EXPANDING THE CHORUS ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 095073

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA IR PREL AORC
SUBJECT: EXPANDING THE CHORUS ON IRAN

REF: STATE 91633

CLASSIFIED BY ISN VANN H. VAN DIEPEN, REASONS: 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE
PARAGRAPHS 10-30.


2. (C) SUMMARY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING IRAN'S
PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 9 - SUGGEST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
AIMS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM'S NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND DEFUSE
GROWING PRESSURE FOR ADDITIONAL PUNITIVE MEASURES AHEAD
OF THE OPENING SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA)
AND THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY TO COUNTERING
IRAN'S EFFORTS WILL BE EXPANDING ITS SENSE OF
INCREASING ISOLATION ON THE ISSUE, SPECIFICALLY BY
ALLIES AND PARTNERS, AND IN PARTICULAR ENLISTING
MODERATE MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO CALL ON
IRAN TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE P5+1 OFFER TO
ENGAGE, OR RISK NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. DEPARTMENT
REQUESTS AMBASSADORS AT ADDRESSEE POSTS TO PERSUADE HOST
GOVERNMENTS' SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES TO DELIVER SUCH A
MESSAGE AT THE UNGA OPENING SESSION AND IAEA MEETINGS;
HOWEVER, POSTS ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO ENGAGE ALL
RELEVANT HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO PRESS IRAN IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CHANNELS. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) OBJECTIVE: TO PROVIDE HOST GOVERNMENTS WITH
SUGGESTED KEY MESSAGES TO DELIVER TO IRAN ABOUT THE
SEVERITY OF SPURNING THE P5+1 AND THE REAL POSSIBILITY
OF ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS. DEPENDING ON THE
COUNTRY, THESE MESSAGES MAY BE DELIVERED IN PUBLIC FORA,
PRIVATE CHANNELS, OR BOTH. COUNTRY SPECIFIC
INSTRUCTIONS ARE IN PARAGRAPHS 10-30.


4. (U) BACKGROUND: EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE UNITED STATES
AND OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND
GERMANY OFFERED IRAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT
NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS. IN
THE ENSUING MONTHS, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUED ITS
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN VIOLATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. AS A
CONSEQUENCE, PRESIDENT OBAMA, SECRETARY CLINTON AND OUR
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS NOTED IN RECENT WEEKS THAT WE
WILL SOON TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION AND BEGIN TO
CONSIDER INTENSIFYING PRESSURE ON IRAN IN RESPONSE TO
ITS CONTINUED NON-COMPLIANCE.


5. (U) IN LATE AUGUST, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SUDDENLY
ALLOWED LIMITED IAEA INSPECTION VISITS OF TWO NUCLEAR
FACILITIES AT NATANZ AND ARAK. WHILE THIS CONSTITUTED
SOME PROGRESS, THE IAEA ITSELF NOTED THAT THE
INSPECTIONS FELL FAR SHORT OF MEETING IRAN'S OBLIGATIONS
TO THE IAEA (REFTEL). MOREOVER, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE WITH THE IAEA IN
ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE MILITARY
DIMENSIONS OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ON SEPTEMBER 9, IRAN
PROVIDED ITS PROPOSAL IN RESPONSE TO THE P5+1'S OFFER TO
MEET FROM APRIL 2009. THIS PROPOSAL IS STILL BEING
ASSESSED, IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR P5+1 PARTNERS
(FURTHER DISCUSSED IN PARA 9 BELOW).


6. (C) THESE RECENT EFFORTS, IN ADDITION TO THE 9
SEPTEMBER IRANIAN RESPONSE, SUGGEST THAT IRAN AIMS TO
BLUNT GROWING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ITS NUCLEAR
PROGRAM BY CREATING A MORE COOPERATIVE IMAGE WHILE
AVOIDING FULL OR EVEN PARTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. INTERNATIONAL REACTION SO FAR
INDICATES THAT THE TACTICS MAY HAVE SOME RESONANCE WITH
SOME MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, PARTICULARLY
AMONG THOSE WHO FEAR THAT POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR
RIGHTS TO CIVILIAN USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY OUTWEIGH ANY
RISK THEY MAY FACE FROM A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS CAPABLE IRAN.


