U.S.-Baltic Annual CFE Consultations: Support for CFE, U.S.

S E C R E T TALLINN 000293

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/25
TAGS: PARM PREL NATO KCFE EN
SUBJECT: U.S.-Baltic Annual CFE Consultations: Support for CFE, U.S.
Lead with Russia

REF: STATE 92528

CLASSIFIED BY: Karen Decker, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: The three Baltic states used this year's annual
CFE consultations in Tallinn to express regret that U.S.-Russia
discussions on CFE were not progressing due to Russia's repetition
of old ideas, but insisted the U.S. continue to lead on CFE in
order to maintain a unified NATO approach. They reaffirmed the
readiness of their governments to join the Adapted CFE Treaty when
that became possible. They urged that the new Administration
stick to positions in the NATO-agreed Parallel Actions Package and
hoped that we would not change fundamentally our approach on CFE,
either by ceding too much to the Russians or relegating European
conventional forces - and CFE itself - to the second tier.


2. (S/NF) The Balts also took the opportunity to underscore the
importance of continued USG engagement on practical European
security issues - such as NATO defense planning and exercises - as
well as CFE. The U.S. team's outline of Russia's ongoing military
reorganization provided the basis for a wide-ranging discussion of
conventional military challenges. MOD briefers from Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia insisted that training and resources for
territorial defense and expeditionary missions are mutually
supportive, but also stressed that NATO must take the Balts'
Article 5 concerns seriously if we expect them to be able to
sustain support for expeditionary missions. All highlighted that
U.S./EUCOM practical involvement with exercise and visits was a
huge plus. They were explicit in stating that it was essential for
the U.S. conventional and nuclear presence in Europe to remain
undiminished. End summary.

Support for CFE and U.S. as Lead with Russia


3. (C) Estonian MFA Director General for Security Policy and
International Organizations Margus Kolga opened the meeting with a
general tour d'horizon on CFE-related topics. He reaffirmed
Estonia's continued willingness to accede to the Adapted CFE Treaty
when the conditions were right. Latvian MFA Director of Security
Policy Kaspars Ozolins announced that there had been discussions
among the three Baltic States on how they could increase their
security through CFE implementation. Lithuanian MFA Director of
Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy Gediminas Varvuolis
encouraged the U.S. to make all efforts to "bring Russia back to
the table." U.S. Head of Delegation Rich Davis reaffirmed that the
U.S. welcomed the Balts' willingness to accede to Adapted CFE and
recalled that it was one of the elements of the parallel actions
package. Davis said that in Washington there was active
consideration at senior levels of the way ahead on CFE. Assistant
Secretary Rose Gottemoeller had recently met twice with Russian MFA
Disarmament Director Anatoly Antonov, but eliciting Russian
flexibility on the "toughest issues" was proving difficult.

Russian Force Restructuring: Update


4. (S/NF) The U.S. side provided an update, as per usual practice,
on the security situation in the Baltic region to include the
status of the Russian military's reorganization. Following up on
previous Baltic interest in the situation in Georgia, the U.S.
offered a snapshot: Russian forces were still located in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia but had been pulled out of the rest of
Georgia, generally on schedule when EU monitors were in place.
Russia had declared these forces in its Vienna Document data as of
1 January 2009 under the identity of the units from which they had
been formed at their peacetime locations at Maykop and Vladikavkaz
in the North Caucasus Military District. Russian border guards
had been placed on South Ossetian and Abkhazian borders.


5. (S/NF) Concerning Russian forces more generally, the U.S.
explained that the largest restructuring of Russian ground forces
in at least two decades or more was ongoing. Most inactive
formations and units were being eliminated, and divisions were
being restructured into one, two, or three brigades in order to
create smaller, more agile units that would be able more quickly to
respond to regional conflicts and contingencies. Overall, there
will be fewer tank battalions and motorized rifle battalions in the
Area of Application than heretofore. The large-scale
reorganization would take time to digest and it is likely that
Russia would be somewhat less ready to react to a contingency like
Georgia now than it was this time last year. Nevertheless, Russia
would be able to respond promptly to any contingency related to
South Ossetia or Abkhazia.



6. (S/NF) More broadly, the restructuring also signaled a
decision by Russia to focus on a small number of ready forces,
rather than maintaining its ability to generate a large, heavy
force quickly. Under its previous organization, Russia had aimed
to be able to mobilize a large, heavy force in a matter of weeks;
now the timeframe for generating that type of large, defensive
force would be perhaps as much as six months or more. The Russian
premise appeared to be that there would not be a major land war in
Europe that engaged, for example, Russia and NATO, whereas there
might be a need for Russian forces to act to meet smaller
contingencies, and here Russia wanted to be more capable.


