Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT1447
2009-08-14 11:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

Uzbekistan: Scenesetter for the Visit of General Petraeus

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR AF UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 141152Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T TASHKENT 001447 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/14
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Scenesetter for the Visit of General Petraeus

CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

For General Petraeus from Ambassador Norland



S E C R E T TASHKENT 001447

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/14
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Scenesetter for the Visit of General Petraeus

CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

For General Petraeus from Ambassador Norland




1. (S) Summary: Your second visit to Uzbekistan comes at a pivotal
moment in the U.S.-Uzbek relationship and will build upon the July
12-13 visit of Under Secretary of State Bill Burns during which we
proposed to the Uzbeks the establishment of a structured bilateral
dialogue. The Uzbek leadership is following events in Afghanistan
very closely and there will be keen interest in the upcoming
elections. Your discussions will be an opportunity to underscore to
a still-skeptical President Karimov the extent of our commitment to
Afghanistan and allay his lingering fears that the U.S. and NATO
will not see this mission through to its end, a segue to seeking
his views on lethal transit through Uzbekistan and direct
(non-lethal) cargo flights to Afghanistan (both of which he has
heretofore strongly opposed). You will also likely hear Karimov
expound at length on Russian duplicity and his efforts to steer an
independent course, factors that are conducive to our efforts to
develop a more constructive relationship with Uzbekistan. End
Summary.



Recent Political Developments

--------------


2. (C) Under Secretary of State Bill Burns visited Tashkent on July
12-13 and met with President Karimov and Foreign Minister Norov.
Burns was the highest level USG civilian visitor to Uzbekistan in
four years and delivered a message that the U.S. wants to build a
constructive relationship with Uzbekistan that enables us to
address sensitive issues such as human rights effectively. He
proposed setting up regular political consultations at the level of
Assistant Secretary or above on four general groups of issues: 1)
Political; 2) Security; 3) Human Rights and Democracy; 4) Economic
and Development. We are now waiting for the Uzbek reaction to
these proposals, but all signals are that the GOU welcomes the
opportunity to rebuild relations.




3. (C) On the issues of human rights and democracy that continue to
be problems in the relationship, the GOU may have been hoping that
the Administration's "pragmatism" meant that these issues are now

off the table. U/S Burns made very clear that they are not off the
table and remain very important principles in U.S. foreign policy.
Karimov gave positive signals on a prominent human rights case and
the International Committee of the Red Cross has since been able to
renew its prison monitoring program here. Likewise, there appears
to be a realization on the part of the GOU that it must cooperate
with UNICEF and the International Labor Organization to address the
issue of child labor in Uzbekistan. However, other recent arrests
and imprisonments of human rights activists offer little assurance
that we will see comprehensive improvements soon. On the issue of
religious freedom, despite positive statements, we have yet to get
a response from the GOU on our draft language to resolve this
issue. The GOU had been waiting for signals from the new
Administration on its approach and, despite a clear signal from
Burns, is still taking an incremental and cautious approach in its
relations with the U.S. Our challenge is to keep forward progress
on these issues that is sufficient to relieve the periodic pressure
from some quarters to take a harder line on Uzbekistan.



Guantanamo Detainees

--------------


4. (S) The Government of Uzbekistan is increasingly aware that
Guantanamo detainees are being returned to neighboring countries,
including Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, at the same time as they know
Uzbek detainees are being resettled in places like Ireland and
Switzerland. They strongly desire the Uzbek detainees back and have
expressed their dissatisfaction. Washington agencies have thus far
been reluctant to consider returning Uzbek nationals to Uzbekistan
given the poor human rights record here. You should be prepared for
the possibility of this issue being raised in your discussions with
the GOU.



Uzbekistan and Russia

--------------


5. (C) Even when relations with the West were at their worst,
Uzbekistan never fully aligned with Russia in the way that Moscow
hoped and has limited its engagement with Russian-dominated
organization such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO),Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Community
(EURASEC). The Uzbeks seem to be in another period of strategic
reassessment in light of Russia's announcement of intent to build a
military base in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, which is located adjacent to the
Ferghana Valley-Uzbekistan's breadbasket and most troublesome and
vulnerable region. The Uzbeks are linked to Russia by history,
culture and economics but remain suspicious of Russia's intent. We
have been careful never to lend credence to the "Great Game"
interpretations of politics in Central Asia. The Uzbeks, however,
believe that they are in the middle of this chess board and must
calculate their moves accordingly. Although we should discount
facile conjecture that the Uzbeks are "leaning" one way or another,
we do believe that the present moment provides an opportunity for
the GOU to pursue greater engagement with the U.S. across a range
of issues, beginning with Afghanistan. In several recent meetings,
Karimov has expressed his visceral distrust of Russia.



