despite
their utter lack of confidence in Karzai, the Uzbeks are convinced
of his eventual victory and seek stability above any other goal.
As such, we judge that they would be unlikely to take steps to
further aggravate the situation should there be unrest in the wake
of the elections. Uzbek influence is relatively limited to Northern
Afghanistan and to remaining connections from the time when the
Northern Alliance held power there. The GOU would likely respond
to unrest in a non-public manner, but if there were large-scale
violence, could take a more public posture in urging restraint.



C) Advice on how we could best encourage Uzbekistan to play such a
role: In the event of unrest, we should be prepared to consult with
the Uzbeks on the situation and approach them with requests to urge
restraint and to quietly intercede with those individuals with whom
they still have influence in Afghanistan. Assurances to the effect
that we will help to make sure any violence does not spill over
Afghanistan's borders would also help to allay fears in Tashkent
and elicit cooperation.
NORLAND