GUIDANCE FOR SEPTEMBER 15 CORFU PROCESS MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 095507

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS: PREL OSCE RU
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR SEPTEMBER 15 CORFU PROCESS MEETING

REF: A. STATE 57920

B. STATE 59226

C. USOSCE 181

Classified By: EUR PDAS NANCY MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (SBU) Post is authorized to draw from the points below
(see paragraph 5) during the September 15 "Corfu process"
discussion of "cooperative security versus unilateralism" and
"different levels of security in the OSCE area."


2. (C) Background: In a speech in Berlin on June 5, 2008,
and again in an April 20, 2009 speech in Helsinki, Russian
President Medvedev called for a new set of treaty-based
European "hard" security arrangements covering conflict
resolution, arms control, and alliances. Medvedev provided
few details, and Russia has not elaborated by tabling any
specific proposals. A central theme underlying Russia's
rationale for developing a "new" European Security
architecture is the idea -- based on the principle of the
"indivisibility of security" contained in any number of NATO,
NATO-Russia, and OSCE documents -- that no state should be
allowed to provide for its security at the expense of any
other (see reftels). Russian leaders have made clear that
they do not believe this principle of the indivisibility of
security is currently being observed as a result of NATO and
EU enlargements. Foreign Minister Lavrov opined recently
that the process of NATO enlargement demonstrates how
security enhancements for some states come at the expense of
others.


3. (U) Background (cont'd): The U.S. and our NATO Allies are
committed to upholding Article 10 of the Washington Treaty,
NATO's foundational document, which states that "The Parties
may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State
in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to
accede to this Treaty." As the President has made clear, we
also stand by the principles that all states have a right to
choose their own alliances, and that no country should have a
"sphere of privileged interests."


4. (U) We seek practical cooperation with Russia across all
three OSCE dimensions. This also means engaging with Russia
in a broader security dialogue -- based on the "Corfu
process" launched by the Greek Chairmanship -- in which we
seek to transcend zero-sum thinking about security in Europe
and Eurasia. We believe all OSCE states have an interest in
cooperative security and we will continue to pursue practical
cooperation with Russia while maintaining our principled
position rejecting spheres of influence and affirming the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of OSCE
participating States. We should continue to work to convince
Russia that NATO and EU enlargement are not threats to its
security -- indeed, relations among European countries have
become more stable and predictable as a result, and military
equipment levels have reached historical lows -- and that a
vital, active OSCE can build security in Europe by engaging
effectively on some of the toughest issues that shape our
global security environment today, even as OSCE continues to
pursue core missions in its three dimensions.


5. (U) Begin Points:

-- The U.S. welcomes the opportunity to engage in a
comprehensive discussion of European security here at the
OSCE as part of the so-called "Corfu process" to discuss ways
to improve the existing security architecture in Europe and
Eurasia. Today's topic of discussion, "cooperative
security," is important, relevant, and timely.

-- The indivisibility of security is an important concept,
and one which the United States fully supports. It is
important to be clear what we mean by this term, which is
found in such important foundational documents as the
Helsinki Final Act (1975),the Charter of Paris (1990),and
the Rome Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of
NATO Member States and the Russian Federation (2002). It is
also important not to treat the principle of indivisibility
of security in isolation, as these documents show repeatedly
that it is one principle to be considered in the context of

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other principles.

-- One important element of the indivisibility of security is
the comprehensive nature of security as embodied in the three
dimensions of the OSCE: human, economic, and
political-military. Any reduction of the notion of security
to just one or two of these dimensions to the exclusion of
any of the other dimensions fails to do justice to the
complex and integrated nature of security in the 21st
century. Economic collapse, armed conflict, and the
systematic violation of human rights all imperil our
collective security and deserve to be on our agenda in
collective fora such as this one. All of these threats are
also most effectively dealt with through a cooperative
approach to security, rather than through unilateral action.

-- A second important element is the indivisibility of
security among states. We recognize that building a lasting
and inclusive peace in the OSCE arena requires that all
states share in the benefits of cooperative security
arrangements. In this context, we also believe that all
states have a sovereign right to freely choose their own
alliances, and no state should claim or be allowed a "sphere
of privileged interests." These principles were explicitly
outlined and agreed by all OSCE participating States in the
Charter for European Security, which states in paragraph 8
that &each participating State has an equal right to
security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every
participating State to be free to choose or change its
security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as
they evolve. Each state also has the right to neutrality.
Each participating State will respect the rights of all
others in these regards. They will not strengthen their
security at the expense of the security of other States.
Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can
have any preeminent responsibility for maintaining peace and
stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the
OSCE area as its sphere of influence.8 We remain convinced
that the transparent enlargement of the Alliance that has
taken place to date has benefited both NATO and non-NATO
members alike by ensuring stability that benefits all. NATO
enlargement is not focused on obtaining military advantage on
the ground in Europe. Interestingly -- and this is also
relevant in ongoing discussions about the future of the CFE
Treaty -- the 28 NATO Allies together hold less heavy
equipment on the ground in Europe today than the 16 NATO
Allies held in 1990.

-- A third and related element is the recognition,
particularly in the security environment we face today, that
the security of Europe and Eurasia is inextricably linked to
global security. It is not only the physically immense reach
of the OSCE space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, but also the
interdependent nature of our world, that makes our security
challenges indivisible and underscores the need to deal with
them cooperatively.

-- Finally, a fourth principle of the indivisibility of
security is the appreciation that security within states
impacts security among states. We have seen repeatedly how
instability within a state can easily spill across borders.
This fact in no way implies, however, any diminution of our
support for the core international principles of sovereignty
and territorial integrity. On the contrary, the OSCE and
other regional institutions such as the Council of Europe
provide an array of tools that can and should be used to
bolster the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of participating states for the benefit of the entire
organization.

-- One of our challenges looking ahead is to think creatively
about new ways to bolster our collective security. The United
States highly values existing European security institutions
and we do not wish to see these institutions diminished. At
the same time, we are open to looking for ways to structure
these institutions to improve our common security, such as an
OSCE crisis management mechanism, which could be deployed to
monitor and defuse a tense situation in a conflict zone. We
should explore this fall how we can spark progress in
resolving protracted conflicts, and more generally, whether
there are ways we can more effectively deal with crises when
unrecognized, breakaway regions or other non-state actors are
involved. Similarly, a review of the OSCE,s role in
addressing 21st century threats, to include the OSCE's
contribution to the political-military dimension of security,

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could be productive. We also support the development of
mechanisms to address energy security and climate change. We
should also look at the possibility of creating new
mechanisms to investigate human rights violations and ensure
freedom of the press and to establish norms for the
protection of journalists. Finally, we should consider
whether the OSCE might strengthen its efforts to address
human trafficking and tolerance issues. These are just a few
of the ideas we look forward to discussing in the coming
weeks.

End points.
CLINTON