Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STRASBOURG16
2009-07-17 13:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Strasbourg
Cable title:  

COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND KOSOVO MEMBERSHIP

Tags:  PREL PHUM COE KV FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0147
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHSR #0016/01 1981307
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171307Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0176
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSR/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG 0187
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STRASBOURG 000016 

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM COE KV FR
SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND KOSOVO MEMBERSHIP

REF: DYOKAS-SILBERSTEIN AND CARVER-SILBERSTEIN EMAILS

STRASBOURG 00000016 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
SUMMARY
- - - - - - - - -
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STRASBOURG 000016

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM COE KV FR
SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND KOSOVO MEMBERSHIP

REF: DYOKAS-SILBERSTEIN AND CARVER-SILBERSTEIN EMAILS

STRASBOURG 00000016 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
SUMMARY
- - - - - - - - -

1. (C) The Council of Europe (COE),involved in democratic
consolidation in Kosovo over the past decade, takes a
"status-neutral" approach to Pristina; many COE member states
that have recognized Kosovo independence, including the UK, are
cautious about promoting Kosovo's potential COE membership.
Serbia and Russia will obviously oppose anything but a "status
neutral" approach to Kosovo; the departing COE Secretary General
strongly supports such a status-neutral policy. Should Kosovo
plan on applying for COE membership, we will have to prepare
member state capitals to push back on those ambassadors here who
likely would argue that such a move would break the spirit of
consensus of the COE; we should also ensure support for such
membership at the level of foreign ministers (two-thirds of the
47 COE FMs would have to vote in favor of membership). In
addition to the consensus argument, Serbia assuredly would call
for no movement on such an application until at least after the
International Court of Justice rules on Kosovo's declaration of
independence. Kosovo is not precluded from joining "partial
agreements" of the COE, such as that covering the COE's
Development Bank (CEB). Pristina's membership in the bank,
however, likely would also face an uphill battle. End summary.
COE's MODEST PRIORITIES
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2. (U) COE activities in Kosovo are generally taken in concert
with other international organizations. The Council notably
co-sponsors a series of "joint programs" with the European
Union. These projects are focused on education, particularly on
the Council's three pillars: human rights, democracy, and the
rule of law. In 2009, the COE and EU co-sponsored workshops in
Pristina and Mavrovo discussing the rights of the Roma, the
state-building process, and the modernization of history
curricula to encourage social cohesion. To a more limited
degree, the COE-EU programs engage Kosovo's leaders on
governmental issues. The organizations are currently in the

middle of a multi-year joint mission looking to assist in
establishing non-judicial Human Rights Structures (NHRS). All
COE and EU operations are performed under the auspices of UNMIK
and comply with UN Resolution 1244.

3. (U) One of the flagship "joint actions" between the COE and
European Commission in Kosovo is the "Ljubljana Process," an
initiative to fund the rehabilitation of heritage sites in
South-East Europe. The COE and EC selected three landmarks in
Kosovo to be restored among the 26 total projects. In
refurbishing the sites, the Ljubljana Process has aimed to bring
tangible benefits to local populations in transition by
providing skills training, creating jobs, and eventually
increasing tourism.

4. (U) In January 2009, the COE began the process of
re-launching a Local Democracy Agency (LDA) in Kosovo. In order
to facilitate the integration of Kosovo's many ethnic
communities, the LDA aims to promote democratic consolidation at
the local level, inter alia, through training of local
councilors and civil servants. The LDA is slated to become
operational in September 2009.
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
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5. (U) The "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo," which
entered into force in June 2008, also attests to the involved
relationship between Pristina and Strasbourg. According to
Article 22, the European Convention on Human Rights, the COE
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities,
and the COE Convention against Torture and other Inhuman
Treatment and Punishments are directly applicable in Kosovo.
The European Court of Human Rights, however, has no legal basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction over Kosovo.
THE FEAR OF NON-CONSENSUS ~
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6. (C) The Council of Europe maintains a "status-neutral"
approach to Kosovo - an approach adhered to in the strictest
terms given the direct orders of the (departing August 31) COE
Secretary General (criticized by several ambassadors here for
not allowing the COE staff in Kosovo to meet with Kosovo
officials absent the presence of any UNMIK personnel). After
Kosovo declared independence, the President of the PACE, Llums
Maria de Puig, reiterated then that the ultimate goal remained a
Kosovo "safe for all those who live in it regardless of their
ethnic origin," but also implored EU member states to agree on a
single position.

