POLITICAL HEAT RISING IN WAKE OF TYPHOON MORAKOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001004

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR S/EC-O/CMS, AND EAP/TC, BANGKOK FOR
USAID/OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR AEMR PGOV XE TW
SUBJECT: POLITICAL HEAT RISING IN WAKE OF TYPHOON MORAKOT

REF: TAIPEI 996 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Acting Director Robert Wang for reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) Summary. Vice Foreign Minister Andrew Hsia became the
first political victim of Typhoon Morakot, stepping down to
accept responsibility for his Ministry's initial decision to
refuse international aid. Members of Taiwan's opposition
party- and some ruling party legislators - are calling for
more senior officials to step down in response to the
government's handling of recovery efforts. President Ma's
troubles will not necessarily translate into gains for the
opposition Democratic Progressive Party and there is no
reason (yet) to believe it will affect his ability to pursue
his cross-Strait agenda. End Summary.

Vice Foreign Minister the First to Fall?
--------------


2. (C) MOFA North American Affairs Director General Harry
Tseng confirmed to AIT POL chief press reports that on August
17 Vice Foreign Minister Andrew Hsia submitted his letter of
resignation to take responsibility for MOFA's initial refusal
to accept foreign aid. Initially, Tseng said, Hsia intended
merely to offer a letter accepting responsibility for MOFA's
mishandling of the response to Typhoon Morakot, in particular
for having sent a cable instructing Taiwan,s overseas posts
to refuse foreign offers of assistance. Following an August
16 meeting of the Administration's "big five" (President Ma,
LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, Premier
Liu Chao-shiuan and Vice President Vincent Siew),though,
Hsia was told to resign by "people above the Foreign
Ministry." Tseng predicted that additional Ministry staff
will be penalized, noting that the offending instruction
cable went out under the name of another Vice Foreign
Minister (David Lin) and saying that disciplinary action was
the topic of a Ministry-wide personnel meeting scheduled for
later in the week.


3. (SBU) Few in Taipei believe that VFM Hsia will be the only
official to lose his job over the government's handling of
the response to Morakot. Calls for other top government
officials to step down have been widespread. Among those
whose jobs are threatened is Defense Minister Chen Chao-min,
who was urged to resign by opposition Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) but also ruling party KMT members of Taiwan,s
legislature, the Legislative Yuan (LY). Likewise, Water
Resources Agency Director General Chen Shen-hsien,s tenure
appears in danger. Pro-DPP media are gleefully questioning
Premier Liu Chao-shiuan's decision to have his hair died on
August 11, just as the extent of the disaster in the island's
south was becoming clear.


4. (C) Most critics, however, have focused their ire squarely
on President Ma Ying-jeou. Although the methodology of a
widely-reported CNN poll, in which 80 percent of respondents
said the President should step down, is highly suspect, the
results reflect a general mood of dissatisfaction with Ma.
In recognition of his growing image problem, Ma convened two
press conferences on the afternoon of August 18 (one for
Taiwan reporters and one for the foreign media) at which he
expressed his sincere apologies for any mistakes his
government had made.

Opposition Hopes to Make Hay
--------------


5. (C) DPP Central Standing Committee member Tuan I-kang, in
an August 18 meeting with AIT Poloffs, criticized Ma and
those appointed to head Taiwan's relief efforts (such as the
Minister of Communications and Transportation) advisors for
failing to connect with victims or effectively express the
government's concern. In addition, said Tuan, Ma's refusal
to declare a state of emergency made it impossible for the
government to mandate public companies with unoccupied land
to turn these over for temporary use as shelters or staging
areas. Public dissatisfaction with Ma's performance,
however, would not necessarily translate into increased
support for the DPP, Tuan said. It would, however, provide
the DPP with an opportunity to challenge KMT candidates in
the year-end elections. Meanwhile, the DPP plans to send to

TAIPEI 00001004 002 OF 002


the Kaohsiung government unofficial advisors experienced in
dealing with the "921" earthquake (which occurred on
9/21/2001, when the DPP held the presidency) relief and
reconstruction efforts. Their experience in dealing with
issues such as prefabricated housing and distribution of
other post-disaster benefits, said Tuan, should allow the
Kaohsiung government to direct its reconstruction efforts
more effectively.

Comment
--------------

6. (C) One year ago, the Ma administration, already faced
with the fallout from the global economic crisis, was damaged
by a series of public relations missteps that left many with
the impression that the KMT was unprepared to be the ruling
party after eight years in opposition. Having won more than
60 percent of the vote in the May 2008 elections, Ma saw his
approval rating drop to just 20 percent. Over the past 8-9
months, the President and his team gradually pulled these
numbers up, helping make the case that he and his advisors
are the technocrats they campaign as and now had the knack of
running the government. Deserved or not - an argument can be
made that it would be impossible to prepare for the nearly 13
feet of rain that fell in 24 hours in parts of the island -
the government's response to Morakot may have damaged that
permanently. Now, many people will be inclined to credit his
previous (and future) blunders less to inexperience than to
incompetence. That said, Taiwan,s political system does not
provide for a vote of no confidence in a President and Ma
will stay where he is until 2012. Even then, even if voters
never forgive his government for mistakes made after Morakot,
he will most likely remain the KMT candidate for the 2012
election. In the interim, at least for now, his domestic
troubles are unlikely to have a major impact on his
cross-Strait policy.
WANG