UNITED RUSSIA WINS THROUGHOUT NORTHWEST RUSSIA

UNCLAS ST PETERSBURG 000028


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: RS PGOV
SUBJECT: UNITED RUSSIA WINS THROUGHOUT NORTHWEST RUSSIA


1. (SBU) Summary: Numerous elections were held in Northwest
Russia on March 1st at the oblast, city, and local levels. With
turnout low, United Russia won everywhere resoundingly with only
minor setbacks. The Communists and Liberal Democrats had
relatively poor showings, and other opposition groups were
similarly marginalized. The elections have demonstrated the
efficacy of the Kremlin's and United Russia's powerful electoral
machine, which makes it increasingly difficult for other parties
to compete. End Summary.


2. (U) United Russia (YR) won the Arkhangelsk Oblast legislative
elections with a 38% turnout. United Russia will hold 39 of the
62 legislative seats (62%, almost a constitutional majority). A
Just Russia (SR) came the second with nine seats, and the less
successful Communists (KPRF) and Liberal Democrats (LDPR)
captured six and two seats respectively. The remaining six
seats were won by independent candidates in single mandate
districts.


3. (U) Nenets Autonomous District (NAO) was the sole dark spot
in the region for United Russia. Although YR did win the
region, it failed to garner more than half the vote (winning
just over 42%) - its lowest figure nationwide. However, the way
the seats are distributed in the district gives an advantage to
the winning party, and thus YR will have an absolute majority in
the 11-member Assembly with six seats. Of the remaining five
seats, the Communists and Liberal Democrats each won two and A
Just Russia the remaining one. Recent changes in the NAO
election laws had eliminated single mandate district seats, so
the Assembly seats were filled proportionately in accordance
with the party ballot vote. Turnout in NAO was 49%, which was
dramatically lower than the previous regional election turnout
of 60%.


4. (SBU) The first round of the mayoral election in Murmansk was
inconclusive and required a runoff. Incumbent Mayor Mikhail
Savchenko won 31% of the vote, and in second place was ex-Vice
Governor Sergey Subbotin with 24%. Both candidates are members
of YR, and the local party apparatus officially supported the
incumbent Savchenko. However, Oblast Governor Yuriy Yevdokimov,
also of YR, appeared to support his protegee Subbotin, and
criticized his party's pro-Savchenko campaign. The March 15th
runoff election, with 40 % turnout, resulted in a victory for
Subbotin who received 61% of the vote. United Russia doesn't
seem to be taking this loss lightly, however. Sergey Volodin, a
federal leader of United Russia, blames Governor Yevdokimov for
the party's election loss, and Volodin has spoken of sanctions
against Yevdokimov as well as of possible legal measures that
will be taken to cancel the election results.


5. (U) In St. Petersburg, local council elections were held in
108 of the 111 municipal units. United Russia swept the field
with 1,145 winning candidates (75% of the total). A Just
Russia won 107, the Communists 27, and the Liberal Democrats
just 13. 195 seats were won by technically non-partisan
candidates - of these, six are members of Yabloko. Around a
thousand candidates (more than 20% of those who wanted to run)
were unable to register for the election and so did not appear
on the ballot. Among those were hundreds of SR and CPR
candidates, half of all Yabloko candidates, and a number of
independent candidates who represented opposition movements and
local interest groups. In contrast, almost all of United
Russia's candidates were successfully registered, with their
registration failure rate below 1%.


6. (SBU) A leading St. Petersburg electoral analyst opined to us
that these elections in NW Russia confirmed already existing
electoral trends. According to him, the Kremlin is now able to
set certain election outcome plans for the regions, and the
regions can usually carry out those plans. He also believes
that election results depend largely on the extent of YR
administrative control over the electoral process. For example,
the results in Arkhangelsk Oblast (a clean sweep for YR) were
more or less predictable. On the other hand, the poor
performance of United Russia in NAO showed that a different sort
of mindset was also in play. Our interlocutor said he had heard
the Kremlin initially expected United Russia to win 60% of the
votes in NAO. But, shortly before election day, that target was
dropped to avoid possible discontent amongst the residents of
the okrug who would find such a high figure for UR unbelievable
given YR's general unpopularity there. So, it seemed Moscow
chose to tolerate a lower percentage of the vote in order to
make the results more credible to voters. The entire process
was indicative of YR's complete control over the electoral
process.


7. (SBU) Our interlocutor also thought the relatively bad
results for the Communists and the Liberal Democrats not
unexpected. He believes the KPRF had already discredited itself
among many of its voters, while the LDPR's social base has
always been rather narrow in NW Russia as well as in the rest of
the country. Zhirinovskiy's party seems to have lost the
backing of YR power brokers, and it is ill-equipped to counter
this situation. The LDPR was initially prevented from even
participating in the NAO elections, and Zhirinovskiy personally
had to intervene at the federal level in order for his party to
be allowed to compete. Zhirinovskiy severely criticized the
election process, which was unusual for him, which was
apparently done out of frustration with his party's poor
showing. Our interlocutor suggested that there might have been
a significant amount of vote tampering against LDPR, and that it
was even possible that some LDPR votes were counted as A Just
Russia votes. If this is true, then our contact believes
Zhirinovskiy's party's long term prospects are not very bright.


8. (SBU) Commenting on A Just Russia's performance, our
interlocutor said the party had been inconsistent in its
campaigning. SR actively campaigned in Arkhangelsk Oblast,
although its campaign there was focused on a few popular local
figures rather than on any ideological content. But, in NAO SR
did not campaign at all, and many voters probably learned about
its participation in the election only when they saw the party's
name on the ballot in the polling booth.


9. (SBU) Our contact also thought that Northwest oblasts are
significantly different from the typical Russian oblast in terms
of relations between United Russia and the governors. Whereas
in most oblasts the governors and regional branches of United
Russia act in concert, in a number of Northwest oblasts the
governors seem to behave differently from the way their local YR
branches would like them to. Murmansk was a perfect example of
this type of tension, as Governor Yevdokimov and the oblast's YR
apparatus supported competing candidates in the mayoral election.


10. (SBU) In St. Petersburg itself, our interlocutor sees three
major forces which all worked against opposition candidates and
ensured United Russia's sweeping victory. First, the city
government worked hard to ensure a YR victory. Second, members
of the City Legislative Assembly (of whom a majority are also
members of United Russia) were also interested in having
"cooperative" (read: YR majority) municipal councils elected.
Third, local building and utility conglomerates
("Zhilkomservis") were reluctant to see opposition candidates
seated on the municipal councils, apparently fearing those
candidates would attempt to strengthen the councils' position
vis-a-vis the conglomerates. Our contact also thought that
widespread election fraud had been committed which cemented YR's
decisive municipal victory. However, the sheer extent and
brazenness of the fraud has led to a number of fraud
accusations, which are currently working their way through the
St. Petersburg legal system. Our interlocutor believes the
accusations will shortly be forgotten and lost in legal limbo
while the election results will stand.


11. (SBU) Comment. The March 1st elections in Northwest Russia
showed that, by manipulating the levers of power, United Russia
is able to easily defeat opponents in regional and municipal
elections. When the administrative machinery fails or is
divided in its loyalties, as happened in Murmansk, YR's
electoral prospects are more doubtful even if the party's
overall dominance is not. United Russia's electoral machinery
is still working out its kinks, as the significant number of
fraud accusations in St. Petersburg showed. Nevertheless, the
most likely prognosis is continued YR domination of politics at
all levels throughout the region, for the foreseeable future.
End Comment.

GWALTNEY