CROSS-STRAIT POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000433

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD PINR ECON WHO TW CH US
SUBJECT: CROSS-STRAIT POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU

REF: A. BEIJING 666

B. TAIPEI 280

Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young for reasons 1.4(b/d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ma Ying-jeou is the central player in a vigorous, if
at times poorly coordinated, effort to reshape Taiwan,s ties
with China. While his approach to cross-Strait issues
represents a dramatic shift from that of his predecessor, it
is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Ma will focus on
economic and other issues that affect the lives of ordinary
citizens, deferring any decision on the political issues at
the core of the cross-Strait dispute for the foreseeable
future. This methodical, pragmatic policy reflects Ma's
personal style as well as his political assessment that there
is little support in Taiwan's deeply divided population for
closer political ties to China. End Summary.

Taiwan,s China Desk Officer
--------------


2. (C) President Ma Ying-jeou's March 13 comment in an
interview with the United Daily News that Taiwan will begin
talks with China on World Health Assembly observer status for
the island, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's comment on the
subject the same day (ref A),underscore the extent of
cross-Strait warming since Ma's March 2008 election. A
lawyer by training and inclination, Ma was criticized early
in his tenure for deferring to his Premier on economic and
disaster relief issues. While defensible from a
constitutional law perspective, the move was not
well-received, with voters demanding that he personally take
the lead on key decisions facing the island.


3. (C) On foreign relations and cross-Strait issues, however,
Ma has been hands-on from the very beginning of his
administration. As President, he takes full advantage of the
powers the Taiwan constitution clearly delegates to the
President in these areas and of the political mandate he
believes his landslide victory gave him. Indeed, Ma has been
criticized for relegating the decision-making process on
China policy to a very close circle of advisors, most notably
NSC Secretary General Su Chi.

Other Players in Cross-Strait Policy
--------------


4. (C) P.K. Chiang, head of the quasi-official Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF) that serves as Taiwan's primary
conduit for talks with China, has a say in policy, but his
organization lacks technical expertise and staffing. The
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) coordinates cross-Strait
negotiations, but relies on technical experts from economic
ministries in talks with China. MAC Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan
does not have a central role in policy-making although her
views are heard. MOFA likewise plays little role, with MOFA
officials admitting they are struggling to demonstrate their
relevance in an age of Ma's "diplomatic truce."


5. (C) At a political level, Ma sought to limit the influence
of former Vice President Lien Chan by replacing him with
current party Chairman Wu Po-hsiung as head of Taiwan's
delegation at the December 2008 KMT-CCP Forum in Shanghai.
Nevertheless, the still ambitious Lien, who represented
Taiwan at last November,s APEC Senior Officials Meeting and
could well reprise the role in the future, does not see his
role as merely implementing Ma's policies. Finally,
Legislative Yuan (LY) Speaker Wang Jin-pyng seeks a larger
role for himself in cross-Strait policy. Ma has rebuffed
Wang, but will need to be more accommodating to secure
legislative approval of cross-Strait agreements now under
discussion. (Note: There is apparently an internal debate at
this time as to whether Ma should bid to resume the
Chairmanship of the KMT party when current Chair Wu
Pu-hsiung's tenure ends in June. One strong argument for Ma
doing so is that he would be better able to unify China
policy under his direction.)


6. (C) The number of actors with a stake in China policy (ref
B describes Taiwan's economic policy agencies) makes it
difficult for Ma and Su Chi to completely control the
government's message. This, coupled with active (and

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inventive) media, means a certain amount of "white noise" and
missteps is unavoidable. Examples include the SEF announcing
that Ma's proposed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA) would be on the agenda of the next SEF-ARATS talks at
almost the same time MAC was telling reporters it would not,
and FM Ou's admission to the Director that he had not
instructed Taiwan's overseas missions how to implement the
President's "diplomatic truce" initiative because the
President had never explained what exactly it meant.

Taiwan Society Divided over China
--------------


7. (C) Public opinion polls show only single-digit support
among Taiwan voters for either immediate independence or
reunification, with a large majority content to see the
political status quo prevail for the foreseeable future.
This reflects a pragmatic assessment that Taiwan's economic
future is inextricably linked to the PRC and the
understanding that, although closer political ties are
unpalatable, de jure independence is not a realistic option.
Polls also make clear that the number of those on Taiwan who
identify themselves as exclusively Chinese is dwindling while
those who see themselves as exclusively "Taiwanese" has
risen. This ensures that cross-Strait policy will remain a
deeply divisive political issue for some time to come.


8. (C) The result, at a partisan political level, is that the
opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has become the
voice of those who worry that President Ma is going too far,
too fast. Frustrated by electoral rules that give it roughly
one-quarter of the seats in the LY despite having won 40% of
the popular vote, though, the DPP can do little from within
the system to thwart the President. Instead, the DPP can be
expected to protest almost any cross-Strait policy President
Ma proposes. One proof of this was the DPP's criticism of
the "three links" agreements signed last November, despite
the fact that the agreements had been negotiated largely
under the Chen administration.


9. (C) For his part, even with his considerable mandate for
change, Ma is attuned to public opinion and can be expected
to adjust the speed or direction of improvement of relations
with China if polling shows ordinary people on Taiwan are
dissatisfied. Some public unease is caused by the fact that
Ma has not clearly laid out the long-term goal of his
cross-Strait policy, defining it instead by what it is not )
"no independence, no reunification and no war." Without
question, there is some tension between his insistence on
preserving the political status quo while, at the same time,
significantly improving ties with China.


