SWEDISH ENVOY TO HORN OF AFRICA TALKS ABOUT SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000606

SIPDIS

STATE FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: EAID PHUM PTER KECF KGHA SW
SUBJECT: SWEDISH ENVOY TO HORN OF AFRICA TALKS ABOUT SOMALIA

Classified By: Economic Counselor Laura Kirkconnel for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On September 15, Emboffs met with Swedish
Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador Marika Fahlen
to discuss her 12 day visit to Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Kenya and Djibouti. Fahlen strongly emphasized the need for
a combination of a bottom-up and top-down approach to
stabilizing and developing Somalia. She singled out the
following as being crucial to achieving this goal:

- gaining greater credibility for the Transitional Federal
Government (TGF),

- getting President Sheikh Sharif out of his palace to gain a
better grasp of the challenges his government is facing,

- selecting military and police trainees from several
different clans,

- utilizing the various Somali diaspora more efficiently,

- distributing aid more efficiently and with greater
transparency, and

- coordinating U.S. and EU aid efforts more closely.

End Summary.


2. (C) Swedish Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador
Marika Fahlen told Emboffs on September 15 that in order to
stabilize and develop Somalia, the international community
needs to utilize a combination of a bottom-up and top-down
approach to its aid efforts. Fahlen, who was accompanied by
General Pierre Joana, Advisor to Solana, the Council
Secretariat, and Jeremy Lester, head of the Horn Africa
Section, the EU Commission, returned in early September from
a 12-day fact-finding mission to Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Kenya and Djibouti. Fahlen called the trip "successful" for
three reasons: (1) the different branches of the EU had the
same impressions and made the same analysis independently;
(2) the EU listened to others instead of "telling others what
to do"; and (3) the EU strengthened partnerships with the
African Union (AU),AMISOM, the U.S. and other regional
actors.


3. (C) The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is suffering
from serious credibility problems, Fahlen opined. Contrary
to what many Western analysts think, Fahlen alleges that a
growing number of Somalis are questioning why they should
align themselves with a "weak partner," as Fahlen
characterized President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed's TFG. The TFG,
a moderate Islamist government, is to some extent "imprisoned
by its dependency on an international community that
continues to scream security, security, security," Fahlen
emphasized. Fahlen alleged that Sheikh Sharif is heavily
influenced by the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister.
She stated that "he sees what is going on but lacks the
strong personality required to something about this." Fahlen
also told us that she feels Sheikh Sharif is not well
advised. He cannot gain a full grasp of the situation unless
he moves out of his palace and continues to build on the
modest gains he has made by emphasizing religion instead of
clans, she stated.


4. (C) Fahlen maintained that the international community can
best support the TFG by trying to adapt its efforts to the
structure the TFG has established. The TFG, according to
Fahlen, has organized its government around five clusters:
Security; Economy and Accountability; Social Sector Service;
Religion and Justice; and International and National
Relations. She stated that the EU can do a much better job
of channeling its funds into this framework than the UN, as
the latter is burdened by comprehensive procedures and
regulations. Fahlen commented that the TFG and the UN were
"dragging their feet."


5. (C) Fahlen said that the U.S. and the EU must work
together to encourage our respective Somali diaspora to
return and contribute to the development of Somalia. There
is a wealth of talent and cultural knowledge that we are not
taking advantage of, she opined. Many of the current TFG
representatives are seen as corrupt and "in the pockets of
donors," according to Fahlen. In the case of humanitarian
assistance, the international community simply has too few
people in the field. "Absentee management simply does not
work," she stated. How the international community
distributes aid is crucial, and we need to re-examine our

STOCKHOLM 00000606 002 OF 002


efforts to reach out and make them more transparent, Fahlen
emphasized. She commented that Al-Shabaab controls large
areas where this assistance is need most, and we cannot
access those areas without the permission of this group.
Fahlen told us that Al-Shabaab has even established its own
NGOs and wants the international community to allow it to
distribute aid, which would empower Al-Shabaab and help it
gain support from the locals.


6. (C) Fahlen told us she understands the EU's push to focus
on security and police but feels that the international
community does not recognize the problem involved in
establishing a well-functioning professional force. She
cited the French effort to train soldiers in Djibouti as a
case in point. The government selects the soldiers for
French training from a single large clan, which could fuel
clan warfare, according to Fahlen. She pointed out that the
vast majority of these soldiers are young, illiterate and
afraid of the "consequences they might experience" when they
return home. There is a great risk that these soldiers will
not feel any "national loyalty" but will simply fight for
whichever side pays them the most.


7. (C) Although Fahlen did not visit the coastal area of
Somalia, she did comment on the issue of piracy. She
characterized the pirates being captured as "small fish,"
adding that what the TFG and international community should
do is to track the flow of the money obtained from hijacking
ships. Fahlen told us she observed some improved housing,
more consumer goods and luxury cars for certain individuals,
but she believes the bulk of the ransom money flows to Kenya,
Dubai and even London. The TFG is training a coast guard
force, but once again, is making the same mistake by
selecting trainees from only one clan. The risk is too great
that the "coast-guard clan" will simply look after its own
interests and line its own pockets, thus fueling the already
gigantic problem of corruption that exists throughout
Somalia.


8. Comment: Fahlen has a perspective that appears to differ
from that of many Western analysts, at least when it comes to
how widespread Sheikh Sharif's support is among the
population. She questions how extensive the much-touted
"grass-roots" support for the TFG really is. She favors a
much closer cooperation with the U.S., mentioning several
times in our discussion that the U.S. and the EU must
coordinate efforts to stabilize and develop Somalia. (This
is a reoccurring theme we have been hearing from our Swedish
interlocutors regarding aid and development efforts around
the world.) Fahlen's most interesting comment, however, was
her opinion that the TFG is weakened by an international
community that seeks security at the expense of other
efforts, hinting perhaps that some sort of contact with
Al-Shabaab might be necessary to distribute aid in certain
areas. End Comment,
BARZUN