Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TAIPEI1093
2009-09-09 09:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN MAKES A CASE FOR UNFCCC PARTICIPATION AS

Tags:  AORC SENV PGOV PREL UNGA XE CH TW 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AIT TAIPEI
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RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TAIPEI 001093 

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/TC, OES/PCI, OES/E, IO/T, EPA OIA LUIS
TROCHE, JUSTIN HARRIS AND MARK KASMAN, DEPT OF ENERGY FOR
INTERNATIONAL, COMMERCE FOR 4431/ITA/MAC/AP/OPB/TAIWAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: AORC SENV PGOV PREL UNGA XE CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN MAKES A CASE FOR UNFCCC PARTICIPATION AS
"EMISSIONS ENTITY"

REF: A. TAIPEI 1065

B. TAIPEI 645

C. TAIPEI 937

Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TAIPEI 001093

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/TC, OES/PCI, OES/E, IO/T, EPA OIA LUIS
TROCHE, JUSTIN HARRIS AND MARK KASMAN, DEPT OF ENERGY FOR
INTERNATIONAL, COMMERCE FOR 4431/ITA/MAC/AP/OPB/TAIWAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: AORC SENV PGOV PREL UNGA XE CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN MAKES A CASE FOR UNFCCC PARTICIPATION AS
"EMISSIONS ENTITY"

REF: A. TAIPEI 1065

B. TAIPEI 645

C. TAIPEI 937

Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Taiwan is seeking U.S. assistance in a
proposed bid to join the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as an "emissions entity." Taiwan
argues it should be allowed to actively participate through
the UNFCCC in global environmental discussions that may
affect its economy, and should not be excluded from
carbon-trading mechanisms under the UN. According to Taiwan
officials, the PRC's initial reaction to Taiwan's plan has
not been positive for reasons that reportedly include the
fear of public embarrassment because Taiwan has specific CO2
reduction targets and China does not. We believe it is
important to our bilateral relationship with Taiwan to
express support for its effort to seek meaningful
participation in the UNFCCC. Regardless, however, of how
Taiwan's UNFCCC bid plays out, there are other meaningful
ways serving both U.S. and Taiwan interests for us to support
Taiwan's desire for increased international engagement in the
environmental field. END SUMMARY.

--------------
TAIWAN SEEKS UNFCCC PARTICIPATION
--------------


2. (C) Over the past month, President Ma Ying-jeou, National
Security Advisor Su Chi, Foreign Minister Ou Hong-lien, and
other contacts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have all
directly raised with AIT the issue of Taiwan participation in
the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC currently consists of 192 parties
(all states) and four observer states (Andorra, The Holy See,
Iraq, and Somalia). In addition, 985 NGOs and 67 IGOs are
admitted as observers. NGO observers include local
governments, parliaments, and research and academic
institutions, which can register to attend yearly Conference

of Parties (COP) meetings, such as the upcoming December 2009
COP-15 in Copenhagen. Taiwan's UNFCCC strategy, according to
Ma and Ou, is to have one or more of Taiwan's diplomatic
allies make a statement during the September UNGA supporting
Taiwan's participation in the UNFCCC. Ma suggested that the
U.S. could play a helpful role in supporting UNFCCC
participation for Taiwan, noting that the USUN website
statement supporting WHA observership played an important
role in Taiwan's breakthrough in that organization (ref A).


3. (C) According to MOFA IO Director General Paul Chang,
Taiwan,s current thinking on how best to realize its desire
to be treated as a party to the UNFCCC would be to find an
appropriate place to insert language on "emissions entities"
into relevant UNFCCC documents (Chang did not specify to us
which documents he had in mind). This strategy is largely
based on Taiwan's success in joining international fisheries
agreements as a "fishing entity," and aims to circumvent the
rule that only states can join the UNFCCC.


TAIPEI 00001093 002 OF 005



4. (C) Taiwan has, in fact, participated in the UNFCCC COP
meetings since 1995 as an NGO, represented by the island's
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). ITRI, which
is listed in official UNFCCC documents as an NGO located in
"Hsinchu, China," plans to attend COP-15 this December.
According to the UNFCCC, NGOs vetted and admitted by the
organization can, in principle, attend all open UNFCCC
sessions, ask to speak during sessions, host side events and
exhibits, and make submissions in the same manner as a Party
to the Convention.

