AUSTRALIA GROUP: SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 097434

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC RS KN IR SY KZ BR CI MX
SB, AINR
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE FOR
AUSTRALIA GROUP PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 21-25, 2009

REF: (A) 08 STATE 2956, (B)07 MOSCOW 5535

Classified by: ISN TFoley. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This message provides supplmentary guidance on
membership and regional nonproliferation issues for the
U.S. delegation to the Australia Group plenary in Paris,
September 21-25, 2009.

--------------
MEMBERSHIP
--------------


2. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Russia:

-- The Del may not support Russian membership in the
Australia Group at this time because Russia still has
not satisfied the AG's well-established criteria for
membership. We continue to be concerned that Russia has
not addressed AG concerns adequately, particularly those
related to compliance with the CWC and BWC, a
requirement relevant to membership.

-- The Del may not support the idea of inviting Russia
to a special AG meeting for reasons outlined in REF B;

-- The Del should express continued interest in holding
a technical-level outreach visit to Moscow during the
intersessional period focused on eliciting information
on how the Russian export control system works.


3. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Kazakhstan: The Del may
not/not support consideration of Kazakhstan for AG
membership at this time, but may support an outreach
visit to Astana. The U.S. has yet to resolve
outstanding compliance issues relating to Kazakhstan's
initial declaration to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). Inquires made by the OPCW Technical Secretariat
to clarify Kazakhstan's declaration remain unanswered
since 2002. The Del may note that Kazakhstan continues
to make significant progress in improving its national
export controls with bilateral assistance from the U.S.
and other AG members, but we do not believe Kazakhstan's
controls meet the standard set by the AG.


4. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Brazil: The Del should
welcome Brazilian interest in AG membership and inform
AG participants that the U.S. would look favorably upon
a formal expression of interest in membership. The Del
should urge AG participants to consider an outreach
visit to Brasilia during the intersessional period to
help entice Brazilian interest.


5. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Serbia: The Del may not/not
support consideration of Serbia for AG membership at
this time, but may support an outreach visit by
neighboring AG participants to Belgrade. The U.S. has
yet to resolve outstanding compliance issues related to
Serbia's (then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's)
initial declaration to the CWC.


6. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Mexico: The Del may not/not
support consideration of Mexico for AG membership at
this time, but may support an outreach visit to Mexico
City. The Del may note that Mexico recently passed CWC
implementing legislation and is now beginning to draft
export control legislation. If raised, the Del may
agree to support an outreach visit to Mexico.


7. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Chile: The Del may not/not
support consideration of Chile for AG membership at this
time, but may support an outreach visit to Santiago.
The Del should note that although Chile is only in the
initial stages of drafting export control legislation,
an initial outreach visit may help to catalyze interest
on the part of Chilean officials.

--------------
REGIONAL NONPROLIFERATION
--------------


8. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Opening Statement: In its
opening plenary statement, the Del should note in
general terms the continuing problems presented by Iran,
Syria and North Korea and suggest that ways to address
these continuing problems should be considered.


9. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Meetings on the Margins:
The Del may approach the British, French, German, and
Japanese delegations and AG secretariat:

-- Remind delegations of the decision the Australia
Group took in 2005 to exercise increased scrutiny of
export license applications and AG-controlled goods
bound for Syria, Iran or North Korea;

-- Note the numerous Information Exchange presentations
delivered at plenary sessions since 2005 suggesting that
Syria, Iran and North Korea have continued to acquire
goods useful to their chemical and/or biological weapons
programs;

-- Emphasize that failure to halt the flow of AG-
controlled goods into Syria, Iran and North Korea may on
day call into question the AG's relevance and important
role in nonproliferation.

-- Indicate that during the intersessional period the
United States may suggest that AG participants should
begin a conversation about what additional steps the AG
could take to strengthen its posture against CBW
proliferation to Syria, Iran and North Korea, including
possibilities such as:

- Agree to exercise, on a national basis, a 'strong
presumption to deny' export license applications for
some or all AG-controlled goods and technology bound for
Syria, Iran and North Korea similar to the approach
currently employed by the Missile Technology Control
Regime;

- Urge China, India and other key non-member supplier
states to adopt a similar posture to what the AG adopted
in 2005 ('exercise a high degree of scrutiny');

- Urge specific citation of the proliferant behavior of
Syria, Iran and North Korea in an Australia Group press
release.
CLINTON