CFE: A/S GOTTEMOELLER'S INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 092527

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2014
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL NATO
SUBJECT: CFE: A/S GOTTEMOELLER'S INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH
DIRECTOR ANTONOV ON SEPTEMBER 3

Classified By: Richard Davis, Office Director, VCI/CCA, for
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: An extended "informal" discussion of CFE
Treaty issues between VCI Assistant Secretary Rose
Gottemoeller and Russian Disarmament Director Anatoliy
Antonov in Geneva September 3 revealed some common ground
regarding basic concepts for potential provisional
application, trial implementation, and ratification of
Adapted CFE, but also highlighted Russia's determination to
eliminate the flank limits as they apply to Russia.
Gottemoeller outlined new, informal U.S. ideas on the
possibility of a timeline for ratification and trial
implementation of Adapted CFE; the Russian side suggested
conditions under which they thought provisional application
of Adapted CFE should be possible. But these areas of common
concern and mutual brainstorming were eclipsed in the meeting
by Antonov's message on the flank. He said unambiguously
that a CFE "package deal" that created the conditions for
ratification of Adapted CFE by all Treaty parties would have
to eliminate the flank limits for Russia, in order to be
acceptable in Moscow. Gottemoeller stressed the importance
of the flank regime to NATO Allies and warned that unless we
employed "constructive ambiguity" to find a way forward, we
could lose CFE. The meeting concluded with Russia
reiterating an earlier call for a formal U.S.-Russia session
during the week of September 21; Gottemoeller made no
commitment, in light of the need for consultations in
Washington and with Allies. End summary.

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Ratification and Implementation -- Some common ground
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2. (SBU) VCI A/S Rose Gottemoeller and Russian Disarmament
Director Anatoliy Antonov held a three-hour "informal"
discussion of CFE Treaty issues at the Russian mission in
Geneva September 3. Gottemoeller and NSC Director Anita
Friedt stressed the Obama Administration's readiness to think
creatively to find a way forward on CFE and welcomed Russia's
stated readiness, in its aide-memoire, to work on the basis
of U.S.-drafted parallel actions package.


3. (SBU) Gottemoeller said she recognized that Russia wanted
certainty about Allies' willingness to ratify Adapted CFE.
She noted that Allies would not be able to ratify the Adapted
Treaty unless Russia was implementing CFE: we needed to find
a way ahead on these two issues simultaneously. Gottemoeller
observed that Russia's aide-memoire of May 2009 on CFE, and
the questions they had posed in capitals in July regarding
possibilities for trial implementation or provisional
application of Adapted CFE, had suggested a possible way
forward.


4. (U) Before Gottemoeller could lay out her full concept,
Antonov took the floor to raise again the question of
provisional application. Why, he asked, couldn't the U.S.
agree to provisional application of Adapted CFE, as we had
done in 1992, when the original Treaty came into force.
Gottemoeller said that it would be impossible for the U.S. to
provisionally apply the Treaty before the Senate had given
its consent. The U.S. team explained that in the 1992
context, the Senate had already given advice and consent to
the Treaty. Antonov built on that, elaborating an idea he
had voiced to Gottemoeller privately: could the U.S. and
Allies agree to provisionally apply the Adapted Treaty if a
large majority of key states had actually ratified? "What if
perhaps 25 (of 30) states had ratified, including the U.S.?
Would provisional application then be possible?" The U.S.
team responded that it might well be possible in a
circumstance where the Senate had already acted and all that
remained was for a few treaty parties to complete their
domestic procedures.


5. (C) Gottemoeller said the key, however, was to get to the
point where the U.S. and Allies were in a position to ratify.
Allies could not ratify unless Russia resumed implementation
of CFE. She suggested that in the context of agreement
between Russia and NATO on the issues in the parallel actions
package, the U.S. could consider committing to complete
ratification in a specific timeframe, just as had been done

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in the 1996 Flank Document, while Russia agreed to resume
implementation of CFE for the same time frame. At the end of
that period, the parties would convene an Extraordinary
Conference to address questions relating to the future of the
Treaty. If all CFE states had ratified and the Adapted
Treaty had entered into force by the time of the
Extraordinary Conference, we could begin the process of
considering further updates; if not all CFE states had
ratified, we would need to consider whether provisional
application was possible, or whether other steps were
necessary. Gottemoeller stressed that this was at this stage
an informal idea; if Russia was interested we would raise it
with Allies and discuss it formally in Washington.


6. (C) In response, Antonov initially rejoined that this was
another U.S. proposal of "actions for promises." Russia
would start implementing, and the U.S. would "consider"
ratification. He inveighed against any notion that Russia
would ever resume implementation of the current/current CFE
Treaty, which he described as a Cold War relic that
disadvantaged Russia. Gottemoeller explained that the U.S.
and all CFE states had long since agreed that the original
Treaty needed to be updated; this was why we had agreed on
the Adapted CFE Treaty. There was no reason why we could not
consider trial implementation of the Adapted -- vice the
current -- CFE Treaty. All of the Adapted Treaty's
provisions -- limitations, verification, and information --
were important, but in a trial period, we might be able to
focus on those that were operational, such as the
verification and data exchange provisions. She said that
this would place a significant burden on those nations that
were already implementing the current Treaty, since they
would have extra work. But if Russia was interested, this
was something we would consider. Somewhat mollified, Antonov
agreed that Russia wanted assurance about NATO's commitment
to ratification. He did not express opposition to the idea
of trial implementation. CFE expert Anton Mazur asked
specifically what provisions of Adapted CFE we would envision
implementing on a trial basis. Data and inspections, but not
limitations?


