HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 095492

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL NATO
SUBJECT: HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING

REF: (A)STATE 92527, (B)STATE 92528, (C)USNATO 309,
(D)STATE 93327

Classified by Rich Davis, VCI/CCA Office Director, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) The September 17 High Level Task Force (HLTF)
meeting will provide an opportunity to give Allies a
frank report of the September 3 U.S.-Russia bilateral
discussion of the CFE parallel actions package and to
raise the issue of how we should deal with the second
anniversary (in December)of Russia's cessation of its
implementation of CFE. While Russia remains willing to
discuss CFE, so far it has shown no indication that it
is ready to engage seriously on solving the CFE impasse;
it is important that we make this clear to Allies, while
also reinforcing our commitment both to CFE and to
working with Allies as we chart the way forward.

U.S. goals for the September 17 HLTF and related
meetings are to:

-- give a frank report to Allies on the September 3
U.S.-Russian bilateral discussion;

-- begin a conversation with Allies regarding the
upcoming two-year anniversary of Russia's ceasing to
implement CFE. We have all said consistently that NATO
implementing while Russia does not cannot go on
indefinitely. Now is an important moment to raise this
question, particularly in light of the need to begin to
consider how to position ourselves for the NATO and OSCE
Ministerials in December -- just ahead of the two-year
anniversary; and

-- in the context of the frank U.S. report, indicate
that senior levels in Washington are assessing next
steps and welcome Allied views.

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Contacts and Bilaterals
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2. (C) U.S. Rep should draw from Reftels A and B for
details of Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller's September
3 meeting in Geneva with Russian Security and
Disarmament Director Antonov on CFE. U.S. Rep may share
the following:

- A/S Gottemoeller stressed the Obama Administration's
readiness to think creatively to find a way forward on
CFE and welcomed Russia's stated readiness, in its May
2009 aide-memoire on CFE, to work on the basis of U.S.-
drafted parallel actions package.

- Recognizing that Russia wanted certainty about Allies'
willingness to ratify Adapted CFE, A/S Gottemoeller
underscored that Russia's current suspension of its
implementation of CFE was a major bar to movement on
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty (A/CFE) by the
United States and others. She observed that Russia's
aide-memoire and the questions Russian officials had
posed in capitals in July regarding possibilities for
trial implementation or provisional application of
Adapted CFE had suggested a possible way forward. In
this context, the two exchanged ideas on the possibility
of trial implementation of all -- or elements of --
A/CFE; provisional application of A/CFE; and how those
questions might relate to the ratification of A/CFE as
elements of the parallel actions package.

- Gottemoeller said she thought that in the context of
an agreed parallel actions package, it would be possible
to move on ratification of A/CFE if Russia were
implementing at least some aspects of CFE. Antonov made
clear that Russia would never agree to resume
implementation of the existing CFE treaty.

- Gottemoeller suggested informally that in the context
of agreement between Russia and NATO on the issues in
the parallel actions package, one option might be for
NATO States Parties to commit to complete ratification
in a specific timeframe, just as had been done in the
1996 Flank Document, while Russia agrees to resume
implementation of CFE for the same time frame. She

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noted that while all elements of CFE limitations,
verification, and information exchange are important,
it might be possible to consider trial implementation of
some of the operational aspects of the Adapted Treaty
for a specified period. Depending on what had been
achieved by the end of that period, entry into force or
provisional application might follow, or states could
consider whether other steps were necessary. She said
that if this idea sounded promising, we would consider
it formally in Washington and with Allies.

- Antonov did not reject the concept, but focused his
remarks on Russia's hope for provisional application of
the Adapted Treaty, perhaps after a majority of states
had ratified the Adapted Treaty. In addition, the
Russian team asked about which elements of the Adapted
Treaty might be part of a trial implementation effort.

- However, Antonov was very explicit in underscoring
that ratification of A/CFE was "not enough." He
stressed that any CFE package must include elimination
of the Treaty's legally-binding limits on where Russia
can locate forces on its own territory. He made a
detailed and unambiguous presentation of Russia's
position on the flank issue, building on the points in
Russia's May 5 aide-memoire. Antonov said unambiguously
that a CFE "package deal" that created the conditions
for ratification of Adapted CFE by all Treaty parties
would have to eliminate the flank limits for Russia, in
order to be considered positively in Moscow.

