TAIWAN MOFA PROPOSES POL/MIL TALKS

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REASON: TAIPEI 344 CONTAINS FINAL DRAFT

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN MOFA PROPOSES POL/MIL TALKS

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Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young
Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) Summary. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
is proposing U.S.-Taiwan political-military talks in
Washington, at a date to be determined. North American
Affairs Division Director General Harry Tseng would lead
Taiwan's delegation, at least for the first of what MOFA
envisions to be an annual dialogue. A key MOFA goal for the
talks is to learn from the U.S. model as Taiwan looks to
improve its own interagency coordination on security issues.
The proposal would complement existing dialogues which tend
to focus on strictly military issues and should strengthen
the relatively weak political and interagency aspects of our
bilateral security relationship. Recommendations for a
possible structure and agenda for the talks is included at
paragraph 6. End Summary.


2. (C) Taiwan has proposed annual political-military talks in
Washington to complement the twice-annual pol/mil visits to
Taiwan led by AIT/W. In a March 25 conversation with AIT Pol
Chief, MOFA North American Affairs Division DG Harry Tseng
said that, to alleviate U.S. concerns about the profile of
the talks, VFM Andrew Hsia decided not to lead Taiwan's
delegation, at least for the first round. Tseng emphasized
that Taiwan hopes the level of representation can be
reconsidered as the talks prove their usefulness. As a
practical matter, Hsia's decision not to take part would
affect the composition of Taiwan's delegation. For example,
MND had proposed sending a general officer but now would be
represented at a lower level. Tseng also indicated
flexibility on the dates, given U.S. concerns that May or
June would not be feasible.


3. (C) While MOFA is prepared to suggest specific agenda
items, and the Taiwan delegation would be prepared to discuss
specific issues, Tseng stressed that important goals for
Taiwan are to learn how to structure its relatively weak
interagency process and how to improve and strengthen
Taiwan's civil-military relationship. All Taiwan would ask
is assistance in putting together a schedule of USG meetings,
Tseng said. TECRO is prepared to handle all administrative
and logistics issues and expenses for the delegation. Tseng
emphasized that Taiwan intends to keep the visit low profile,
as it does with the AIT/W-led visits and the Monterey Talks.

Considerations
--------------


4. (C) These talks have the potential to strengthen our
bilateral security relationship with Taiwan and contribute to
our overall objective of maintaining a peaceful and stable
Asia-Pacific region. Security cooperation activities in
support of our significant defense-related commitments under
the Taiwan Relations Act have led to a robust U.S.-Taiwan
military-to-military relationship. Such cooperation,
however, has largely neglected the political and interagency
component that buttresses our security relationship.
Taiwan's proposal provides an opportunity to address this by
developing our relationship in a more strategic direction
that includes, but is not dominated by, military issues. It
also would shape our security dialogue with Taiwan in a
manner similar to those we have with other defense partners,
where State and Defense lead separate but complementary
talks, with the State-led dialogue focusing on
political-military issues (i.e. interagency cooperation,
export controls, foreign policy issues) and the DoD talks
focusing on traditional defense related matters (i.e.
strategy, threat, and security cooperation).


5. (C) Giving Taiwan civilian and defense officials at
working levels better access to more senior U.S. officials
and letting them hear a broader range of U.S. voices is

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particularly important now, during a time of significant
change in the U.S., Taiwan, and in cross-Strait relations.
By providing a platform for greater political-military
exchange and offering Taiwan one model for interagency
coordination, the MOFA proposal would help advance Taiwan's
fledgling efforts to improve policy coordination and would
also enhance the role of Taiwan's civilian leadership in
formulating defense policy. The Taiwan military has in the
past jealously guarded its ability to set the parameters of
defense discussions, but greater interest and capabilities on
the part of Taiwan civilian partners would assist the shift
to a more integrated pol-mil policy process here. This
initiative also could provide a mechanism to gain greater
insight into Taiwan leadership's thinking on how efforts to
strengthen military capabilities also can support efforts to
improve cross-Strait relations.

Possible Structure
--------------


6. (C) A possible structure for the talks follows:

Level: The U.S. delegation could be led by a State DAS (EAP,
possibly joined by PM),with possible drop-bys or office
calls with more senior State or other USG officials.
Depending on the agenda, USG participants could include
State, DoD, NSC, DHS, AIT, and others. Possible Taiwan
participants include MOFA, NSC, MND, MAC, SEF, the Executive
Yuan Homeland Security Office, and TECRO.

Timing: One day of formal talks, with possible smaller-group
follow-on meetings or site visits. Specific dates would be
determined through consultations with Taiwan.

Venue: Because of policy restrictions on meetings at State,
the talks would be held at either a USG facility not affected
by policy restrictions or a commercial venue where sensitive
and/or classified discussions may take place.

Agenda: The agenda should complement existing dialogues,
with emphasis on broader defense and security issues
requiring interagency coordination. Proceedings of the
talks, with outcomes, follow-up actions and future agenda
items, will be made available to participants. Possible
agenda items (of which one session might only cover 2-3)
could include:

--U.S. Interagency Cooperation and Civil-Military Relations
(1947 National Security Act; State-Defense/Defense-State
Collaborations)

--Regional and Cross Strait Relations (including how CBMs can
support these relations)

--Impact of Taiwan's Defense Reforms and Civil-Military
Relations

--Interagency Role in Arms Acquisition

--Non-FCS Armaments Acquisition/Production (Direct Commercial
Sales; development of domestic production capabilities)

--Export Control and Licensing

--Homeland Security Issues (Critical Infrastructure
Protection; Continuity of Operations; harbor protection)
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