7. (SBU) Gottemoeller responded that the list of specific
measures to be implemented would need to be negotiated; it
was not set in stone. The idea was trial implementation of
agreed provisions for a specified period, during which
nations would ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. Depending on
what had been achieved by the end of that period, entry into
force or provisional application might follow.

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"It's not enough..."
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8. (U) Antonov expressed thanks for this U.S. thinking, then
said simply "it's not enough. Ratification of Adapted CFE
may have been enough at one point, but it is not enough now.
Russia's concerns need to be addressed ... the flank
sublimits that restrict where Russia can locate forces on its
own territory must be abolished." With interjections from
MOD CFE expert General Buzhinskiy, Antonov recounted the very
strong views held by Prime Minister Putin regarding the flank
limits.


9. (U) Gottemoeller responded that Russia was not the only
nation that had strong views regarding the flank limits:
these were critically important for a number of NATO Allies.
This was an issue we could return to once the Adapted Treaty
was in force, but if Russia insisted on abolition of the
flank for Russia at this stage, that would be very
problematic. Acknowledging the political importance of the
flank limits for the U.S., because they are important to NATO
Allies, Antonov pressed Gottemoeller to explain why the flank
limits were essential for the U.S. from a military
perspective.


10. (C) Gottemoeller said that Turkey and others in the
region regard those limits as the core of the Treaty; those
concerns had been heightened by events in Georgia in 2008.
Buzhinskiy interjected that it was precisely because of
Georgia that Russia could no longer tolerate the flank limits
-- Russia needed to be prepared to defend its people and its
friends. (Comment: in fact, Russia's military actions in
Georgia in 2008 were not significantly restricted by the
flank regime. Most of the hardware that Russia used in the
conflict came from within the CFE flank zone. The CFE flank
limits in the Adapted Treaty -- the only flank limits Russia

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has referenced as legitimate at any point since 1999 --
provide Russia with vastly more flexibility in the key
equipment category (ACVs) than the original Treaty. End
comment.)

11. (U) Gottemoeller said it was essential to handle this
issue sensitively if we wanted to reach agreement on a
package that would preserve the benefits of CFE. All parties
would need to exercise a measure of "constructive ambiguity."
Russia's concerns need to be accommodated, Antonov insisted.
Gottemoeller countered that Antonov should be patient and
consider carefully whether there were issues we could use as
ice breakers which would enable us to reach agreement on a
package that preserves the Treaty and permits its further
development.

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Other Issues
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12. (U) Several other elements of the parallel actions
package were discussed in the course of the three-hour
meeting and subsequent lunch:
-- Substantial combat forces: Antonov pushed hard for
immediate discussion of a specific definition of the phrase
"substantial combat forces:" he suggested that this might
take place in Vienna at the JCG, or elsewhere. EUR/RPM
Deputy Director Jennifer Laurendeau responded that while the
U.S. was open to discussing this issue, the phrase was
contained in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This was an issue
involving NATO and Russia; it was not a CFE (or JCG) issue,
but had been included in the parallel actions package because
Russia had said this was important. Antonov agreed that it
was important, and urged that it be discussed, anywhere,
between the U.S. and Russia or NATO and Russia. Buzhinskiy
interjected that it was a CFE issue, since CFE is at the core
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The U.S. observed that
commitments contained in the Founding Act had been predicated
on the existence of a viable CFE Treaty.

-- Moldova: Antonov suggested (comment: more mischieviously
than seriously) that the March 18 statement by Medvedev,
Voronin, and Smirnov on the Transnistria conflict obviated
the need to address withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova
in the CFE context. Gottmoeller observed that there was a
lot of common ground between Russia and the U.S. on the
Moldova section of the parallel actions package, but that the
devil was in the details.

-- Georgia: In a brief exchange over lunch, Laurendeau
suggested that stabilizing measures relevant to the region
(the context included Georgia and the flank) should be
calibrated to address the obvious sources of security unease
or concern: military equipment and personnel, military
facilities (e.g., Georgia's concerns about Russian facilities
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia),and generalized military
transparency. Mazur observed that a regime for observation
visits could address many of these issues at the same time.
Buzhinskiy said that all these issues could be discussed.
Antonov then discouraged further conversation without
opposing any of these comments.

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Next Steps
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13. (U) Antonov urged that Gottemoeller and he meet in a
formal session on CFE during the week of September 21. He
also asked whether she envisioned moving quickly on an
expanded meeting that would include Allies, as had been
previously discussed. Gottemoeller said she thought options
should be discussed for further meetings, including
U.S.-Russian bilateral meetings and meetings involving
Russia, the U.S. and a small group of interested Allies.
Discussion was needed, but she did not commit to Antonov's
proposed timeline. He asked that the U.S. be prepared to
address substantial combat forces and the U.S. political and
military rationale for retaining the flank at the next
meeting. It was understood that they would need to return to
Moldova and Georgia.


14. (U) Meeting Participants: In addition to A/S
Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov, participants in the
meeting included:

U.S.
NSCS - Anita Friedt

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VCI/CCA - Richard Davis
EUR/RPM - Jennifer Laurendeau

Russia
MFA - Anton Mazur
MOD - Yevgeny Buzhinskiy, Yevgeny Ilin
FSB - Vladimir Venevtsev
CLINTON