Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SURABAYA10
2009-02-03 11:23:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Surabaya
Cable title:  

EAST JAVA: GOVERNOR'S RACE ENDS WITH MURKY LESSONS FOR 2009

Tags:  PGOV ID KISL KIRF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1601
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJS #0010/01 0341123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031123Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL SURABAYA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0355
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0170
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0341
RUEHJS/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0361
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SURABAYA 000010 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, INR/EAP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ID KISL KIRF
SUBJECT: EAST JAVA: GOVERNOR'S RACE ENDS WITH MURKY LESSONS FOR 2009
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

REF: A. A) 2008 SURABAYA 94 (EAST JAVA'S FIRST FEMALE GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE)

B. B) 2008 SURABAYA 131 (RUN-OFF SIGNALS VOTER APATHY AND PARTY DISUNITY)

C. C) 2008 SURABAYA 88 (WEAK PARTY LOYALTY IN GENERAL ELECTION)

SURABAYA 00000010 001.2 OF 002


The message is sensitive but unclassified. Please protect
accordingly.


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SURABAYA 000010

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, INR/EAP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ID KISL KIRF
SUBJECT: EAST JAVA: GOVERNOR'S RACE ENDS WITH MURKY LESSONS FOR 2009
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

REF: A. A) 2008 SURABAYA 94 (EAST JAVA'S FIRST FEMALE GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE)

B. B) 2008 SURABAYA 131 (RUN-OFF SIGNALS VOTER APATHY AND PARTY DISUNITY)

C. C) 2008 SURABAYA 88 (WEAK PARTY LOYALTY IN GENERAL ELECTION)

SURABAYA 00000010 001.2 OF 002


The message is sensitive but unclassified. Please protect
accordingly.



1. (SBU) Summary: Indonesia's most populous province has finally
elected a new governor after one general election and two
run-off elections. Unprecedented televised testimony in
Indonesia's Constitutional Court triggered a second runoff after
vote buying in Madura was revealed. In a province of nearly 40
million, East Java's Election's Commission (KPU) and the
Constitutional courts effectively managed complex logistic and
legal challenges through three rounds of elections. With only
34,000 votes out of more than 15 million cast separating winners
from losers, this election raised more questions that it has
answered about what it takes to win over today's Indonesian
voter. End Summary

Good Ground Game Plus Religious Conservatism
--------------


2. (SBU) After three rounds of voting, Soekarwo and Syaifullah
Yusuf, supported by the National Mandate Party (PAN),Party
Democrat (PD),and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS),again
narrowly defeated Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Mudjiono,
supported by the United Development Party (PPP),the Patriot
Party, and a coalition of smaller parties. Voters in the
court-mandated January 21 run-off in two regencies on the
conservative island of Madura cast the deciding votes in a
closely fought election. Discussions with voters at polling
stations in Madura showed that village heads were critical in
getting out the vote for Soekarwo. One village head claimed that
he provided transportation to the polls for each of the
village's 300 registered voters -- intercepting them on the way
to work their fields. Similar claims were made at two other
polling stations.


3. (SBU) Perhaps reflecting Soekarwo's behind the scenes
campaigning during the Madura run-off, one conservative Muslim
voter told us that he could not vote for Khofifah on religious
grounds since she is a woman. This was also the reason Soekarwo
got the backing of PKS, who reportedly declined to support

Khofifah due to her gender. The KPU received reports of vague
threats made to voters by Khofifah's Patriot Party supporters,
who are reportedly tied to gangsters or 'preman'. (Ref A).
Khofifah has yet to concede and will reportedly file formal
complaints regarding new irregularities found by her campaign's
poll watchers. KPU officials have told us, however, that
reported irregularities do not appear to be systematic and are
very unlikely to affect the outcome.

The Courts' Evolving Role in Elections
--------------


4. (SBU) Staff attorney for East Java KPU, Mr. Fahmi Bachmid,
told us that the Constitutional Court's decision to hold
hearings in response to Khofifah's original allegations of
widespread fraud during the general election was unnecessary and
weakened the role of the KPU. He noted that while Khofifah's
campaign alleged violations in only some of Madura's polling
stations, the courts decided that the run-off should include two
entire regencies containing nearly half a million people. The
KPU had no choice but to comply with the decision. However,
violations during the election did not rise to the levels
required for a recount, according to Bachmid. And the court's
order put a real strain on the KPU at a time when it could ill
afford the extra expense.


5. (SBU) The KPU's unease with the courts echoes what we have
heard from KPU officials in South Sulawesi, which was the scene
of a contentious courtroom drama over the results of last year's
governor's election. KPU officials expressed concern that the
courts might increasingly wade into election disputes due to
pressure from political parties hoping to overturn a loss at the
polls. Other observers said that the Constitutional Court's
decision was an attempt to play a constructive role and clear
the air over the results in a close race.

General Election vs. Runoff --Strategies for 2009
-------------- ---


6. (SBU) The East Java governor's race shows the complex
electoral landscape facing presidential campaign strategists. In

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a crowded field, early campaigning in East Java sought support
based on party platforms. This culminated in a first-ever
televised debate between the original five East Java candidate
teams. Discussion of issues faded, however as get-out-the-vote
efforts focused on the candidates' persona alone in the run-off
elections between Soekarwo and Khofifah. Voter turnout also
dropped dramatically after the general election (Ref B). While
East Java is home to Indonesia's largest Muslim organization,
Nadlatul Ulama (NU),the political role of local Islamic leaders
(or Kiai) was weakened during the campaign as voters ignored
their endorsements and NU support splintered between two
NU-affiliated candidates. Religion seems to have been
repositioned too. While Islamic credentials loomed large early
in public discussions regarding the candidates, an anticipated
Islamic voting bloc never coalesced decisively behind a single
pair of candidates. If the East Java governor's election is a
guide, issues like employment, healthcare and education will
continue to motivate voters' choice of a candidate rather than
party affiliation. However, a strong ground operation and direct
appeals to individual voters are required to get voters to the
polls.
MCCLELLAND