10. (C) In the near term, Ma's goals are clear ) to reduce
tensions, minimize the risk of conflict, and prevent Taiwan
from becoming economically, politically, or militarily
marginalized to the extent that it will be unable to resist
PRC coercion. Experts realize that enhanced cross-Strait
economic ties will deliver significant benefits only in the
medium- and long-term. Candidate Ma's optimistic campaign
rhetoric and pre-economic crisis promises regarding the
short-term economic benefits of cross-Strait rapprochement
helped inflate public expectations to unrealistic levels.
Disappointment over the modest fruits of closer economic
relations with China thus far has been the predictable result.

Substance over Style
--------------


11. (C) Rhetoric matters in the theology of cross-Strait
relations, and the opposition has seized on Ma,s efforts to
defer to Beijing's sensibilities or sidestep disagreements on
issues such as nomenclature. They have cited these as proof
that the President is sacrificing Taiwan,s sovereignty in
the interest of short term political gains or, more
conspiratorially, as part of a conscious effort to make
Taiwan part of the PRC. For example, during the November
2008 visit of Chen Yunlin, Ma met with the ARATS Chairman,
even though Chen did not agree to address him as &Mr.
President." Responding to DPP critics, Ma argued that the
fact a Minister-level PRC official met with him showed that
China no longer denied Taiwan,s sovereignty. (Note: While
Chen did not specifically address Ma as the President, he was
in the room when "President Ma's" arrival was announced.)


12. (C) Likewise, by dropping the -- by all evidence --

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quixotic effort by the previous administration to secure
formal membership in UN agencies and other international
organizations, Ma is calculating that the benefits of
meaningful participation under terms to be hammered out with
Beijing outweigh the gains to be had from a firm but
isolating insistence on principle. This strategy appears to
be paying off, with Taiwan gaining access to the WHO,s
communication infrastructure for the International Health
Regulations (IHR),but the first significant test will come
at the May meeting of the World Health Assembly. It is not
clear whether or to what extent Ma's team has discussed the
details of a deal with Beijing. The President appears
confident, though, that China will offer an acceptable
solution rather than risk strengthening the DPP and others
who would cite the failure to reach a deal as proof that Ma's
conciliatory policy had failed.


13. (C) This emphasis on substance over style affects
Taiwan's relations with the United States as well. Ma's
predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, saw Washington as a central
front in the cross-Strait rivalry, and much of Taipei's
diplomatic energy was spent pursuing symbolic signs of
support. So far, Ma has been true to a pledge of "no
surprises" in relations with the United States. How the two
Presidents handled U.S. transits is instructive. Chen's
transits, with each stop and each event freighted with
political symbolism, put a serious strain on our relations.
In contrast, when Ma transitted the United States twice on
his way to and from a Presidential inauguration in Paraguay
last August, his low-key stops left barely a ripple at a time
when a higher profile might have distracted attention from
the Beijing Olympics and become a major complication in
U.S.-PRC relations. Ma is not interested in the PR victories
Chen believed he scored during his high-profile transits.
Instead, President Ma hopes the tangible benefits of a
surprise-free relationship with Washington will bolster his
popularity at home and his ability to negotiate confidently
with Beijing.

Economics over Politics
--------------


14. (C) Economically, with tens of billions of dollars
invested in China and hundreds of thousands of businesspeople
living and working there, Taiwan is already closely tied to
China. China has now eclipsed the U.S. and Japan as Taiwan's
number one trading partner, and President Ma believes the
island's economic future depends on deepening this
relationship through agreements on cross-Strait travel and
shipping, financial services and an Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA). In the short run, the global
economic downturn has made this a tough sell and has made
many of his campaign pledges appear wildly optimistic. For
example, initial projections that direct cross-Strait flights
would bring 3,000 PRC tourists to Taiwan each day were
exaggerated.


15. (C) Similarly, not everyone on Taiwan sees expanded
economic engagement and integration with China as an
unalloyed boon. Some, primarily from the political
opposition have sharply criticized expanded trade ties,
tapping into fears of those involved in sectors such as
agriculture and low-end manufacturing that would fare poorly
if forced to compete directly with PRC imports.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the trend toward closer
cross-Strait economic integration - already well underway
before Ma took office - will continue to accelerate.
Meanwhile, in the midst of a whirl of discussion of economic
and commercial agreements, the only "political" issue Ma has
taken on thus far has been Taiwan's ability to observe WHO
activities, kicking tougher political and military issues
into the distant future.

Evolution over Revolution
--------------


16. (C) While Ma's pragmatism represents a significant change
from his predecessor's confrontational approach, his policy
is nonetheless essentially conservative. He believes that,
while confrontation weakens Taiwan economically, militarily
and politically, a policy of rapprochement does not imply a
change in the political status quo. Having accepted the
"1992 Consensus" (one China, defined by each side in its own
way),the President defers talk of reunification to his
children, or grandchildren, once the PRC's political system

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is more compatible with Taiwan's. At times, Ma talks about
using Taiwan's "soft power" to bring about this change,
citing Taiwan as proof that democracy is compatible with
Chinese culture and that a peaceful transition from
authoritarian rule to an open civil society is possible. He
frequently couches the value of cross-Strait tourism,
educational and cultural exchanges in these terms, arguing
that PRC visitors who watch Taiwan television will return
home asking why such freewheeling news coverage is impossible
there. Put simply, though, Ma does not expect fundamental
changes to be realized in the foreseeable future, and is
content to work on this process step-by-step.
YOUNG