Afghanistan

--------------


6. (C) Uzbek officials across the board have been very skeptical of
our engagement in Afghanistan. Drawing on the Soviet experience,
they frequently point out that there is no military solution to the
problem and are loathe to become too closely associated with the
military effort partially for fear of retribution should a vengeful
Taliban one day return to power in Kabul. At the same time,
however, the threat of instability in the region and the movement
of extremist groups northward is a major concern here, a fact
underscored by the May attacks in Andijon province on a border and
police post that left at least one officer dead. The Uzbeks
therefore want and need us to succeed in Afghanistan. Your
meetings here will be an opportunity to update them on the progress
of our strategy and drive home the point that the U.S and NATO will
see this mission through.




7. (C) The upcoming Afghan elections will also be major point of
interest here. Karimov and others have made no secret of their
disdain for Karzai, whom they believe was "Washington's man," and
frequently point to the need for a "Pashtun strongman" who can rein
in regional governors and warlords. Your discussions will be an
opportunity to reinforce the message that the U.S. is neutral on
the elections, but is doing everything possible to ensure that they
are conducted in a fair, transparent and secure fashion. You
should urge the Uzbeks to engage closely with whomever emerges as
the next Afghan president.



Other Key Operational Objectives and Points

--------------


8. (S) Lethal Transit - Since the announcement of the agreement
with Russia following the Moscow Summit, the Uzbeks have been
following this issue closely and likely expect it to be raised. We
judge Tashkent may not acquiesce now to a U.S. request to expand
transit to include lethal materiel or flights, but our gradually
escalating dialogue could set the stage for a possible shift in
Uzbek attitudes down the line, should we decide we really need to
pursue this option. As the Uzbeks already believe they are
indispensable to NDN because of their rail network, raising lethal
transit would only marginally influence their thinking on this
score. On balance, however, putting the issue of lethal transit on
the table with the Uzbeks even while there are uncertain prospect
of actual early implementation advances our interests; both in
terms of developing more options for resupply of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and in taking our dialogue with the Uzbeks to a new,
possibly more productive level across the board.




9. (C) Northern Distribution Network - NDN is the concept that has
provided us the opening to broaden our relationship with
Uzbekistan. NDN rail shipments are moving successfully through
Uzbekistan, however there were some delays in June and July during
which several trains were not released within the 30-day window
stipulated in the transit agreement (exchange of letters). Since
Major General Dowd's June visit, during which he emphasized the
importance of timely release of logistics trains, delays have been
largely resolved and trains have begun to move again in accordance
with the transit agreement. We must continue to make clear to the
GOU that, in order to gain the confidence necessary to accelerate
local purchase and increase volumes on NDN, they must ensure trains
are released according to agreement-specified timelines and
preferably even sooner. Our logisticians tell us that they can
ship even more through NDN if the Uzbeks can make the process more
efficient. The GOU, from President Karimov down to the lowest
level, wants NDN through Uzbekistan to succeed. In particular,
they are keen to work with the US on efforts to extend the rail
line from Hairaton to Mazar-e Sharif and are highly appreciative of
our support in the Asian Development Bank on that issue. Karimov
has yet to relent on the prohibition on flying cargo directly from
Uzbekistan to Afghanistan; this is a chance to underscore the
opportunity cost of this policy for Uzbekistan.