--------------
TAIWAN'S ARGUMENT
--------------


5. (C) Nevertheless, Taiwan has submitted to AIT a non-paper
making the case for UNFCCC participation, which states the
island can only attend peripheral UNFCCC events, cannot
attend working conferences, important discussions, or
negotiations, all because Taiwan's role is limited to that of
an NGO. Taiwan's arguments for increased participation in the
UNFCCC include pointing to a long list of voluntary actions
the island has taken toward reducing greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in the interest of "global welfare," and noting
that, "We wish to gain recognition (for) assuming our shared
responsibility as a member of the international community."
Officials add that Taiwan's total annual CO2 emissions are
already three times the world average, and Taiwan ranks 16th
globally in CO2 emissions per capita (higher than Japan,
Korea, and the OECD average). The argument follows that, as
a major per capita emitter of CO2, Taiwan should play an
important role in drafting legally binding international
agreements on climate change. Moreover, Taiwan authorities
add, climate change is a transboundary issue that requires a
global solution, and it is thus appropriate to define
contributors to the problem (and the solution) as "emissions
entities," rather than necessarily as states. Finally,
Taiwan adds, the rights of its 23 million people should not
be ignored by excluding the island from international
decisions that could affect its industries and the livelihood
of its people. For instance, a mandated cap on emissions
would likely restrict traditional forms of industrial output.


6. (C) Officials are also concerned that even if Taiwan is
not party to a UN agreement, and has no role in the drafting
process, the island will still be compelled by the specter of
sanctions to comply with GHG emissions caps (our contacts
note that in 1994 the U.S. sanctioned Taiwan for
non-compliance with the UN's Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, to which Taiwan was not a
party). Authorities here are also concerned that as a
non-member of the UNFCCC, Taiwan will not be eligible to take
part in carbon trading programs such as the UN's Clean
Development Mechanism. Taiwan officials worry that
international pressure and the threat of trade-related
sanctions will compel Taiwan to abide by emissions targets,
but Taiwan will have no way to purchase carbon credits to
meet these targets.


TAIPEI 00001093 003 OF 005


--------------
IS THERE A "RED LINE" AROUND THE UN?
--------------


7. (C) Based on precedent, Taiwan's reliance on the "fishing
entity" argument may not work in the UN context. In cases
where Taiwan has joined fisheries organizations as an
"entity," Taiwan's participation is typically necessary for
the effective functioning of the regime, since it has one of
the largest distant water fishing fleets in the world. In
the case of climate change, however, mainland opponents of
Taiwan's participation may argue an effective global
agreement is possible without Taiwan's participation.
Indeed, when Taiwan has attempted to join a UN fisheries
agency as a "fishing entity," China has blocked Taiwan's
participation. MOFA IO DG Chang in fact told us that Taiwan
understood the importance of securing PRC support for any
approach to joining the UNFCCC, and agreed that Beijing had
not agreed to the "fisheries entity" model for UN-affiliated
fisheries agreements. This is why, for instance, Taiwan
attends meetings of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)
as an "invited expert." In cases where Taiwan has joined
international organizations under apolitical nomenclature,
such as an "economic entity" in APEC or a "separate customs
territory" in the WTO, the apparent "red line" of membership
in a UN organization was not crossed.


8. (C) In light of past experience, it is not surprising
that FM Ou told us Beijing's initial response to Taiwan's
plan to join the UNFCCC "has not been positive." Separately,
a MOFA official who deals specifically with international
environmental affairs echoed Ou's read-out on the PRC's
position. TEPA Minister Stephen Shen, meanwhile, recently
confided to us that through close contacts in Beijing he has
learned that the State Council objects to Taiwan's
participation in the UNFCCC because China does not have
specific CO2 reduction targets while Taiwan does, and
Taiwan's positive stance and active participation in the
UNFCCC would thus be an "embarrassment" to China.

