Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TAIPEI1043
2009-08-28 04:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

BROAD PUBLIC, OPPOSITION SUPPORT FOR U.S.-TAIWAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL KJUS KCRIM TW 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001043 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KJUS KCRIM TW
SUBJECT: BROAD PUBLIC, OPPOSITION SUPPORT FOR U.S.-TAIWAN
EXTRADITION AGREEMENT

REF: A. TAIPEI 277

B. TAIPEI 570

TAIPEI 00001043 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001043

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KJUS KCRIM TW
SUBJECT: BROAD PUBLIC, OPPOSITION SUPPORT FOR U.S.-TAIWAN
EXTRADITION AGREEMENT

REF: A. TAIPEI 277

B. TAIPEI 570

TAIPEI 00001043 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D).


1. (SBU) Summary. Officials, academics and other AIT contacts
associated with the ruling KMT party, as well as Taiwan's
opposition, voice support for an extradition agreement with
the United States. Media and public opinion polling also
suggests that pursuing an agreement will be relatively
non-controversial. Top opposition party officials and reform
advocates say such an agreement would strengthen judicial and
law enforcement cooperation with the United States and could
provide an impetus for judicial reforms on Taiwan. End
summary.

Consensus on Need for Extradition
--------------


2. (C) AIT canvassed a range of ruling party and opposition
contacts to assess the extent of potential opposition to the
possible negotiation of a U.S.-Taiwan extradition agreement
(technically signed between AIT and TECRO). Perhaps not
surprisingly, scholars, analysts and officials associated
with the ruling KMT party uniformly endorsed President Ma's
push to begin talks. While some emphasized the role an
extradition agreement would have in deepening U.S.-Taiwan law
enforcement cooperation, most focused squarely on the need
for a reliable and regularized mechanism for returning the
more than 130 indicted criminals who have fled to the United
States.


3. (C) Even some of the Ma administration's most outspoken
critics endorsed the need for an extradition agreement with
the United States. Indeed, AIT found few voices who
expressed reservations about the idea. In separate
conversations with AIT officers, Bikhim Hsiao, the
International Affairs Director of Taiwan's main opposition
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and DPP Central
Standing Committee member Tuan I-kang both welcomed an
extradition agreement as a means to secure the return of the
many high-profile, primarily white-collar, fugitives now at
large in the United States. Hsiao, a close confidante of DPP
Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, said she had not heard anyone in the
party express opposition to an agreement. In fact, she
believed it would help strengthen judicial cooperation.


4. (C) Likewise, there has been little media or popular
opposition to the Ma administration's well-publicized
interest in concluding extradition agreements with the United
States and others. Indeed, the most common media criticism
leveled against the government is its willingness to return
criminal suspects to the United States without demanding
reciprocal treatment. Another useful barometer of public -
and opposition party - views about extradition has been the
response to the Taiwan-PRC Mutual Judicial Assistance
Agreement, which includes extradition-type provisions, signed
in April. Polling conducted by the DPP at the time, showed
88.4 percent of the public supported including the
repatriation of economic criminals within the cross-Strait
agreement. Since almost all cross-Strait interactions are
controversial here, this high level of support suggests that
a U.S.-Taiwan agreement will face little opposition.

Opportunity to Advance Reform
--------------


5. (C) DPP Foreign Policy Advisor Joseph Wu noted that
Taiwan's interest in an agreement predated the Ma
administration, since he was involved in conversations about
the possibility of pursuing talks when he served as the head
of the TECRO Representative Office in Washington at the end
of DPP President Chen Shui-bian's administration in 2008.
Even now, he told AIT, an extradition agreement would advance
law enforcement cooperation while also "shining a light" on
areas of the judicial system needing reform. Judicial Reform
Foundation President Remington Huang offered a similar
assessment, noting that negotiating an extradition agreement

TAIPEI 00001043 002.2 OF 002


with the United States could prompt the administration, and
hopefully the public, to pay increased attention to judicial
reforms.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) In our many meetings with government officials,
opposition party members, academics, and reform advocates, we
have yet to run across anyone who does not support an
extradition agreement. The Taiwan public is also clearly
supportive of any agreement that would facilitate the return
from the U.S. of alleged embezzlers like Wang You-theng, who
is accused of stealing funds in excess of one billion
dollars. Although there are no polls of public attitudes
toward an extradition agreement with Washington, surveys show
overwhelming support for a similar agreement with Beijing,
which is a distant second to the U.S. as a safehaven for
Taiwan's fugitives.
WANG