Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SUVA282
2009-07-06 05:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Suva
Cable title:  

MELANESIAN SPEARHEAD GROUP LEADERS TO MEET FIJI

Tags:  PREL KDEM FJ 
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RR RUEHKN RUEHMJ RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0282/01 1870525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060525Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1369
INFO RUEHAP/AMEMBASSY APIA 0304
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0376
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2306
RUEHKN/AMEMBASSY KOLONIA 0373
RUEHKR/AMEMBASSY KOROR 0257
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0209
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO 0801
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0212
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 1739
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0202
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0001
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0464
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0023
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000282 

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO EAP PDAS MARCIEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: PREL KDEM FJ
SUBJECT: MELANESIAN SPEARHEAD GROUP LEADERS TO MEET FIJI
STRONGMAN BAINIMARAMA

REF: A. SUVA 279

B. SUVA 267

Classified By: Ambassador C. Steven McGann for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000282

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO EAP PDAS MARCIEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: PREL KDEM FJ
SUBJECT: MELANESIAN SPEARHEAD GROUP LEADERS TO MEET FIJI
STRONGMAN BAINIMARAMA

REF: A. SUVA 279

B. SUVA 267

Classified By: Ambassador C. Steven McGann for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Papua New Guinea (PNG) High Commissioner
Peter Eafeare warns that the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)
meeting planned for July 10 must reaffirm directly to Fiji
strongman Bainimarama MSG support for the Pacific Islands
Forum (PIF) position regarding Fiji. Otherwise, MSG retreat
from support of the PIF would likely fracture the PIF while
signaling a potentially contentious leaders meeting in Cairns
in August. Port Moresby is weighing whether to call for a
foreign ministers meeting before Cairns in order to address
the issue of Fiji in a way that will prevent it from
dominating yet another Forum summit. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) During a call on July 6 by Ambassador McGann and
DCM Pruett, PNG High Commissioner Peter Eafeare, the dean of
Suva,s diplomatic corps, discussed preparations for the MSG
meeting planned for July 10 in Port Vila, Vanuatu. Vanuatu
currently chairs the MSG, which also includes Fiji, Papua New
Guinea, and Solomon Islands. The MSG members have invited
Fiji strongman Frank Bainimarama to explain Fiji,s position
and to explore the possibility of a common MSG posture
regarding Fiji within the PIF.

3. (C) As the sole diplomatic representative of an MSG
country resident in Suva, Eafeare said he believes it
critically important to the integrity of the MSG that it
support the PIF in its dealings with Fiji. He revealed that
he is seeking to consult with PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael
Somare by telephone to appeal for his personal diplomacy in
shaping the Port Vila meeting for a successful outcome.
Eafeare felt that Somare should intercede personally with
Solomon Islands Prime Minister Dr. Derek Sikua and perhaps
Vanuatu Prime Minister Edward Natapei in advance of the
meeting, in order to impress upon them the need for a united
front in dealing with Bainiamarama. Both Sikua and Natapei
have shown sympathy for Fiji and a certain degree of naivete,
observed Eafeare. Somare, however, has plumbed the depth of
his patience in dealing with Bainimarama, having been burned
more than once by the dictator after committing his personal
prestige to outreach attempts.


4. (C) Eafeare argued that whatever their personal
misgivings about the PIF,s stand on Fiji, the MSG leaders
would need to take a stand consistent with the unanimous
declaration of the PIF Special Leaders Meeting on Fiji in
Port Moresby in January. If not, the Port Vila meeting could
open the latent fissure within the PIF on the issue of Fiji,
which could lead to Kiribati, Tonga and Tuvalu--and probably
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands--joining with the MSG,
which would tend to isolate Australia, New Zealand, and Samoa
on the issue. Eafeare disclosed that the suggestion had
already been vetted of an "MSG-Plus" meeting to include these
same countries, but the idea was struck in recognition of its
divisive impact on the PIF.

5. (C) Eafeare,s best case scenario for the Port Vila
meeting envisions a united front to Bainimarama that urges
him to bring forward elections in Fiji to 2011, vice the
September 2014 date Bainimarama declared as part of Fiji,s
"Roadmap" on July 1 (Ref A). Eafeare agreed that Bainimarama
seldom reverses himself publicly, but he noted that if
Bainimarama chose, he could convene a new Leaders of
Political Parties meeting to include Fiji,s opposition
parties. Bainimarama could then deem the meeting successful
enough to allow the proposed next step, the inauguration of
the President,s Political Dialogue Forum, to proceed without
delay.

6. (C) Even this best case scenario would tend to thrust the
issue of Fiji to the forefront of the PIF Leaders Meeting
agenda, despite the wishes of PIF Chair Australia and other
PIF members to shelve the issue of Fiji for now in order to
concentrate on other important issues, such as regional

SUVA 00000282 002 OF 002


institutional restructuring and a regional trade agreement.
To avoid such an outcome, Eafeare said he intended to suggest
to his government that it propose a foreign ministers meeting
in advance of Cairns. The meeting would have the sole
purpose of reviewing the issue of Fiji after the Port Vila
meeting and of dealing with it in such a way as to keep the
meeting at Cairns focused on these other issues, even while
conceding that the question of Fiji,s status will
necessarily impact on all of them.

7. (C) The MSG meeting in Port Vila is a prelude to a
variety of interactions likely to involve Fiji,s de facto
government in the run-up to Cairns. For example, the
Australian High Commission in Suva now informs us that its
high commissioner has been given the green light to pursue a
meeting with Bainimarama. Although a tactical loosening of
its engagement policy, this change in Canberra,s approach
does not intend to confer any sense of legitimacy on
Bainimarama,s government. It does recognize, however, that
the question of Fiji,s political future weighs on the
region,s ability to fully address other Pacific issues, and
it brings Canberra in closer alignment with the steps already
taken by the British High Commission and Embassy Suva.
MCGANN