COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND GEORGIA: LITTLE TO SHOW AFTER AUGUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STRASBOURG 000017

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM COE FR GG RU
SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND GEORGIA: LITTLE TO SHOW AFTER AUGUST
WAR

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CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: The Council of Europe (COE) has had a very
limited effect on post-conflict relations between Russia and
Georgia. The "quiet diplomacy" of the COE Commissioner of Human
Rights has achieved only modest results. While Georgia may
seek the suspension of the Russian COE parliamentary
delegation's credentials in September, we doubt that the COE
will take such a bold step. Inside Georgia, the COE's Venice
Commission has labored to build with Tblisi a constitution that
meets European standards,and a COE field office in Tbilisi has
been coordinating local projects with other international actors
in an attempt to encourage stability. End summary.

Political Maneuvers and Russian Threats
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2. (SBU) The COE's Committee of Ministers' Deputies (resident
ambassadors) and the COE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) continue
to debate "the consequences of the war between Russia and
Georgia." The PACE approved a resolution at the end of
September 2008, denouncing the use of arms by both sides as
"unacceptable." Though it established that "truth is a
precondition for reconciliation," the resolution did not focus
on concrete investigation procedures. Instead, the PACE
implored both Georgian and Russian officials to first respect
the European Convention on Human Rights and, second, to
facilitate the work of the international monitors on the ground.
This approach - scold the various authorities, plead for the
respect of COE human rights standards - was repeated in PACE's
January (Resolution 1648) and April 2009 (Resolution 1664)
sessions.


3. (SBU) Special rapporteurs dispatched by the PACE to report
on the consequences of the August 2008 war have produced some of
the only incising statements against the involved parties. In
June 2009, they condemned Russia's veto of the continuation of
the UNOMIG mandate, without which, they claimed, "Abkhazia is in
danger of slipping into a human rights black hole."


4. (SBU) Then-Chairman of the Committee of Ministers (CM),Carl
Bildt, presented a voice for the Ministers' Deputies during the
August conflict. Before the Deputies reconvened in September,
the Chairman had urged Russia, Georgia, and the separatist
administrations to adopt a cease-fire and, later, condemned
Moscow's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. The Chair was likewise quick to reaffirm the
territorial integrity of Georgia after the "so-called
parliamentary elections" in South Ossetia in May 2009.


5. (C) The Swedish Chair continued to seek a strong resolution
from the Deputies calling for the monitoring of all of Russia's
and Georgia's COE commitments. In response, the Russian
Ambassador went on the offensive, threatening privately and
publicly that Moscow would cease all cooperation with the COE if
it were placed "on the same level as the aggressor - Georgia."
Sweden turned over the chairmanship in late November to Spain.
The Spanish took a more conciliatory approach and managed to
obtain Russian acquiescence to regular reports from the COE
Secretary General on the situation in Georgia. Still, the
Russians have balked at any COE criticism of their actions.


Commissioner of Human Rights - Quiet but active diplomacy
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6. (SBU) Some of the most productive, albeit limited, efforts
from Strasbourg to reconcile the two camps have come from the
office of the Commissioner of Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg,
the COE's "quiet diplomat." Hammarberg visited both Tbilisi and
Moscow (in addition to conflict areas like Tskhinvali) from
August 22 to 29, 2008. Concluding that the war had incited a
humanitarian disaster, the Commissioner presented six principles
for the urgent protection of human rights: the right to return;
the provision of sufficient aid and living conditions for
refugees and returnees; the de-mining of combat zones; the
re-establishment of law and order in the "buffer zone";
continued exchanges of detainees and POW; and an international
humanitarian presence in affected areas. These principles have
become the COE's benchmarks for human rights progress in the
Northern Caucasus. Hammarberg has performed three subsequent
visits to the region, the most recent in February 2009.