7. (C) OUR CHALLENGE IS TO CONVINCE ALLIES AND
PARTNERS, PARTICULARLY MODERATES IN THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT, THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT AND TANGIBLE RISKS
TO THEIR INTERESTS IN ALLOWING IRAN TO EVADE FULL
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
SPECIFICALLY, CONTINUED IRANIAN NON-COMPLIANCE COULD:

-- FORCE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO CONSIDER MORE STRINGENT
CONTROLS ON TRANSFERS TO NUCLEAR CONSUMERS, POTENTIALLY
IMPEDING THEIR OWN FUTURE ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

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AND COOPERATION;

-- PROMPT SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
NONPROLIFERATION SANCTIONS THAT WILL RISK COLLATERAL
DAMAGE TO COUNTRIES WITH TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKS WITH
IRAN;

-- RAISE TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RISKING INCREASED
MILITARIZATION AND THREATS OF PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY
ACTION; AND

-- (AS APPLICABLE FOR ENERGY-IMPORTING COUNTRIES) RISK
DRAMATICALLY INCREASED ENERGY PRICES.


8. (U) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN HELP AVOID THESE
RISKS BY ENCOURAGING IRAN TO RESPOND SERIOUSLY TO
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S AND OUR P5+1 PARTNERS' OFFER TO
ENGAGE, AND TO BRING ITSELF INTO COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR OBLIGATIONS. OUR GOAL IN
APPROACHING HOST GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE TO PERSUADE THESE
STATES TO CALL ON IRAN, BOTH PRIVATELY AND IN PUBLIC, TO
AVOID CONFRONTATION BY ACCEPTING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION
TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AND FULFILLING ITS INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ACKNOWLEDGE
IRAN'S RIGHTS TO THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
UNDER THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, WHILE NOTING
THAT WITH THESE RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES. IT WOULD
BE HELPFUL FOR ADDRESSEE GOVERNMENTS TO REINFORCE THIS
MESSAGE VIA THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE (14-18
SEPTEMBER) AS WELL AS DURING THE OPENING SESSION OF THE
UNGA (22-25 SEPTEMBER). IF WE CANNOT SECURE PUBLIC
STATEMENTS, WE SHOULD PRESS FOR STRONG PRIVATE
APPROACHES ON THE MARGINS OF THESE MEETINGS.


9. (U) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS. POSTS ARE
REQUESTED TO:

--PERSUADE HOST GOVERNMENTS' SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES TO
DELIVER MESSAGES AT THE UNGA OPENING SESSION AND IAEA
MEETINGS;
--ENGAGE OTHER RELEVANT HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO
PRESS IRAN IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CHANNELS;
--COMPLIMENT GOVERNMENTS, AS APPROPRIATE, ON THEIR IAEA
BOARD OF GOVERNORS STATEMENTS;
--TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO FRAME THESE POINTS IN WAYS THAT
WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS THE POLITICAL GAIN
THEY COULD DERIVE FROM SUCH STANCES, AS WELL AS CALL ON
HOST GOVERNMENTS TO AMPLIFY OUR EFFORTS BY PRESSING
THEIR OTHER ALLIES TO JOIN IN THE CHORUS.

IF ASKED ABOUT THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL DELIVERED ON 9
SEPTEMBER 2009, POSTS CAN RESPOND:

--WE AND OUR P5+1 PARTNERS HAVE RECEIVED IRAN'S PROPOSAL
AND ARE STUDYING IT.
--WE ARE ALL COMMITTEED TO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH
IRAN TO RESOLVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S CONCERNS
ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
--WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE EU WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE
IRANIANS, ON BEHALF OF THE P5+1, TO ARRANGE A FACE-TO-
FACE MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
--THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL DOES NOT COVER THE NUCLEAR ISSUE,
WHICH IS PRECISELY WHY WE NEED AN EARLY MEETING.
--BUT, WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN TALKING FOR THE SAKE OF
TALKING. ANY DIALOGUE MUST BE MEANINGFUL AND PRODUCE
CONCRETE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.


