SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER BILDT'S WASHINGTON AGENDA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 000266

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN SW
SUBJECT: SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER BILDT'S WASHINGTON AGENDA

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 259

B. BRUSSELS 537

C. STOCKHOLM 192

D. STOCKHOLM 65

Classified By: CDA Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (B) & (D).


1. (S) Summary: For Bildt's May 4 visit to Washington, we
recommend the following top three issues: additional
contributions in Afghanistan, resettlement of Guantanamo
detainees, and leadership in the EU on autonomous sanctions
on Iran. Given Sweden's upcoming EU Presidency,
July-December 2009, early action now on these topics could
spur other EU Member States. Other issues he is coming with
include security relations with Russia, Turkish EU accession,
the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, and support for
Ukraine and the Baltics. During his meeting with the
Secretary, Bildt will extend an invitation for her to meet
with EU ministers on the margins of the September 4-5 Gymnich
in Stockholm, and he will inquire about the possibility of
Prime Minister Reinfeldt visiting the White House before
Sweden's EU Presidency commences on July 1 (Ref D). End
Summary.

Carl Bildt: Medium Size Dog with Big Dog Attitude
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2. (S) Bildt represents a medium-size country (9.5 million,
$350 billion annual GDP) that has some major power ambitions
and capabilities, and which looks forward to working closely
with us on its upcoming EU Presidency. Sweden has the
world's 7th largest foreign aid program (nearly $5 billion),
focused on Africa and the Middle East. The largest Nordic
country, with the legacy of a Baltic empire, it often takes
regional leadership roles (e.g., leading a PRT in Afghanistan
with Finland and Norway). It also has a tradition of
international civil servants including Jan Eliasson (Darfur),
Rolf Ekeus and Hans Blix (Iraq) and Bildt himself (Bosnia).
Bildt, formerly a prime minister from 1991-1994, made a
surprise come-back as foreign minister under the Moderate
Party-led alliance government elected in 2006. He is widely
respected in Sweden as an elder statesman (he is 60 while
Prime Minister Reinfeldt is 42),and has a free hand in
running foreign policy at present. But he is not close to
Reinfeldt and has limited political skills (often seen as a
haughty member of the nobility, not the image which Reinfeldt
and the new Moderates seek to project). Some rumors in
Stockholm have him moving on after Sweden's EU Presidency
finishes in December, perhaps to a senior job in Brussels.
But for many European observers, he is seen as too close to
the British and the Americans to get full French or German
backing to replace Solana in the High Representative role.

Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) Sweden has some 400 troops based in four provinces in
Regional Command-North, joined by an additional 200
Norwegians and Finns. The Swedes will expand to 500 troops
by the end of 2009, including a second OMLT at brigade level,
plus a C-130 at ISAF HQ's disposal and medevac helicopters
coming in 2010-2011. Recent security incidents in and around
the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif involved the ambush and
killing of ten Afghan police officers, and firing on Swedish
troops. Given the rising threat level, Sweden deployed 40
special operations troops to the PRT on April 20. Bildt will
be interested in U.S. thinking on security trends, and should
be asked about funding Afghanistan National Army training.


4. (C) On the civilian side, Sweden could -- and should -- do
more. It currently has three officers in EUPOL and three
more in training, but the head of the joint MoD/MFA-run
training academy tells us that several dozen more Swedish
policemen want to go to Afghanistan. We recommend USG
interlocutors stress to Bildt the importance of Sweden doing
more on EUPOL quickly, and then using its EU Presidency to
lead EU-wide efforts to fully staff EUPOL.

Guantanamo
--------------


5. (S) Sweden's Minister for Migration Tobias Billstrom has
the lead on detainee resettlement, but FM Bildt is directly
involved through his stewardship of the bilateral
relationship. For the past few months, Swedish officials
have told us they are considering accepting one or more
detainees and the Swedish security service vetted and cleared
five Uighurs and two non-Uighurs for possible resettlement.
An independent agency, the Swedish Migration Board, makes the
resettlement decisions, but the government has the ability to
consult with the Board on groups of individuals of
"particular interest." We recommend raising this with Bildt

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during each of his Washington meetings, noting general UNHCR
support for resettlement (which is important in Swedish
refugee resettlement),and asking for Swedish leadership in
the lead-up to its EU Presidency.