7. (SBU) Hammarberg enjoys access to the various authorities
involved in the Russia-Georgia conflict. Since August, he has
held talks with President Saakashvili and his Minister for
Foreign Affairs, the Speaker of the Russian Duma, the Chairman
of the Council of the Russian Federation, and the Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. He has maintained
contact with FM Lavrov and the de facto PM of South Ossetia,
Boris Chochiev. His efforts include close cooperation with the
Russian Ombudsman, the Georgian public defender, and the de

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facto Ombudsman in South Ossetia. Hammarberg discussed further
humanitarian work with Ilia II, Patriarch of the Georgian
Orthodox Church. It is this broad network that has allowed the
Commissioner to get results - in October he secured the release
by Georgian authorities of an adolescent Ossetian and his
father, and in November he ensured the return of a number of
corpses from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi.


8. (C) Still, Hammarberg has told us he is frustrated with
continued obstructionism from the Russians and, at times, a lack
of transparency from the Georgians. He will continue, however,
to underscore the importance of meeting his six principles to
all interlocutors. It is, indeed, Hammarberg's work and limited
results that are touted by the COE as evidence of the COE's
efficacy. The Russians have seized upon this and threaten
explicitly to cease "cooperation" with the Commissioner should
the COE take "punitive measures" against Moscow, including
equating Russian actions with Georgia's.

Training the EUMM
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9. (U) One of the other modest results of the COE is the human
rights training of over 200 European Union Monitoring Mission
members.

Venice Commission - Working with Georgia
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10. (U) The Venice Commission, the COE's independent advisory
body on questions of constitutional law, has worked closely and
consistently with Georgian authorities in the wake of the August
war. At the request of the Georgian officials, the Venice
Commission considered and rendered opinions on two sets of
constitutional amendments - mostly relating to the powers of the
Executive and the use of referenda - and the Law on Occupied
Territories of Georgia. In June 2009, the Venice Commission
accepted a request from the Georgian authorities to assess the
most recent draft of the nation's Imprisonment Code.

COE Field Office - Tbilisi
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11. (U) The COE's field office in Tbilisi has promoted programs
to support IDPs, combat violence in schools, and fight
cybercrime. It hosted a delegation from the COE Development
Bank that discussed financing Georgian SMEs and prisons. A
resident Human Rights Adviser investigates allegations of human
rights abuses, coordinates with the national Public Defender's
Office, and informs not only Hammarberg's office, but other COE
outfits and the EUMM as well.

European Court of Human Rights - A wave of complaints
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12. (U) On August 11, 2008, the Georgian government lodged a
rare state-state complaint against Russia at the European Court
of Human Rights, the full application for which was submitted in
February. While the merits of the case are still under
consideration, a previous Georgia v. Russia complaint -
concerning the harassment of the Georgian immigrant community in
Russia, considered a reprisal for the arrest of four Russians by
Georgian officials - was recently declared admissible by the
Court.


13. (SBU) By February 2009, 3,300 individual applications had
been submitted against Georgia by those affected by the
hostilities in South Ossetia in August 2008. Several of our
contacts have characterized the spike in complaints as having
been orchestrated by Moscow. At that same point, the Court had
received 90 individual applications involving 565 alleged
victims from Georgia complaining about violations perpetrated by
the Russian Federation. The Court in Strasbourg has not yet
made clear how it will handle the overwhelming bulk of these
cases.

Comment
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14. (C) The COE's continued discussions on the consequences of
the August war demonstrate two key items. The first is that the
COE can effectively promote its "three pillars" - democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law - only in permissive
environments. The second is the lack of political will from
many member states, and therefore many in the COE's secretariat,
to confront Russian aggression and threats. Rather, many view
limited engagement with Russia as better than confrontation.
Despite the reported hope of the Georgian Ambassador to question
the Russian parliamentary delegation's credentials at the late
September PACE session, we doubt the COE will take such a

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"confrontational" stand. Few here want to risk Russia's ending
its limited cooperation with Commissioner Hammarberg. Nor do
they want Russia to walk away from the COE, even temporarily.
As one German diplomat here told us, "Do not expect bold
decisions - we aren't the Security Council, after all.
CARVER