POSTS CAN OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE
INADEQUACY OF IRAN'S ACTIONS TO DATE IN REFTEL.


10. (U) ADDITIONALLY, POSTS MAY WISH TO ENGAGE HOST
GOVERNMENTS ON IRAN'S POOR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD,
ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE THE NONPROLIFERATION ISSUE MAY
NOT RESONATE TO THE SAME DEGREE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
WOULD.


11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS WITHOUT SPECIFIC
GUIDANCE BELOW: ALL POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ADVISE
DEPARTMENT OF ANY OTHER VENUES, MEETINGS, OR FORA WHERE
THE MESSAGE IN THESE TALKING POINTS AND IN REFTEL COULD
BE DEPLOYED. POSTS ARE ALSO REQUESTED TO ADVISE
DEPARTMENT IF IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO DEPLOY A
SIMILAR DEMARCHE IN THAT COUNTRY. FINALLY, ALL POSTS
ARE REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN THEIR HOST COUNTRY DURING
ROUTINE EXCHANGES AND, AS APPROPRIATE, TO ENCOURAGE THEM
TO PRESS IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY
BEFORE IT:


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--NOTE THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS INTERESTED IN
FINDING A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CONCERNS WITH IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE P5+1 OFFERED
IRAN SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN APRIL 2009 BY INVITING IRAN
TO MEET WITH THE GROUP, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, TO
DISCUSS MUTUAL CONCERNS IN MUTUAL RESPECT.

-- THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE P5+1 ARE
REVIEWING THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGH NOTING THAT IT
DOES NOT ADDRESS THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM. IN THE MEANTIME,
IRAN CONTINUES TO DEFY MULTIPLE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND REFUSES TO FULLY COOPERATE WITH
THE IAEA ON ITS INVESTIGATION INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM.

-- IRAN SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MEANINGFUL
OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED TO IT WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.

-- IRAN CONTINUES TO COMMIT GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF ITS PEOPLE AND TO DENY THEIR
BASIC FREEDOMS. WE CALL UPON THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO COOPERATE IN ENCOURAGING IRAN TO RESPECT
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. OVER THE PAST
FEW MONTHS, IRAN HAS IN PARTICULAR VIOLATED ITS PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, EXPRESSION, AND OF THE
PRESS. HUNDREDS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAIN JAILED
FOR EXPRESSING THEIR SUPPORT FOR OTHER POLITICAL
CANDIDATES AND FOR QUESTIONING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS.

POST-SPECIFIC POINTS


12. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSIES LONDON AND
PARIS: POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE THE U.K. AND
FRANCE TO SEND SIMILAR MESSAGES TO THE COUNTRIES LISTED
BELOW OR TO COUNTRIES WITH WHICH EACH HAS A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP.


13. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSIES BANGKOK, HANOI,
AND MANILA: POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE
HOST GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS TO REQUEST THAT
PHILIPPINE, THAI, AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS SEND A STRONG
PRIVATE MESSAGE TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS AND TO ENCOURAGE IRAN TO GIVE A SUBSTANTIVE
RESPONSE TO THE P5+1. YOU SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE THEM TO
GIVE STRONG STATEMENTS DURING THE UNGA GENERAL DEBATE.
AS IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN),THESE THREE COUNTRIES HAVE
DEMONSTRATED A STRONG COMMITMENT TO NONPROLIFERATION AND
THE UN, INCLUDING THE UNSC. POSTS SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT
STRONG, UNITED INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON THIS ISSUE IS
CRITICAL TO DEAL WITH THE NUCLEAR THREAT, WHETHER IT IS
FROM A COUNTRY LIKE IRAN OR THE DPRK. KEY MESSAGES WE
WOULD LIKE THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM TO
DELIVER INCLUDE:

- SUPPORT IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY
CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY
ASSUMED.
- NOTE THEIR OWN COMMITMENT TO THE NPT AND TO THE
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME MORE GENERALLY, AND HOW
RIGHTS IN THIS REGIME CARRY OBLIGATIONS.
- UNDERSCORE THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME
RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
FULFILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL.
- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN DECIDE NOT TO
SERIOUSLY ENGAGE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3, IT WILL LIKELY
FACE ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS.
- COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.


14. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSIES IN GCC+3
COUNTRIES: YOU ARE REQUESTED TO URGE HOST GOVERNMENTS TO
USE UPCOMING OPPORTUNITIES AT THE UNGA, INCLUDING
STATEMENTS ISSUED FROM GCC/GCC+3 MEETINGS, TO PUBLICLY
VOICE SHARED CONCERN ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND
ITS ACTIVITIES THAT THREATEN REGIONAL SECURITY. PRIVATE
MESSAGES ARE USEFUL BUT NOT ENOUGH; KEY PARTNERS SUCH AS
JORDAN, EGYPT, UAE, AND KSA SHOULD TAKE A MORE PUBLIC
APPROACH TO EXPRESS OUR SHARED CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY AS
THEY COULD BE DIRECTLY IMPACTED BY THE REPERCUSSIONS OF
ANY MILITARY STRIKE. WE HOPE THESE GOVERNMENTS WILL
ACTIVELY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE
IRANIAN CHALLENGE. YOU SHOULD REASSURE HOST GOVERNMENTS
THAT AS WE MOVE FORWARD ON OUR IRAN POLICY, WE WILL
CONTINUE TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH THEM.
MESSAGES INCLUDE:


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- STRESS THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS A KEY ROLE IN
THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO IRAN AND
SHOULD EXPRESS ITS CONCERN TO IRAN IRAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM THREATEN REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY,
AND WITH IT THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL
SECURITY.
- IRAN HAS AN OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT TO ACHIEVE A
DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF THESE CONCERNS, AND CAN
AVOID HARSHER SANCTIONS MEASURES IN SO DOING.
- IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF IRAN'S ECONOMY AND
PEOPLE TO AVOID THAT PATH. DOING SO WOULD IMPROVE
IRAN'S STANDING IN THE REGION AND STEM THE GROWING
DIVIDE CAUSED BY MISTRUST OF IRANIAN INTENTIONS.


15. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ACCRA: BUILDING ON
THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PRESIDENT OBAMA'S RECENT TRIP
AND OUR PAST GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN VIENNA,
EMBASSY ACCRA SHOULD ENCOURAGE GHANA TO USE ITS POSITION
IN THE NAM AND BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN TO
DELIVER CLEAR, EVEN IF PRIVATE, MESSAGES ON THE MARGINS
OF UNGA THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT RUBBER-STAMP
IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS. MESSAGES
THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE GHANIANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL
USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT
OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- UNDERSCORE TO IRAN THAT YOU STAND WITH IRAN IN
DEFENSE OF THAT PRINCIPLE, BUT EMPHASIZE THAT WITH
SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS AND ANSWERS TO THE IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS POSED BY THE IAEA, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY
THAT IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS
AND PRESSURE.
- URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY IT
HAS BEEN OFFERED TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY WITH THE
P5+1/E3+3 TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.


16. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ANKARA: EMBASSY
ANKARA IS REQUESTED TO URGE TURKEY TO USE UPCOMING
OPPORTUNITIES AT THE UNGA GENERAL DEBATE TO PUBLICLY
VOICE OUR SHARED CONCERN ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
PRIVATE MESSAGES ARE USEFUL BUT NOT ENOUGH AND WE NEED
TO URGE TURKEY TO TAKE A MORE PUBLIC APPROACH TO EXPRESS
OUR SHARED CONCERNS. MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE
TURKS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- STRESS TO TURKEY THAT IT HAS A KEY ROLE IN THIS
ISSUE BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO IRAN AND SHOULD
EXPRESS ITS CONCERN TO IRAN THAT ITS NUCLEAR
PROGRAM THREATENS REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY,
AND WITH IT THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL
SECURITY. NOTE CONCERN THAT TENSION IN THE REGION
MAY CAUSE AN ALREADY DELICATE SECURITY SITUATION TO
UNRAVEL. IRANIAN REFUSAL TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL
CONCERNS WITH ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS CONTRIBUTING
TO REGIONAL UNEASE AND DESTABILIZATION, WHICH IS IN
NO ONE'S INTERESTS.
- IRAN HAS AN OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT TO ACHIEVE A
DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF THESE CONCERNS AND TO
AVOID FURTHER SANCTIONS IN SO DOING.
- IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF IRAN'S ECONOMY AND
PEOPLE TO AVOID THAT PATH.
- IRAN SHOULD TAKE SERIOUSLY PRESIDENT OBAMA'S OFFER
OF ENGAGEMENT AND RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE THROUGH
DIRECT, SUBSTANTIVE DIPLOMACY WITH THE P5+1/E3+3.


17. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ASTANA: POST IS
REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT
INTERLOCUTORS TO REQUEST THAT KAZAKH OFFICIALS SEND
STRONG PRIVATE MESSAGES TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS. THIS ALSO
CAN BE RAISED ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA. AS A LEADER ON
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES, KAZAKHSTAN'S DECISION
TO RENOUNCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROVIDES A POWERFUL EXAMPLE
FOR IRAN. KAZAKHSTAN ALSO COULD USEFULLY STRESS HOW
GROWING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KAZAKHSTAN AND
IRAN AS WELL AS CONTINUED STABILITY IN THE CASPIAN
REGION, WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES VALUE, ARE IMPERILED BY
IRAN'S OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. KEY MESSAGES WE
WOULD LIKE THE KAZAKHS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- KAZAKHSTAN HAS MADE CLEAR IT SUPPORTS IRAN'S RIGHT
TO NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.
- HOWEVER, IRAN SHOULD DEVELOP ITS CIVIL NUCLEAR
PROGRAM IN A TRANSPARENT MANNER TO ASSURE THE REST
OF THE WORLD OF ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS.
- MOREOVER, KAZAKHSTAN WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT IRAN'S
RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM A NUCLEAR FUEL BANK SUCH AS

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ONE THE GOVERNMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN HAS PROPOSED TO
HOST.
- IRANIAN ACCESS TO SUCH A RESERVE WOULD MAKE IRAN'S
ENRICHMENT PROGRAM UNNECESSARY.
- STRESS THAT KAZAKHSTAN WANTS TO CONTINUE TO EXPAND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN, BUT THIS EFFORT WILL
BE IMPEDED UNTIL IRAN ADDRESSES THE CONCERNS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3
PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY
COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES.


18. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY BRASILIA: EMBASSY
BRASILIA IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH THE APPROPRIATE HOST
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO URGE THE BRAZILIANS TO USE THEIR
STATEMENT AT UNGA TO PRESS IRAN TO FULFILL ITS
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING
IRAN'S NPT RIGHTS. IN THE PAST, BRAZIL HAS BEEN WILLING
TO REGISTER VIEWS WITH IRAN THAT, WHILE NOT IDEAL, BEAR
SOME SIMILARITY TO OUR OWN VIEWS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
BRAZIL WOULD PUBLICLY SPECULATE ON THE NEED FOR NEW
SANCTIONS ON IRAN, BUT BRAZILIAN RHETORIC REGARDING
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES COULD USEFULLY REINFORCE OUR
OWN MESSAGES.
MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE BRAZILIANS TO DELIVER
INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE ADHERING TO ITS
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING TRANSPARENCY
INTO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
- URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THE WELL-BEING OF ITS
ECONOMY AND PEOPLE IN THIS REGARD AND THE
OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE IN A MANNER
THAT PROVIDES FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT.


19. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY JAKARTA: EMBASSY
JAKARTA IS REQUESTED TO URGE INDONESIA TO 'SOUND THE
ALARM' TO IRAN ON SANCTIONS DURING PRIVATE BILATERAL
CONSULTATIONS ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA, DURING NAM
MEETINGS, AND/OR AT THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY
MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE INDONESIA TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- SUPPORT IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS
INTO WHICH IT ENTERED FREELY.
- UNDERSCORE THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN NOT ENGAGE IN A
MEANINGFUL WAY WITH THE P5+1/E3+3 SO AS TO RESOLVE
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM,
IT WILL LIKELY FACE ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS.
- NOTE THAT AS A MEMBER OF THE NAM, INDONESIA DOES
NOT WISH TO SEE IRAN SUFFER ANY FURTHER
CONSEQUENCES OF UN SANCTIONS OR FRICTION WITHIN THE
NAM, WHICH WOULD OCCUR IF IRAN FAILS TO ADDRESS
THESE CONCERNS DIPLOMATICALLY.
- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3
PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY
COOPERATION,
- UNDERSCORE THAT COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO
RESULT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.


20. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY KAMPALA: EMBASSY
KAMPALA IS REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO USE ITS
POSITION IN THE NAM AND THE UNSC, AS WELL AS ITS
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, TO DELIVER CLEAR, EVEN
IF PRIVATE, MESSAGES THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT
RUBBER-STAMP IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS
OBLIGATIONS. APPEALS TO THE UGANDAN PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS
A REGIONAL STATESMAN AND POSITION ON THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL MAY ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE OR
STRENGTHEN IT. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, UGANDA SHOULD
MAKE SOME SUBTLE POINT DURING ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
WITH IRAN ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA AND/OR THE IAEA GC.
KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE UGANDA TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL
USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT
OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- ACKNOWLEDGE THAT UGANDA WILL STAND WITH IRAN IN
DEFENSE OF THAT RIGHT, BUT UNDERSCORE THAT WITH
SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY THAT
IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND
PRESSURE.
- URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY
TO ENGAGE THE P5+1/E3+3 TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR

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ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.


21. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR:
EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH THE
APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS TO REQUEST
THAT MALAYSIA BALANCE FURTHER ITS COMMENTS ON THE IRAN
ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IN PRIVATE ENGAGEMENTS WITH IRAN, IN
THE NAM, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE IAEA BOARD, AND IN PUBLIC
COMMENTS AT UNGA. KEY MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE
MALAYSIANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- NOTE THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL
NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS
IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- UNDERSCORE THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- HIGHLIGHT THAT IRAN HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO AUGMENT
AND IMPROVE ITS COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA TO
ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS AND SHOULD TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THE P5+1 OFFER.
- IRAN HAS AN IMPORTANT, HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE
IT TO AVOID CONTINUED ISOLATION AND SANCTIONS, BUT
IT WILL NOT LAST FOREVER IRAN MUST AFFIRMATIVELY
CHOOSE A POSITIVE PATH.


22. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR MEXICO: EMBASSY MEXICO IS
REQUESTED TO URGE MEXICO TO CONSIDER QUIETLY RAISING A
RED FLAG IN PRIVATE WITH THE IRANIANS DURING THEIR
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA, DURING NAM MEETINGS, AS
A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC, AND AT THE IAEA
BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY MESSAGES
WE WOULD LIKE MEXICO TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE RESPONDING TO THE
LAWFUL REQUESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR
GREATER TRANSPARENCY INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM,
CONSISTENT WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
- URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
INCREASE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ECONOMY.


23. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY MONROVIA: BUILDING
ON THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND LIBERIA, EMBASSY MONROVIA SHOULD ENCOURAGE LIBERIA
TO USE ITS POSITION IN THE NAM AND BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN TO DELIVER CLEAR, MESSAGES ON THE
MARGINS OF UNGA THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT RUBBER-
STAMP IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS.
MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE LIBERIA TO DELIVER
INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL
USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT
OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS AND ANSWERS TO THE IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS POSED BY THE IAEA, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY
THAT IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS
AND PRESSURE.
- URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY IT
HAS BEEN OFFERED TO SERIOUSLY ENGAGE THE P5+1/E3+3
TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- NOTE THAT COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.


24. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY NEW DELHI: EMBASSY
NEW DELHI IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND ENCOURAGE INDIA TO SEND STRONG
PRIVATE MESSAGES TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS. THIS CAN ALSO BE
RAISED ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA. DUE TO INDIA'S OWN LACK
OF NPT STATUS, A FOCUS ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; HOWEVER, INDIA COULD INSTEAD
FOCUS ON THE STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
AND APPEAL TO THE NEED FOR IRAN TO ABIDE BY THE
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ENTERED IN TO IN
ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER SANCTIONS. INDIA COULD ALSO
USEFULLY STRESS HOW BUSINESS INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INDIA
AND IRAN, WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES VALUE, ARE BEING
JEOPARDIZED BY IRAN'S OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. KEY
MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE THE INDIANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN DECIDE NOT TO
ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3, IT WILL
LIKELY FACE ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS. INDIA
WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
IRAN, BUT SUCH EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE IMPEDED
UNTIL IRAN ADDRESSES THE CONCERNS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

STATE 00095073 007 OF 008


- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3
PACKAGE.
- ADVISE IRAN THAT COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE
ADVANTAGEOUS TO OVERALL DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.


25. (C) ACTION REQUEST FOR OUAGADOUGOU: EMBASSY
OUGADOUGOU IS REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE BURKINA FASO TO USE
ITS POSITION IN THE NAM AND THE UNSC, AS WELL AS ITS
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, TO DELIVER CLEAR, EVEN
IF PRIVATE, MESSAGES THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT
RUBBER-STAMP IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS
OBLIGATIONS. APPEALS TO THE BURKINA FASO PRESIDENT'S
ROLE AS A REGIONAL STATESMAN MAY ENCOURAGE BURKINA FASO
TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE OR STRENGTHEN IT. TO THE EXTENT
POSSIBLE, BURKINA FASO SHOULD MAKE SOME SUBTLE POINT
DURING ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAN ON THE
MARGINS OF UNGA AND/OR THE IAEA GC. KEY MESSAGES WE
WOULD LIKE BURKINA FASO TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- (SBU) EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE
NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- (SBU) ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BURKINA FASO WILL STAND WITH
IRAN IN DEFENSE OF THAT RIGHT, BUT UNDERSCORE THAT
WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- (SBU) STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY THAT
IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND
PRESSURE.
- (SBU) URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS NEW
OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY WITH THE P5+1/E3+3
TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.


26. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY PRETORIA: EMBASSY
PRETORIA IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND URGE THEM TO CONSIDER QUIETLY
RAISING A RED FLAG IN PRIVATE WITH THE IRANIANS DURING
THEIR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA, DURING NAM
MEETINGS, AND AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND GENERAL
CONFERENCE. SOUTH AFRICA COULD ALSO HELP INFLUENCE IBSA
PARTNERS BRAZIL AND INDIA. EMBASSY PRETORIA IS ALSO
REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE AMBASSADOR MINTY TO USE HIS
SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE WITHIN THE NAM AND WITH IRAN TO
IMPRESS UPON IRANIAN OFFICIALS THE VALUE OF THE
OPPORTUNITY IN FRONT OF IT AND THE RISKS OF FAILING TO
COOPERATE. AMBASSADOR MINTY'S STATEMENTS AT THE IAEA
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ARE KEENLY READ BY NAM STATES; MINTY
SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO USE HIS INFLUENCE CAREFULLY TO
CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS. ANY APPROACH SHOULD ALSO BUILD
CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THE RECENT U.S-SOUTH AFRICA BILATERAL
NONPROLIFERATION DIALOGUE LED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR ROBERT
EINHORN IN AUGUST. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE THE SOUTH
AFRICANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL
NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS
IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- UNDERSCORE THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE NAM AND SOUTH
AFRICA WILL STAND WITH IRAN IN DEFENSE OF THAT
RIGHT, BUT THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- NOTE CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT SHOULD IRAN NOT
SERIOUSLY ENGAGE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3, AS IT HAS SAID
IT SUPPORTS DOING, IT WILL FACE ADDITIONAL, EVEN
HARSHER SANCTIONS.
- IT IS NOT HELPFUL FOR THERE TO BE FURTHER FRICTION
WITHIN THE NAM, WHICH WOULD OCCUR IF IRAN FAILS TO
ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS DIPLOMATICALLY.
- AS A FELLOW MEMBER OF THE NAM, SOUTH AFRICA DOES
NOT WISH TO SEE IRAN CONTINUALLY SUFFER THE
CONSEQUENCES OF ESCALATING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.
- ENGAGING IN A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE ABOUT IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM WILL BE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS
RESOLVING THIS ISSUE AND RETURNING IRAN TO
PROSPERITY AND GREATER ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.


27. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR SAN JOSE: EMBASSY SAN JOSE
IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND URGE THAT COSTA RICA CONSIDER QUIETLY
RAISING A RED FLAG IN PRIVATE WITH THE IRANIANS DURING
THEIR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA IN ITS CAPACITY AS
A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC, AND/OR AT THE IAEA
GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE COSTA
RICA TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE RESPONDING TO THE

STATE 00095073 008 OF 008


LAWFUL REQUESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR
GREATER TRANSPARENCY INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM,
CONSISTENT WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
- URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ECONOMY,


28. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY SINGAPORE: EMBASSY
SINGAPORE IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND URGE SINGAPORE TO 'SOUND THE
ALARM' ON SANCTIONS TO IRAN. THREE PRIMARY
OPPORTUNITIES THAT SINGAPORE WOULD HAVE TO DELIVER SUCH
A MESSAGE ARE DURING PRIVATE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON
THE MARGINS OF UNGA, DURING NAM MEETINGS, AND AT THE
IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. SINGAPORE CAN ALSO EMPHASIZE
THAT THE NAM SHOULD NOT BE A RUBBER-STAMP FOR SUPPORT OF
IRANIAN DEFIANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IT
FREELY ENTERED INTO. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE
SINGAPORE TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- SUPPORT IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY
CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY
ASSUMED.
- UNDERSCORE THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN DECIDE NOT TO
ENGAGE IN A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3
ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM, IT WILL LIKELY FACE
ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS.
- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3
PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY
COOPERATION,
- COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.


29. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ZAGREB: EMBASSY
ZAGREB IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND ENCOURAGE CROATIA TO HELP 'SOUND THE
ALARM' TO IRAN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL,
HARSHER SANCTIONS. THIS COULD BE DONE ON THE MARGINS OF
UNGA IN ITS CAPACITY AS A UNSC NON-PERMANENT MEMBER, OR
IN MORE PRIVATE, BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
IRANIANS. KEY POINTS WE WOULD LIKE CROATIA TO MAKE
INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME
RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE RESPONDING TO THE
LAWFUL REQUESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR
GREATER TRANSPARENCY INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM,
CONSISTENT WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
INCREASE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ECONOMY.


30. (U) POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT ANY SUBSTANTIVE
RESPONSES WITH 7 BUSINESS DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS CABLE.
RISA MONGIELLO (ISN/RA, 202-736-4730),MICHAEL BEDKE
(ISN/RA, 202-736-4686) AND BRECK HEIDLBERG (ISN/RA, 202-
647-6599) ARE THE DEPARTMENT'S POCS FOR THIS ACTIVITY.


31. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CLINTON