7. (S/NF) The Zapad (West) 2009 military exercise expected in
late September was notified as involving a total of 12,529
personnel (6,820 from Belarus, 5,680 from Russia and 29 from
Kazakhstan) in a simulation of attacks on both the Kaliningrad
Oblast and Belarus that would be repelled by the combined forces.
This combined exercise, Zapad 2009, will be the largest exercise
conducted in the region in many years and is just below the Vienna
Document threshold (13,000 personnel) for observation. Varvuolis
(Lithuania) expressed concern about the large scale exercise on the
Lithuanian border. He stressed that the GOL is "not alarmed" but
suggested the exercise was the largest since the Cold War, and
represented the prospect of activity near the of the Baltic states.
This year's exercise will be even bigger that last year's Zapad
exercise. He inferred that, as such, these exercises had a "show
of force" element. U.S. and Baltic teams both expressed regret
that Russia had used up the last available Vienna Document
inspection quota for this year, thus limiting opportunities for
OSCE partners to observe the Zapad exercise, although Belarus had
notified this exercise and invited neighboring states (Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine) to observe. Estonian LTC Toomas
Peda noted that the opportunity to observe this exercise was not
totally lost -- both Latvia and Lithuania were planning to conduct
two evaluations on a bilateral basis with Russia within the coming
week. (Lithuania announced at the 21 September meeting of NATO's
Verification Coordinating Committee that it has conducted bilateral
evaluation visits of a Belarusian interceptor aviation base (at
which Russian aircraft and personnel were present) and of the
Russian Naval Infantry Brigade in the Kaliningrad Oblast, on 16 and
17 September, respectively.

Russia Ceases Bilateral Activities with Baltic States


8. (C) Kolga noted that Russia had discontinued bilateral
verification visits with Estonia because it did not see any
"military merit" in them. Ozolinz (Latvia) noted that Russia was
not interested in additional bilateral agreements with Latvia. In
contrast, Latvia noted that its bilateral agreement with Belarus
was working well. The Lithuanian rep agreed that Lithuania's
bilateral agreement with Belarus also was working well, but Russia
had ceased to permit any bilateral Confidence and Security-Building
Measures (CSBMs) in the Kaliningrad region. Since "suspending"
CFE, Russia had indicated that it did not feel it needed to
continue its bilateral verification activities with Lithuania.

Post-Oberammergau and Berlin


9. (C) All three Baltic delegations believed there had not been
much change in the Russian position following the Berlin conference
on conventional arms control in Europe. They noted the "unusual"
interest of non-aligned countries (e.g., Austria, Ireland,
Switzerland) in the event. The Estonian rep noted that although
recent meetings, like Berlin, were a positive step, they were not
very successful in paving the way for anything new. Kolga said the
Balts continued to support NATO's position, but they wanted to see
more concrete developments from the Russian side; Russia needed to
compromise, too, and should not keep insisting on maximalist
positions. He also noted that they were unaware of the modalities
regarding the smaller group meeting (June 9) prior to the Berlin
seminar. The Estonian rep asked for clarification regarding
provisional versus temporary application of CFE. Latvia (Diana
Krieva) noted that at this year's Annual Security Review Conference
(ASRC) the Russian rep in Vienna mentioned a next possible
conference in November.


10. (C) The U.S. head of del provided an update on U.S.-Russia
discussions on CFE over the last few months. We welcomed the
Russian aide-memoire, more for its procedural value than substance.
We received a list of questions, which Russian Arms Control
Delegate to the OSCE Ambassador Ulyanov had distributed at the last


plenary of the spring Joint Consultative Group (JCG) session,
regarding provisional application of CFE. The U.S. rep pointed out
that provisional application was not possible for the U.S. and many
other Allies also) until internal ratification procedures were
completed. He explained that the small group meeting on June 9 in
Berlin was not what the U.S. delegation had proposed at an earlier
High Level Task Force (HLTF) meeting. The German hosts had
different plans which resulted in the larger meeting that took
place between Allies and Russia on the 9th. For our part, we did
not find this meeting particularly useful; it exposed many
delegations to Russian rhetoric, but there was no meaningful
discussion. As far as any next conference (suggested by Russia in
the NATO-Russia context),he thought the Alliance had some internal
work to do first. The U.S. rep provided a readout of the
September 3 meeting between Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and
Russian Disarmament Director Antonov per reftel.

