Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE98566
2009-09-23 04:04:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

SFO-V GUIDANCE-004: MOBILE MISSILE MONITORING

Tags:  KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8566 2660423
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230404Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 098566 

SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: SFO-V GUIDANCE-004: MOBILE MISSILE MONITORING
PROVISIONS

REFS: A. STATE 84678 (SFO-DIP-09-001)

B. MOSCOW 1347

Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, VCI.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T STATE 098566

SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: SFO-V GUIDANCE-004: MOBILE MISSILE MONITORING
PROVISIONS

REFS: A. STATE 84678 (SFO-DIP-09-001)

B. MOSCOW 1347

Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, VCI.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1.(S) Background: In a non-paper delivered on August 14,
2009, the United States informed Russia that it remained
committed to including in the START Follow-on Treaty
provisions that would continue the U.S. right to conduct
Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) at Votkinsk
(Ref A). In addition, the non-paper underscored the U.S.
would continue to exercise its START Treaty right to
conduct PPCM at Votkinsk through December 4, 2009, and
acknowledged, without prejudice to the U.S. position in
the START Follow-on negotiations, the necessity of
planning for the conclusion of PPCM at Votkinsk upon the
expiration of START. The Russian side has consistently
made clear that Russia will not agree to include a
provision on any U.S. PPCM rights at Votkinsk in the START
Follow-on Treaty, and that U.S. inspectors and equipment
must be removed from Votkinsk before START expires
(Ref B).


2. (S) Washington recognizes that the U.S. START Treaty
right to conduct PPCM at Votkinsk expires on December 4,
2009, and that time is growing short to work out the
practical arrangements for the withdrawal of U.S.
equipment and personnel from the Votkinsk facility by that
date. In light of Russia's clearly stated position that
it will not permit the United States to conduct PPCM at
Votkinsk under a future Treaty, Washington is willing to
consider alternative measures that would give the United
States an adequate level of confidence regarding the
number of mobile ICBMs Russia possesses.


3. (S) Guidance: On the margins of the SFO negotiations,
Delegation is authorized to conform the draft Agreement on
Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous
Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at
Votkinsk and letters of exchange on the use of ground
transportation and settlement of accounts in connection
with the Agreement that have been previously negotiated in
the JCIC. Delegation should request authorization from

Washington before signing the documents, and should make a
recommendation to Washington regarding the modalities of
getting the necessary signatures from Belarus.


4. (S) With respect to mobile missile monitoring under
the START Follow-on Treaty, Washington instructs the
delegation to table a new U.S. position that the United
States would be willing to consider foregoing PPCM at
Votkinsk, if the following monitoring measures could be
included in the new treaty in its place: 1) continuation
of the practice of placing permanent unique identifiers on
each mobile ICBM; 2) prenotification to the United States
at least 60 hours in advance of the exit from the facility
of a mobile ICBM subject to the limitations of the Treaty,
to include information about the type and variant of the
missile, the scheduled time of departure of the mobile
ICBM, and its unique identifier number; and 3)
installation and operation of a closed circuit TV camera
at the rail exit of the facility that would be connected
via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring facility to
track the entry and exit of railcars from the final
missile assembly facility to confirm that declarations are
being provided accurately. As a gesture of reciprocity,
the United States would be prepared to pre-notify the
exits of missiles or first stages from a similar United
States facility and install a closed circuit TV there. At
para 5 below are talking points the Delegation may draw
upon in presenting this proposal to the Russian side.


5. (S) Begin talking points:

--Since the beginning of our talks on the START Follow-on
Treaty, the United States has been clear about its view
that the unique monitoring challenges associated with
mobile missiles make it necessary to retain in the new
treaty the START provisions on conducting Perimeter Portal
Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) at Votkinsk.

--The reason for our position is simply that the United
States needs to be able to verify with confidence the
number of mobile ICBMs deployed by the Russian
Federation. The exercise of our right to conduct PPCM at
Votkinsk has provided that confidence under the START
Treaty.

--However, the Russian side has made it very clear that it
is not prepared to extend this right under a new Treaty,
particularly since there is no analogous facility in the
United States for Russia to monitor in the same fashion.

--We, therefore, have been giving thought as to what
alternative measures could give the United States an
adequate level of confidence regarding the number of
mobile ICBMs Russia possesses.
--We are prepared to explore, instead of PPCM, a set of
less intrusive measures that would assist our ability to
effectively monitor this aspect of the Treaty.

--Specifically, we would like to propose, in lieu of PPCM,
the following package of measures:

1) Continuation of the Russian practice of
permanently affixing a unique identifier to each mobile
ICBM;

2) Prenotification to the United States at least 60
hours in advance of the exit from the facility of a mobile
ICBM subject to the limitations of the Treaty, to include
information about the type and variant of the missile, the
scheduled time of departure of the mobile ICBM, and its
unique identifier number; and

3) Installation and operation of a closed circuit
TV camera at the rail exit of the facility that would be
connected via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring
facility to track the entry and exit of railcars from the
final missile assembly facility.

--Finally, if the Russian side were to agree to this
proposal, the United States would be prepared, as a
gesture of reciprocity, to provide pre-notification of the
exits of missiles or first stages from a similar United
States facility and to install a closed circuit TV camera
there.

--In making this proposal, the United States has come a
long way in the direction of Russia's position. We trust,
therefore, that you will give serious consideration to our
proposal and our underlying objective, which is to ensure
the United States will be able to verify with confidence
the number of Russian mobile ICBMs.

End talking points.

End guidance.
CLINTON