Iran
--------------


6. (S) Sweden continues to lead efforts by a small number of
EU members to raise concerns with EU autonomous sanctions on
Iran (Ref B). Bildt is directing these efforts, for several
reasons. For economic reasons, Sweden is generally skeptical
about the effectiveness of sanctions and in particular with
Iran, where Ericsson and Volvo Trucks, among other Swedish
companies, have significant exports. Bildt may also hope to
play a mediating role with Iran and may thus be trying to
keep relations with Tehran warm. MFA POL Director Lyrvall
recently told us he expects more discussion within the EU on
why the Americans would be calling for sanctions now, before
enough time has been given to the Iranians to respond to
recent overtures (Ref A). Perhaps in a few months, possibly
September, if Tehran has not responded, it might be time for
Washington to "use the considerable political capital" it has
built up to bring Russia and China along on a new UNSC
resolution, he continued. We have urged the Swedes to focus
on the existing UNSCRs, especially the enhanced vigilance
language of UNSCR 1803, to give the EU3 the tools they are
asking for, including support for additional designations.

Other Topics: Russia, Balkans, Turkey, Ukraine
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7. (S) Russia: Last summer's Georgia crisis rattled Swedish
security planning, causing a delay in the planned publication
of the long-term defense bill. Given what the Swedes see as
Russia's more threatening posture in the Baltic and High
North, Bildt would like to compare views on threat analysis,
engaging Russia militarily (Sweden stopped all mil-mil
exchanges with the Russians last August) and the Medvedev
security proposal. Bildt is reportedly worried about Greek
plans for an informal OSCE ministerial in Corfu, and the
possibility that Athens will unwisely push for a deal at any
cost. Our intelligence cooperation with Sweden on Russia is
excellent; DIA Director LTGEN Burgess will be here next week
for exchanges with the Swedes on Russia and other topics.


8. (C) On the Balkans, Bildt will likely raise his concerns
about Bosnia and the worrisome trends he sees there. We have
asked the Swedes to continue supporting the EUPOL/Althea
mission (even though they no longer have troops involved),
but interlocutors here have increasingly been pushing the
view that there is no longer a military mission requiring the
presence of European troops. Bildt may raise his concerns
about both "enlargement fatigue" and the growing
unwillingness of other member states to move forward on
deeper integration for the Western Balkans.


9. (C) On Turkey, the Swedes are leading the push in the EU
to open new chapters for Turkey's accession talks. PM
Reinfeldt, who normally defers to Bildt on foreign policy
issues, is especially concerned about this issue; Reinfeldt
visited Turkey after President Obama and echoed his message
about support for Turkey's EU accession. Reinfeldt's staff
tell us the Swedes are unhappy over what they perceive as a
weakening of the British position on Turkish accession, and
EU Minister Cecilia Malmstrom traveled to London April 28 to
consult on Turkey with UK EU Minister Caroline Flynt. Bildt
traveled to Cyprus in late April, and hosted northern Cypriot
leader Talat in Stockholm as well, as part of the Swedish
strategy of moving forward on Turkey's accession. Bildt will
want to coordinate on ways ahead, possibly asking for more
U.S. pressure on Ankara to allow Greek Cypriot fishing
vessels into Turkish ports.


10. (C) Ukraine and the Baltics are of special interest given
Sweden's traditional focus on countries that -- like it --
lie on Russia's periphery. Sweden's ambassador in Kyiv
thinks a second tranche of IMF loans will keep the economy
afloat for some months and that President Yushchenko and
Prime Minister Tymoshenko seem to be working together on the
IMF, if not on anything else. But they see Yushchenko losing
power and assess that Tymoshenko would win a second-round
runoff of the presidential election likely to be held this
autumn. Bildt is worried that the closer Ukraine-EU ties
envisioned by the Eastern Partnership are under threat.
Sweden's support for the Baltics (e.g., it convened a meeting
with other Nordics and the IMF to bail out Latvia in
December) is motivated partly by a desire to prevent Baltic
currency devaluations that could bankrupt Swedish banks, but
also by Sweden's concern that these countries not slip back
into the Russian economic sphere. Sweden just concluded a
deal to build an undersea electrical cable to Lithuania,

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called Swedlink, that will provide 700-1,000 megawatts to the
Baltics by 2016.


11. (C) Bildt will ask about the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process. He has focused his public remarks on humanitarian
issues, urging that the Gaza border crossings be opened
immediately. POL Director Lyrvall recently stressed to us
that the international community cannot ignore Hamas;
"Fatah-only elections would mean the end of the Palestinian
state." On the possibility of an EU association agreement
with Syria, Sweden has been in favor but is willing to wait
to see the results of the elections in Lebanon. It has
promised to consult with us before pushing for closer ties
with Syria within the EU.
SILVERMAN