What Does Russia Get for its 2nd Year "Anniversary"?


11. (C) The U.S. rep said that one of the questions Allies needed
to consider was how to handle the annual CFE data exchange in
December, two years into the Russian suspension of implementation.
The Baltic delegations noted that NATO would need to consider its
public message for the 2nd year that marked Russia's "suspension"
of CFE. The Estonian rep noted that putting pressure on Russia
publicly did not necessarily bring a positive response. The
Latvian rep pointed out that what to do in December regarding the
annual CFE data exchange put more pressure on the Allies than on
Russia. The U.S. stressed the importance of NATO solidarity and
said this was a conversation for discussion within the Alliance.

Temporary/trial versus Provisional Application


12. (C) The Lithuanian del asked what would be the Russian
obligation under temporary application and how that differed from
provisional application. The U.S. rep first clarified that during
the September 3 meeting Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller had
presented general ideas -- not a formal proposal -- to Antonov to
determine whether there was Russian interest. The ideas were, in
the context of overall agreement on the parallel actions package,
to establish a timeline for ratification of Adapted CFE by NATO
Allies, and to initiate a period of trial implementation of Adapted
CFE by Russia and others for that same timeframe. If Adapted CFE
was to be ratified by all NATO Allies, Russia would need to be
implementing CFE in some form. Provisional application, which
Russia had focused on, is "a legal concept" that the U.S. could not
pursue until it had ratified the Adapted treaty. Temporary (trial)
application, as an idea, would focus on the operational aspects of
the treaty, e.g. data and inspections. Latvia wondered since trial
application was not a legal concept would it require ratification
by Congress. The U.S. rep explained that the idea was to show
some movement that could provide "an ice breaker" for progress on
some of the tougher issues. However, he emphasized, the Russian
side did not show interest in pursuing such an option and noted
that any agreement on trial application would be in the context of
agreement on the entire parallel actions package.

What about the Istanbul Commitments?


13. (C) Both Lithuanian and Estonian dels expressed concern that
the phrase "Istanbul commitments" had fallen from the vocabulary.
The U.S. rep noted that the September 3 meeting touched on Georgia
and Moldova, but the discussion did not reveal anything new. He
reaffirmed that host nation consent must be part of the discussion
on CFE. The U.S. (Laurendeau) said that in the parallel actions
package itself, the U.S. and NATO Allies had taken a decision to
focus on achieving results, rather than reiterating the phrase
"Istanbul Commitments." Georgia and Moldova were subject lines in
the parallel actions package. Russia had accepted that. The
question was what could be agreed as a way forward. It was notable
that Antonov routinely referred to Moldova as "the issue on which
we are closest to a solution." On Georgia, the U.S. hoped to take
Russia up on its suggestion, in the aide-memoire, that it was ready
to consider transparency measures. She emphasized that Georgia and
Moldova are part of the parallel actions package and explained that
whether or not we use the phrase "Istanbul commitments" we are
focused on the same results.

Frustration with Russian Non-Movement


14. (C) Latvia noted that provisional application and the flank


argument were old issues we had heard from Russia before. Now, she
surmised, it seemed Russia was still "sitting on old items" and
"testing what response" we would give them. How long would we
pursue this path? Did we see a need for a new European security
treaty, or some new form of arms control agreement? Lithuania was
in favor of joining the discussion on CFE, but at the moment it
needed to see some movement from the Russian side on the parallel
actions package.


15. (C) The U.S. clarified that a European security treaty and
CFE were separate items. It was not clear how Russia saw their
relationship. Russia's dissatisfaction with CFE was not well
defined until 2007, though we had a preview at the 2006 CFE Review
Conference. The initial idea for a new European security treaty
seemed more of a speech writer's concept than something fully
fleshed out, and the Russians are still giving it shape. Russian
authorities have said that they do not see their European security
treaty idea as a replacement for CFE, but as an additional
document. That said, it was not clear at this point how interested
Russia is in keeping CFE, or whether Russia would be willing to
compromise to keep it.

Baltic Defense Planning: Updates


16. (S/NF) The Baltic delegations provided an update on recent
defense planning in their countries. The theme was clear: the
economic crisis is having a significant impact on the overall
budgets of each of the Balts, with Latvia and Lithuania expecting
further cuts to defense spending in an effort to make funds
available for other ministries. Despite these near-term setbacks,
each nation remains committed to smartly appropriating resources to
develop complementary homeland defense and NATO expeditionary
operations capabilities. In this regard, tangible evidence of
US-led prudent planning, through boots-on-the ground exercises will
best assuage domestic and parliamentary concerns over the viability
of Article 5.