7. (U) Though they have reaffirmed the need to build trust and
accountability in Kosovo, the Committee of Ministers and the
PACE have widely accepted the status quo. At a May 2009
ministerial conference in Madrid, Serbian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Vuk Jeremic called upon the COE to keep Kosovo
status-neutral until the International Court of Justice
delivered an opinion on the legality of its declaration of
independence. When Jeremic reiterated his argument at a
Committee of Ministers' Deputies (resident ambassadors) meeting
in June 2009, not one delegation challenged him on the issue.

STRASBOURG 00000016 002.2 OF 002



~ AND POTENTIAL COE MEMBERSHIP
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8. (C) Despite the obvious dissent of Serbia and Russia and
grumblings if not outright opposition from Spain, Romania, and
other EU states that have not recognized Pristina, Kosovo could
technically become a member of the Council of Europe.
Membership is attained in one of two ways. At a meeting of the
Ministers' Deputies (resident ambassadors in Strasbourg),the
decision must be unanimous, with two-thirds of the
representatives voting. This obviously would not happen anytime
soon.

9. (C) Foreign ministers, however, could take up the issue at a
formal ministerial (note: the next formal ministerial will be
hosted in May 2010 by Switzerland (COE Chair November 2009-May
2010) - during the Spanish EU Presidency. Ministers themselves
need only secure a two-thirds majority (this must be, however,
two-thirds of all COE member state foreign ministers, not just
two-thirds of those who show up at a ministerial and vote). As
Jean-Louis Laurens, Director General of Democracy and Political
Affairs at the COE, noted, "Kosovo has already been recognized
bilaterally by two-thirds of the Council of Europe members,
thus, logically the votes for admission in this organization ~
are not an issue at all, because there is no consensus vote
rule." Currently, 33 of the 47 COE member states have
bilaterally acknowledged Kosovo's independence.
MORE THAN JUST THE MATH
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10. (C) Several sources, however, have cautioned to us that
Kosovo membership is not simply a numbers game. A colleague
from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office suggested that,
should the question come to a decision, fewer than 33 ministers
likely would actually show up to a formal ministerial to deposit
a positive vote. Similarly, the Chief of Staff of the COE
Commissioner for Human Rights, when asked if she saw sufficient
support for Kosovo membership, responded flatly that the
political will is not there. The Secretariat official in charge
of assisting the Council of Ministers also told us separately
that there is little enthusiasm within the COE to entertain a
possible membership application from Kosovo.
THE COE DEVELOPMENT BANK
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11. (C) Having recently joined the IMF and World Bank, Kosovo
could make a compelling case for membership in the Council of
Europe Development Bank. When reviewing the bank's bylaws, we
note that there is no mention of COE membership being a
prerequisite for accession. In fact, the Holy See, an observer
at the COE, is a bank member. Liechtenstein joined the bank
before joining the COE. We spoke recently, however, with a bank
Vice Governor, who insisted that COE membership, or at least
solid progress on the accession process, would be needed for
bank membership. When we noted the Vatican and Liechtenstein
precedents our contact adjusted his story, but only slightly,
noting that they were "weak" precedents. That said, he observed
that the bank would find it difficult to reject outright a
membership application from Kosovo if it were actively supported
by a majority of central European states. (Note: A majority of
bank member states and a two-thirds majority of bank "shares"
would have to approve a membership application; France, Germany,
and Italy each hold 16.640 percent of shares; Spain holds 10.852
percent; Serbia holds a mere 0.470 percent; neither the UK nor
Russia are bank members; see the bank's website for a complete
list at http://www.coebank.org.)
COMMENT
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12. (C) Should we wish to pursue either or both membership
options for Kosovo as outlined above, we would advise careful
preparation in member state capitals that have recognized
Kosovo. Such demarches, particularly regarding actual COE
membership, would likely be most effective if done not only to
human rights and Balkans desks, but also to the cabinets of the
ministers themselves - given that the ministers would actually
have to vote personally for such membership. Likewise, we
should approach the two candidates to replace the current
secretary general to urge them, if elected this September, to
take a less stringent approach on Kosovo's status within the COE
(ref). Finally, when faced with the likely response from some
member states that Kosovo membership would be a
consensus-breaker, we should use another familiar COE argument -
it is better to have Kosovo inside the organization so that the
COE can be more effective in promoting the rule of law, human
rights, and democracy throughout Kosovo rather than keeping it
outside the organization.
CARVER