10. (C) Local Purchase - DLA came to Tashkent in January to assess
the prospects for local purchase of construction materials,
prepared foods, beverages and fresh fruits and vegetables in
support of NDN. The GOU pulled out all the stops to accommodate
DLA, which is an indication of the importance the Uzbeks attach to
this issue. GOU officials, including Foreign Minister Norov, have
said to us that the lack of economic benefit and local purchase was
a major factor influencing the 2005 decision to close the base at
Karshi-Khanabad (K2). We believe this is an essential element to
solidify cooperation on NDN and you should use the opportunity to
reiterate our commitment to local purchase. During Major General
Dowd's recent visit in late June, the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations, Trade and Investment (MFERIT) arranged for him to visit
the Tashkent Paint Factory, Uzbekistan's only steel mill, the
largest cement factory in the Former Soviet Union outside of Navoi,
as well as the multi-modal transit hub at Navoi Airport and
adjacent Free Industrial Economic Zone (FIEZ). From these site
visits, MG Dowd suggested to GOU officials that local purchase
efforts might soon include construction materials, particularly
Uzbek-produced cement and some steel wire and rebar products.
Product samples from General Dowd's visit are on their way to
USCENTCOM POCs for quality assessment. Purchases from the Defense
Department prime contractor for foodstuffs (Supreme Foodservices)
are now limited to bottled water from the Nestle plant in Namangan.
However, a Supreme Foodservices representative who visited in early
August is hopeful that Supreme may soon add locally produced pasta
as well as UHT boxed milk and juice to existing water purchases.
Sizable local purchase opportunities remain with high quality Uzbek
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (FF&V) and textiles. Since Uzbekistan
still denies direct flight to Afghanistan, Uzbek FF&V might be
trucked a short distance to Chimkent, Kazakhstan for air delivery
to Kabul. Uzbekistan's growing textiles industry is also capable of
producing quality uniform items to order for Afghanistan's police
and military forces although concerns about child labor practices
in the cotton industry may preclude such cooperation. Local
purchase is an important effort capable of building goodwill and
expanding government-to-government relations. Local purchase
expectations already exist inside the GOU, as was demonstrated when
First Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov told visiting USTRANSCOM
Commander General McNabb in April 2009 that the GOU expects more
effort in local purchase and went so far as to set an annual
procurement goal of 100 million USD. We need to develop a simple,
accessible mechanism to define U.S. military requirements and bring
them to the attention of potential local suppliers, as well as to
"plug" interested vendors into the DOD contracting process.




11. (C) Termez Transit - Since January 2008, the GOU has allowed
U.S. Troops to use the German air bridge at Termez Air Base for
transit of NATO/ISAF personnel into Afghanistan. After it became
evident that the clearance process for this transit was overly
complex and unreliable, in June 2009, Uzbekistan simplified the
clearance process for U.S. use of Termez by adding the U.S. to the
list of approved nations and waiving the requirement to submit
dipnotes for each case. This will facilitate U.S. use of the
Uzbek-Afghan Air Bridge.




12. (C) Mil to Mil Cooperation - In August 2007 the MOD began to
re-engage CENTCOM with dialogue about getting past our "diplomatic
pause" and working towards improving our security cooperation
relationship. Even with visa and dip note difficulties in June
2008, FY 2008 was the most prolific military-to military engagement
year since FY 2005. The FY 2009 cooperation plan more than doubled
from FY 2008. Uzbekistan and CENTCOM are well on their way to
completing the majority of the 33 small scale military-to-military
events on our FY 2009 plan. Unfortunately we have had significant
delays and in some cases cancellations of events because the
MOD-selected attendees were never granted Uzbek exit visas. In
fact, our event supporting MOD's top-stated priority of Modeling
and Simulation has been scheduled and postponed two times this year
for that reason. Addressing this issue at presidential-level
meetings would probably be the most effective way to help MOD get
this obstacle removed since no one below that level, to include
MFA, seems to have the power to generate these clearances. On a
very positive note, we met informally with the Border Guards this
past month, which we have otherwise not been able to do for more
than a year. Our relationship with the Border Guards is warming up
quickly and should continue to do so as we will be doing boat
training with them from 7 Sep to 2 Oct in Termez. The Border
Service is very excited about any training or equipment we can help
out with along their shared border with Afghanistan.



Your Meetings

--------------


13. (C) You will have three meetings with GOU officials in
Tashkent. First you will have a combined meeting with Defense
Minister Kobil Berdiev, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations
Investment and Trade Elyor Ganiev and National Security Council
Secretary Murod Ataev. Focus of this meeting should be
streamlining the Northern Distribution Network,
military-to-military cooperation and local purchase. Next you will
have a meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Norov.
You should discuss streamlining the Northern Distribution Network
within the context of Uzbekistan's contribution to efforts in
Afghanistan. The MOD will host you for lunch at Dome Restaurant in
the Intercontinental Hotel. After lunch you will travel to the
Embassy for a photo opportunity and gift presentation with the
Marine Security Guard Detachment and a modified Country Team Brief.
Your last official meeting of the day is with President Karimov.
We have arranged a dinner buffet at Ambassador Norland's residence
to take place after your meeting with the President. This will
provide you an opportunity to chat with Ruslan Mirzaev the
Commander of the Border Service, with whom we are eager to
cultivate a relationship. You will also have the opportunity to
meet other ministers, important to the mil-to-mil relationship,
whom you did not have the chance to meet during the day. Many
players critical to the Northern Distribution Network will also be
present.




14. (U) We look forward to welcoming you and Mrs. Petraeus to
Tashkent.
NORLAND