--------------
COMMENT: AREAS FOR MEANINGFUL U.S. SUPPORT
--------------


9. (C) We believe it is important to our bilateral
relationship with Taiwan to express support for its effort to
seek meaningful participation in the UNFCCC. Based on
precedent, the "emissions entity" strategy may work for
Taiwan in the context of international environmental
organizations outside of the UN system, and is worth
supporting in order to further Taiwan's meaningful
participation in global environmental forums. Meanwhile, the
island's advanced scientific and technological base would
make Taiwan a true asset to international organizations
involved in renewable and alternative energy, in particular.
Our local ESTH interlocutors frequently note that Taiwan is
extremely interested in increasing technical cooperation with
the U.S. on environmental issues. The U.S. has been asked
for assistance in promoting Taiwan's participation in

TAIPEI 00001093 004 OF 005


international environment-related organizations such as the
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy, the
International Renewable Energy Agency, the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership, and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate. In addition, Taiwan's Bureau of
Energy hopes to boost cooperation with the U.S. through the
2004 AIT-TECRO Agreement on Clean Coal Technologies and
Advanced Power Systems, and ITRI and the Institute for
Nuclear Energy Research (INER) have each recently submitted a
project proposal to the U.S. Department of Energy (ref b).
Taiwan has also been at the forefront of support for new
international bodies that would regulate GHG emissions, such
as the proposed Global High-Tech Industries Climate
Protection Council (ref c). In terms of Taiwan's bilateral
cooperation with the U.S., we should be forward-leaning in
reviewing Taiwan's requests for partnerships and respond
positively whenever possible.


10. (C) Although it appears unlikely at this time that China
will support Taiwan's participation in the UNFCCC, the U.S.
can facilitate Taiwan's interests vis-a-vis this organization
on two separate levels. First, for the sake of accuracy,
Taiwan's GHG emissions will need to be taken into account
when calculating global emissions targets. Some MOFA
contacts believe that China would express willingness to take
responsibility for Taiwan's emissions as a "back door" way to
exert sovereignty over the island. In this case, the U.S.
could encourage parties to climate change agreements to
recognize that the Taiwan authorities themselves are
responsible for emissions from the island, which is
preferable to allowing China to act as the self-nominated
guarantor of Taiwan's emissions levels. Second, the U.S.
could promote Taiwan's ability to take part in emissions
trading mechanisms. Taiwan EPA is working on proposals to
register private foundations in UNFCCC member countries
(Japan is frequently mentioned) that could purchase carbon
credits on behalf of Taiwan, using those countries' status as
UNFCCC members for cover. U.S. EPA experts who visited
Taiwan in August 2009 are reviewing Taiwan's proposals, but
we understand that preliminary assessments of their technical
feasibility are not favorable.


11. (C) In terms of cross-Strait relations, environmental
management can serve as a relatively apolitical vehicle to
promote dialogue and cooperation. In July 2009,
environmental issues and climate change were discussed for
the first time in the context of the KMT-CPC cross-Strait
forum. That same month, National Taiwan University and
Peking University in Beijing reached an initial agreement to
begin formal academic and research cooperation in the fields
of climate change and environmental protection. Meanwhile,
academic contacts tell us there are frequent visits by Taiwan
scholars to environmental workshops and seminars on the
mainland and vice-versa. At the same time, cross-Strait
cooperation is necessary to improve the quality of the
integrated China-Taiwan ecosystem in areas such as
transboundary air pollution. The necessity of cooperation in
such areas can be exploited to encourage further cross-Strait
interaction in other environmental areas including sandstorm

TAIPEI 00001093 005 OF 005


and air quality monitoring, integrated environmental
information exchange systems, acid rain control and
management, indoor air quality control (especially in the
area of tobacco smoke control),and environmental education
programs. An array of cross-Strait cooperative projects
spanning various environmental fields can also serve as
non-traditional confidence building measures (CBMs) between
China and Taiwan, and support for such projects is in the
U.S. interest of stable cross-Strait relations.
STANTON