- Gottemoeller emphasized that the flank limits were
critically important for NATO Allies. She made clear
that NATO's approach envisioned a process for updating
the CFE regime. Specifically, we envisioned discussion
of changes to the flank and other Adapted CFE elements
only after entry into force of the Adapted Treaty. She
said it was essential to handle this issue sensitively
if we wanted to reach agreement on a package that would
preserve the benefits of CFE. Gottemoeller suggested
careful consideration as to whether there were issues we
could use as "ice breakers" to enable agreement on a
package that preserves the Treaty and permits its
further development.

- On substantial combat forces, Antonov pushed hard for
immediate discussion of a specific definition,
suggesting that this might take place in Vienna at the
Joint Consultative Group (JCG),or elsewhere. The U.S.
noted again that this was an issue involving NATO and
Russia; it was not a CFE (or JCG) issue, but had been
included in the parallel actions package because Russia
had said this was important.

- For Moldova, Antonov suggested that the March 18
statement by Medvedev, Voronin, and Smirnov on the
Transnistria conflict obviated the need to address
withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova in the CFE
context. Gottemoeller observed that there was a lot of
common ground between Russia and the U.S. on the Moldova
section of the parallel actions package, but that the
devil was in the details.

- A brief exchange on Georgia focused on stabilizing
measures relevant to the region. The U.S. suggested
that these should be calibrated to address the obvious
sources of security concern: military equipment and
personnel, military facilities (e.g., Georgia's concerns
about Russian facilities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
and generalized military transparency. Members of the
Russian team suggested all these areas could be
discussed, but Antonov was not prepared to let the
discussion continue.

- A/S Gottemoeller believes that Russia has not yet
decided to engage seriously with us on how to resolve
the CFE impasse.

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CFE The Way Ahead
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3. (C) U.S. Rep should note to Allies our
disappointment that, despite Russia's aide-memoire on
CFE and its approaches in NATO capitals, we have not
been able to get Russia to engage seriously on solving
the CFE impasse. It is not clear to us how -- short of
offering major concessions -- we can persuade Russia to
engage in a focused negotiation. Given the impending

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two-year anniversary of Russia's non-implementation,
senior U.S. officials believe it is time to begin
considering appropriate next steps, and we would welcome
substantive ideas from Allies on the way forward. The
idea mentioned informally by A/S Gottemoeller on
September 3 to combine some sort of trial implementation
with a possible timeline for ratification of A/CFE,
which might be a catalyst for action on other elements
of the package, is one example. (Note. The idea of a
trial implementation phase with a set end date was
mentioned by the UK rep as a possible alternative to
provisional application during the May 2009 HLTF Away
Day. End Note.) U.S. Rep should explore whether Allies
have any creative thoughts. At this point, we do not
believe it would be helpful to plan for additional
seminars similar to that held in Berlin last June.


4. (C) U.S. Rep should recall the discussion at the
July HLTF meeting regarding an "expanded group"
discussion. While it does not appear to Washington that
Russian authorities are ready to negotiate seriously, if
Allies believe we should seek to arrange such a meeting,
we will do so.


5. (C) Regarding the next possible Gottemoeller-Antonov
meeting, U.S. Rep may note that Antonov has suggested
that he and A/S Gottemoeller meet again on CFE during
the week of September 21, when they are both in Geneva.
Considering the lack of Russian engagement during the
recent meeting, the U.S. has not decided whether to
accept Russia's proposal.


6. (C) December Data Exchange. U.S. Rep should remind
Allies of the upcoming two-year anniversary of Russia's
"suspension" of CFE implementation and the need to
consider how NATO will take note of or react to the
occasion. Allies have noted repeatedly, including in
Summit and Ministerial statements, that the situation in
which we continue to implement the Treaty in the face of
Russia's non-implementation "cannot continue
indefinitely." One obvious question for consideration
is whether NATO Allies should continue to provide their
annual CFE information exchange. The U.S. has not
reached a conclusion on this point, but we are
consulting with our legal advisors on the range of
available options. U.S. Rep should ask whether Allies
have started to think about this, and what are their
initial views. We would propose having a focused
discussion on this topic at the next HLTF, one that we
would like to have scheduled in October, in order to
thoroughly examine options before December.

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Other Business
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7. (SBU) Reftel D contains guidance on issues under
discussion in the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in
Vienna. U.S. Rep should draw from this guidance as
appropriate in the event any of these issues are raised
during the HLTF or in meetings on the margins.
CLINTON