17. (S/NF) Kristjan Prikk, MOD Director for International
Cooperation briefed on Estonian planning. Although resources for
defense planning were limited and would constitute a smaller
percentage of GDP than in previous years (possibly less than 2%),
priorities would not change. The Estonians were committed to
conducting the core mission of the NATO Alliance. The U.S. (Kehl)
noted that the U.S. (and NATO) remained committed to the prudent
planning it was conducing with the Baltic region.


18. (S/NF) Martynas Zapolskis, MOD Deputy Head of the Policy
Formation Division briefed on Lithuanian activities. He outlined
three main pillars for Lithuanian defense. The first pillar is
having well-equipped home forces to provide territorial defense.
The Lithuanian military is undergoing a restructuring of its
forces, while also conducting contingency planning. He said that
Lithuania's participation in the NATO Response Force will help it
to develop military skills in areas which are currently lacking.
The second pillar is collective defense, which requires both
capabilities and also political will. In order to sustain
effective collective defense Zapolskis said the GOL needs the
allies to commit to collective defense as well as to develop its
own capabilities in relation to NATO's ongoing work on an updated
strategic concept. He explained that the new strategic concept
should include practical measures that demonstrate the credibility
of collective defense. Zapolskis elaborated that Article 5 should
be more than a response to crisis and could serve as an early
warning system to deter and prevent crisis. He said that
Lithuania supports NATO visibility in member states such as air
police missions, NATO infrastructure and military exercises. He
noted that these activities help to consolidate public and
political support for the alliance. The third pillar is the
ability to act with Allied forces. Zapolskis cited a recent
fruitful exercise with EUCOM, Baltic Host. The exercise's
scenario focused on facilitating a U.S. deployment to the Baltics.
He stressed that the "plans can turn out worthless, but the
planning process was always priceless" in terms of demonstrating
host-nation support to various initiatives.


19. (S/NF) Diana Krieva of the MFA's Arms Control Division
briefed the group on Latvian planning. Latvia, probably the worst
hit economically, had little to report on its defense planning, as
the previous briefers had already covered most of the topics she
planned to raise. She underscored the importance of bilateral
training with the U.S. and noted that the Latvian Defense Ministry


and Armed Forces are currently undergoing restructuring. Latvia's
involvement with Afghanistan provides added-value for soldiers
since these are the same soldiers that would respond to other, new
threats. Severe budget cuts had caused the Latvians to adopt the
new slogan of "best value for the moment." Latvia will not hit its
target of spending 2% of GDP on defense this year and predicts it
likely will not hit that target in the next few years.


20. (U) Delegation Lists:

-- U.S.: State VCI/CCA Director Richard Davis, head of delegation;
Jennifer Laurendeau, State EUR/RPM; Toniann Wright, State VCI/CCA;
James Starkey, State; Jessica Kehl, Director, Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Southeast Europe and Regional
Affairs; CDR Brett Mietus, Joint Staff J-5; LTC Doug Peterson,
Joint Chiefs of Staff USOSCE; LTC Robert Williams, Office of
Defense Cooperation, Embassy Tallinn; Michelle Hoyt, Embassy
Vilnius; Johnathan Hilton, Embassy Tallinn; and Kelly Busby,
Embassy Riga.

-- Estonia (host): Margus Kolga, Director General Security Policy
and International Organizations Department, MFA; Paul Teesalu,
Director Security Policy Division, MFA; Kristjan Prikk, Director
International Cooperation Department, MOD; Kai-Helin Kaldas,
Adviser, International Cooperation Department, MOD; LTC Toomas
Peda, Head of Arms Control and Verification Branch, Department of
Analysis and Planning, HQ of the Estonian Defense Forces.

-- Latvia: Kaspars Ozolins, Director of Security Policy
Department, MFA; Sintija Visnevska, Director of Defense Policy
Department, MOD; Raimonds Oskalns, Head of Arms Control Division,
MFA; Diana Krieva, 2nd Secretary of Arms Control Divison, MFA.

-- Lithuania: Gediminas Varvuolis, Director of Transatlantic
Cooperation and Security Policy Department, MFA; Martynas
Zapolskis, Deputy Head of the Policy Formation Division, MOD;
Donatas Vainalavicius, 2nd Secretary Transatlantic Cooperation and
Security Policy Department, MFA.


21. (U) This cable was drafted by VCI/CCA: TWright and also
cleared by OSD: JKehl, JS: BMietus and WINPAC: JStarkey.
DECKER