COE: GEORGIA TOUGHENS STANCE; RUSSIA DOES NOT GIVE AN INCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L STRASBOURG 000003


EUR ALSO FOR EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/4/2019
TAGS: PREL AORG FR GG RU
SUBJECT: COE: GEORGIA TOUGHENS STANCE; RUSSIA DOES NOT GIVE AN INCH

REF: STRASBOURG 001


CLASSIFIED BY: V. Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


SUMMARY
- -

1. (C) The Council of Europe continued February 4 to discuss
the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia. Georgia
toughened its rhetoric and called for the COE to issue a
statement should Moscow veto UNOMIG's extension. Russia
continued to refuse monitoring of its COE commitments. The
Czech EU Presidency referred to the EU's September 1 statement,
particularly its support for territorial integrity and
sovereignty and its condemnation of Russia's recognition of
Abkhazia's and S. Ossetia's "independence." We reiterated U.S.
support for the EU's statement. Should the COE deadlock
continue, and even if Russia vetoes the extension of UNOMIG's
mandate, the EU delegations here will likely remain divided on
pushing for a formal COE statement that calls for monitoring of
Russia. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Spanish Chair noted that FM Moratinos had spoken
with his Georgian counterpart January 29 and that Georgia would
present new proposals in the coming days. The Georgian
Ambassador stressed that Tblisi would not accept an action plan
that did not include monitoring of both Georgia's and Russia's
conflict-related COE commitments (Note: not a new position).
Rather, Georgia will work with the Spanish Chair to try to find
"new wording" that might be acceptable to Moscow. The Georgian
emphasized that the COE's draft action plan would lose its added
value and the COE some of its credibility if it could not
include monitoring of both countries' commitments.


3. (SBU) The Georgian Ambassador added that he hoped for
progress at the Geneva talks February 17-18 on access over the
administrative border into South Ossetia. He observed that the
OSCE Mission in Georgia had ended because of Russia's "veto,"
and called on the COE to issue a statement should Russia do
likewise with UNOMIG. He highlighted the COE Parliamentary
Assembly's (PACE - REFTEL) resolution that had noted that
Georgia had met "most" of its obligations regarding an October
PACE resolution on the conflict while Russia had met "almost
none" (Note: the resolution notes that Russia had met "some" of
its obligations).


4. (SBU) Adopting a more subdued tone than usual, the Russian
Ambassador resorted to his claim that the Georgians were
blocking adoption of an action plan. This, he added, would
deprive the COE of "any real role in the zone of conflict." The
Russian said he was "sorry" about the PACE results, terming the
PACE's resolution "a force pulling us back."


5. (SBU) The Polish Ambassador stressed that an earlier draft
of the action plan had been supported by 37 delegations and "it
was not Georgia" that had blocked its adoption. He added that
discussion of the war several months after the fact "is a bit
ridiculous" and underscored that the COE needs monitoring of
both countries to obtain a "good picture" of events on the
ground.


6. (SBU) The Czech EU Presidency referred to the EU statement
of September 1, particularly its condemnation of Russia's
recognition of the breakaway republics and its call on other
states not to recognize them. Switzerland and Norway supported
the EU's statement. We reiterated U.S. support for the
statement and for "almost all" of the previous interventions,
particularly that of the Polish Ambassador.

COMMENT


7. (C) The Spanish Chair continues to get nowhere. The
Russians stressed months ago that they would not agree to be
"put on the same level as that of the aggressors." The
Georgians are insisting on monitoring for both countries and
have the PACE resolutions of October 2008 and January 2009 to
support their position. As evidenced in the "vote to have a
vote" on the action plan last November, however, the EU is
divided here. Some members do not want to push Moscow with a
formal vote. They fear that in so doing, Moscow will retaliate
by cutting off its limited cooperation with Human Rights
Commissioner Hammarberg, who has been concentrating on the
return of IDPs and refugees to their homes. Seen from here,
their fear is well founded. We have stressed to many
delegations individually that, while we support the
Commissioner's work, the apparent price for his continued work
in the conflict zone seems high - the credibility of the COE
will be diminished if its major decision-making body cannot
decide to characterize Moscow's actions for what they are - a
contravention of Russia's COE commitments.

CARVER